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Abstract: 
 
This thesis examines the lives of a group of young middle-class Egyptian men who experience 
a mismatch between their aspirations and their chances of realising them. It analyses the 
historical emergence of an under-recognised ‘falling’ middle-class in contemporary Egypt, by 
comparing their relative fall with another middle-class population which has experienced a 
dramatic rise in wealth and status in the aftermath of neoliberal economic change. I contribute 
to literature examining the rise of the middle-classes across the Global South in recent years. 
First, I reveal the importance of historically-owned rural land, cultural privilege, the legal and 
political remnants of state socialism, and international migration in the socio-economic rise of 
an Egyptian middle-class. Second, I move away from a predominant focus on consumption, 
and instead highlight how educational markers, and ‘character’ differences enable the exercise 
of a new form of ‘open-minded’ middle-class distinction. But finally, I challenge existing 
literature by uncovering the emergence of an alternative, less-celebratory middle-class in the 
late-20th and early-21st century, one which has experienced relative decline as the public sector 
jobs, education, and subsidies they relied on to forge their middle-class lives have been stripped 
away.  
The rest of the thesis uses eleven months of ethnographic fieldwork stretched over two years 
to delve into the lives of a group of young men in this falling middle-class category as they 
attempt to make the transition from education to ‘aspired to’ employment. It first establishes 
the existence of a rupture in the Bourdieu-like congruence between their aspirations for a 
globalised middle-class life, and their ability to reach it. The three main empirical chapters 
analyse the consequences of this ‘mismatch.’ By applying affect theory to the study of class 
immobility, I recast existing understandings of how people navigate conditions of ‘waithood,’ 
in particular through reintroducing a focus on stability and power. I argue that these young men 
survive their classed and aged immobility through forming a ‘cruel attachment’ to a discursive 
and material terrain of Egyptianised meritocracy that affects them with hope for the future. 
This terrain was continuously extended by certain labour market industries and institutions, 
such as training centres, recruitment agencies, and an entrepreneurship ‘scene,’ that constituted 
part of Cairo’s ‘hopeful city.’ The thesis therefore demonstrates how Egypt’s capitalist-
authoritarian regime also survives, securing the compliance of young middle-class men, despite 
denying them access to respectable middle-class living, by continually regurgitating a hopeful 
promise of future fulfilment. 
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Glossary of key Arabic terms 
 
Note on transliteration 
The ways in which Arabic is reproduced in Latin script vary greatly, and the systems preferred 
by Western scholars are different from those used by most Arabic speakers for practical 
purposes. For names, the spelling used by the persons themselves or otherwise current in use 
is preferred. For other Arabic terms, the rules of the International Journal of Middle East 
Studies are used. 
 
Kullyāt al shaʿb – faculties of the people 
Istaqrār – stability 
Al-ṭabaqa al-mutawasiṭa al-‘alya – upper-middle class 
Shaʿby – a term that has come to connote the lower-classes in contemporary Egypt 
Rāqy – classy 
Min ghīr al ’amal mafīsh ḥayāt – without hope there is no life 
Auwwil ṭabaqa al-mutawasiṭa – lower-middle class 
Ibn al-nass’ – son of the people 
Qabr l’al shaʿb – tomb for the youth 
Ikti’āb – depression 
Wasta – nepotism  
Salūq al-shakhṣ’ – attitude of the individual 
Yiṭawwar nafsuh – to develop oneself 
Yistaslim – to surrender 
Balad bint al-wisskhr – daughter of a whore country 
Law kān al-nil salsa, makuntsh koft al-kusa illy f’ Masr – if the Nile was salsa, there would not 
be enough with which to cook all the zucchini (nepotism) that is in Egypt.  
La illaha illa anta sabhanak iny kunt min elzalemiyyn – none has the right to be worshipped by 
You (Allah), Glorified are You. Truly, I have been of the wrong-doers 
Mukāfeḥ – struggler  
Lāzim ta‘mil illy aliyyk, we rabina heya‘mil al bāqy – you need to do what you are supposed 
to do, and God will do the rest 
Mashyeen fe dowama – walking in a whirlpool 
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Chapter 1 Introduction: Hope, meritocracy, and the 
middle-classes in contemporary Egypt 
 
On a typically hot evening in the summer of 2015, Gamal and I were walking along Qasr al-
Nil Bridge towards Tahrir Square in the centre of Cairo. Gamal graduated five years ago from 
Cairo University’s Faculty of Law. Once a prestigious faculty producing some of Egypt’s 
highest-ranking judges, in recent years it has become colloquially known as one of the ‘kullyāt 
 al shaʿb’ (faculties of the people), due to its ever-increasing volume of students and the low-
quality education it offers. Many of these graduates can now be found, not in the law courts, 
but working as taxi-drivers or serving shawarma sandwiches in the city. Gamal, like many of 
his friends, did not want that life. He dreamt of escaping his lower/lower-middle class 
neighbourhood and inhabiting another kind of city. He imagined himself working as an 
international trade lawyer in the glamorous Nile City towers, a modern office block on the 
banks of the Nile, living in one of the newly-built gated communities on the outskirts of the 
city, and eventually moving abroad to work in London.  
 
For the last few years Gamal has been working hard to make this dream a reality, developing 
his English, reading extensively about international trade law, taking courses in CV writing 
and interview techniques, and obtaining relevant work experience. He has repeatedly been told, 
by course trainers and people who were working in good jobs, that he would make it if he just 
improved his English, made the right connections, or gained some experience. For eleven 
months from the middle of 2014, I had been following Gamal and others like him around the 
city, as he attended a ‘soft skills’ course, went to a scholarship fair, submitted his CV to 
prestigious law firms, and sat in cafés drinking tea and talking about his ideal future. But by 
the summer of 2015 Gamal was a long way from realising his dream. Over the years he had 
experienced many false starts, holding three different unpaid positions in small law firms 
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before leaving due to the broken promises of a forthcoming salary. Each time he thought he 
was on the cusp of success, it proved to be an illusion. These disappointments brought forth 
much anguish for Gamal, which manifested in long rails against corruption in the labour 
market, and the decrepit state of Egypt’s economy. However, despite calls from his parents to 
give up and take a job in his local neighbourhood, Gamal would not. He could not. After 
meeting me to complain about his situation, Gamal would quickly move on to his next attempt. 
As we were walking along the bridge, he excitedly told me about how an internet search had 
identified an international law course in England. He would apply the next day. 
 
Our conversation was interrupted when we came across a group of young men staring 
anxiously into the water below. We were informed that an old man had just jumped. We stood 
looking out over the edge trying to spot him as someone called the police, but we were told 
that the body had disappeared. After waiting a few minutes Gamal suggested we walk on. I 
said it was sad to think of someone being driven to kill themselves. “Of course it is sad,” he 
replied, “but I think it is weak, to do something like that is giving up, you have to withstand 
the tough circumstances, like I am doing.” Gamal assumed the man had jumped because he 
was not able to tolerate Egypt’s difficult labour market. I replied that I knew of young men, 
like Gamal, who had talked of suicide due to these difficulties. “But they can find a job!” he 
responded in shock, “then move out and rent a flat, they just need independence, like me. They 
will make it…you know there is a phrase in Egypt, “the journey of 1000 miles starts with a 
single step,” you just have to take that step and keep going. You need to be positive, you need 
to keep hope.” 
 
In this same spot four and a half years previously, nearly 1000 Egyptians, mostly men, died at 
the hands of Egypt’s security forces as millions marched to demand an end to the 30 year rule 
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of Hosni Mubarak. A few also attempted to emulate Mohamed Bouazizi’s act of self-
immolation in Tunisia that had originally sparked the region’s wave of uprisings. Egyptians 
generally recall with great fondness and nostalgia the feeling they felt during those days. It was 
a feeling of hope, a feeling that their country, and thereby their own lives were once again 
moving towards a fulfilling future. This hope famously demanded ‘‘aīsh, hurriyya, w’ ‘adāla 
igtimā‘iyya’ (bread, freedom, and social justice), the overhaul of a system which was denying 
access to a dignified life to so many. Those who died were held up as martyrs (al-shuhadā’) 
who had sacrificed themselves for the security of that hope. Almost five years on, Gamal’s 
interpretation of another who died in the same place was quite different. His was not an act of 
defiance against an unjust system, but an act of weakness. He had been blamed for refusing to 
hope, to persevere with the belief that his efforts would be compensated within Egypt’s current 
economic landscape. Instead it was Gamal’s stoicism and refusal to give up hope in the face of 
difficulty that secured respect. 
 
This thesis uses eleven months of ethnographic field stretched over 2 years to document and 
interpret the attempts of young men like Gamal to lead a good life in contemporary Egypt. 
Gamal belongs to part of a young Egyptian middle-class, whose sense of frustration at their 
inability to do just that was seen as a major stimulus for the Uprising (Bayat, 2011; Kandil, 
2012). In the run up to 2011, the country witnessed intensified political repression, the 
entrenchment of corruption, a declining quality of public services, and rising levels of poverty, 
inequality, and unemployment. Whilst some Egyptians accrued vast amounts of wealth aided 
by late-twentieth century neoliberal reforms – symbolised by the exclusive gated communities, 
glitzy shopping malls, securitised office blocks, and expensive private educational institutions 
that have sprung up in Cairo in recent years – the majority have been pushed into conditions 
resembling poverty. Many in Egypt’s young middle-class struggled to acquire the stable office 
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job, good quality education, and housing they rely on to forge their adult middle-class lives. 
Instead they have been forced into low-paid, low-status, insecure employment, and to reside in 
overcrowded informal neighbourhoods.  
 
This stagnant middle-class has been under-researched in Egyptian scholarship. The aim of this 
thesis is to shed light on the lives of its members, whose plight reflects that of many around the 
world. Scholars across the social sciences have asserted the widespread rupturing among 
various groups, especially youth, of the teleological imperative to live out the present in 
expectation of future progress (Miyazaki, 2004; Jackson, 2011). The Bourdieu-like congruence 
between people’s aspirations for independent adulthood, a certain class lifestyle, and 
respectable masculinity or femininity, and their objective chances of realising them is being 
broken down as capitalist regimes fail to deliver dignified work, education, and housing to 
many. Instead, huge numbers, and no longer only those traditionally recognised as ‘outcasts,’ 
have entered an ‘impasse’ (Berlant 2011), prolonged periods of ‘waithood’ (Honwana, 2012), 
and faced ‘abjection’ (Ferguson, 1999; Anand, 2012), from the ability to build a ‘good life.’ In 
this thesis, I address the following research questions: 
 
 What happens when a mismatch between classed aspirations and chances develops 
within young middle-class men in Egypt?  
 What constitutes their lived experience of middle-class immobility? 
 
For this, I depart from mainstream sociological approaches to understanding classed, aged, and 
gendered immobility, and turn attention to affect and emotion. Some scholars have posited that 
a feeling of hope, a vital presence for individualised projects of class, gender, and age, is being 
replaced by frustration, fear, and disenchantment among stagnant populations across the world 
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(Hage, 2003; Hochschild, 2016). These emotions can also be channelled politically in various 
ways. According to some, it was personalised frustrations stemming from middle-class 
immobility that were channelled into the wave of right-wing, racially-infused narratives which 
brought about Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and the success of Turkey’s Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan in recent years (Hochschild, 2016; Müller, 2017). Other scholars are attempting to 
locate acts of resistance emerging out of hamstrung frustration that represent more progressive 
‘spaces of hope’ (Harvey, 2000). These are found in a plethora of protest movements, alongside 
more mundane acts of defiance that signify resistance to punitive capitalist regimes, as well as 
the possible emergence of alternative, and more just socio-economic arrangements. Egypt’s 
uprising, centred on Tahrir Square, was projected to be one such place of utopian hope 
(Gregory, 2013), initiated, in part, by a frustrated middle-class (Bayat, 2011). The events 
literally provided the space for the conception of radical alternative socio-economic orders and 
relations, recreating for millions of Egyptians a sense of hope for a good future that had been 
lost (Mittermaier, 2014). Yet the revolutionary period was brief. Though protests and 
occupations lasted for two years after 2011, spending time with young middle-class men like 
Gamal more than four years after the uprising, the kind of hope it had induced felt remote. 
Though Gamal had attended protests in early 2011 as a university student, he was now relying 
on very different registers of hope, the kind that – in his words – turns martyrs into cowards.  
 
Revolutions are truly exceptional moments. When protests cease, most people return to what 
they had been doing before, trying to get a good job and afford a fulfilling lifestyle for 
themselves and their families. The inability to do this had led to the events of 2011. And for 
many Egyptians, economic stagnation, political instability, and the return of authoritarian 
government has only made this task harder since. If 2011-13 offered a glimpse of radical hope 
for them, I wanted to understand how young middle-class men were holding on to a vital sense 
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of hope for a good future in post-revolutionary, or ‘normal’ times when my research began in 
the summer of 2014. I was interested in the registers, languages, and daily enactments of hope 
on to which they hold as they struggle to obtain a respectable middle-class job, afford a 
desirable lifestyle, get married, and raise a family.  
 
Despite what is yearned for by many scholars, most Egyptians are not engaged in resistance at 
present. The overwhelming trend remains one of stability, not transformation. Indeed, Samuli 
Schielke (2016) recently argued that stability, ‘istaqrār’ in Arabic, is a post-revolutionary 
aspiration among ordinary Egyptians. Yet, personal growth is inherent to his definition of 
‘stability.’ I want to therefore tackle a further research question: 
 
 How is ‘stability’ maintained when many are still being denied movement towards their 
classed, gendered, and aged dreams? 
 
In doing so, my key contribution is uncovering a much quieter, but more pervasive and 
powerful meritocratic revolution that has been taking place in Egypt, and specifically within 
Cairo’s global city, in recent decades. This revolution establishes the individual as the 
determinant of success and failure, and promises the fulfilment of dreams to all. It is this 
revolution that provides hope to young middle-class Egyptians in their daily lives, and 
perpetually staves off frustration arising from their immobility. Thus, ultimately I want to argue 
that, whilst producing populations who cannot achieve a ‘good life,’ Egypt’s capitalist regime 
secures compliance by offering up the possibility and promise that it will come. By making 
this argument, and turning attention to affect and emotion, I want to contribute new 
understandings to the lived experience of class in Egypt, and class immobility specifically. I 
also want to reveal a new dimension of the way people cope in periods of waithood, in Egypt 
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and beyond, as well as to the way capitalist-authoritarian regimes survive despite pushing 
millions into deprivation. 
 
This opening chapter provides a context, overviews existing literature, asks some key research 
questions, and establishes a conceptual framework through which those questions will be 
answered. It begins by challenging the hopeful narrative of a rising middle-class across the 
Global South, by using a Bourdieu-inspired approach to class to explicating the emergence of 
alternative, less-celebratory middle-classes who have faced decline in the early 21st century. I 
then introduce one such middle-class group in Egypt. Thereafter, the chapter sets out a 
conceptual framework for approaching the lives of people who experience classed, aged, and 
gendered immobility and waithood. I depart from the social theory of Pierre Bourdieu, and 
instead turn to work on affect and emotion, which helps explain how contemporary class 
immobility is lived through a loss of a vital feeling of hope. I then critique studies that focus 
on either the potential for resistance to develop, or the adaptive capacity of the structurally 
disenfranchised. I instead call for more attention to the objects, places, and discourses that 
induce particular emotions, and finish by arguing that a discursive and material terrain of 
meritocracy might be affecting people who are being pushed into conditions of waithood with 
perpetual hope.  
 
March of the global middle class? 
 
Before 2011, Egypt had been projected as a place of hope by development institutions (AfDB, 
2011). Not only was economic growth strong, it was also an important signifier for what has 
been advertised by development organisations, global consultancy firms, the media, and parts 
of academia as the surge of a new middle class across the Global South over the last 30 years. 
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Whilst the middle classes in the Global North has been widely understood to be experiencing 
decline, much quantitative research has pointed to a huge expansion of a population in the 
Global South which is enjoying incomes and spending power lifting it out of established 
boundaries of poverty, towards ‘secure’ and ‘comfortable’ living (Banerjee and Duflo, 2008; 
Ravallion, 2009; Birdsall, 2010; Ncube & Lufumpa, 2014).1 This middle-class subject is 
defined as urban, holding a ‘secure job,’ enjoying a higher disposable income which can be 
spent on higher quality – often private – education and healthcare as well as ‘modern,’ ‘world-
class’ commodities (such as refrigerators, telephones, TVs, and cars), and possessing an ability 
to aspire and plan for future prosperity for them and their family (Das, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 1.1 - Illustration depicting the rising middle-class (Source: The Christian Science Monitor, 2011) 
 
                                                          
1 Defining its entrants has predominantly been based on different numerical measures of relative or absolute 
income, or spending power and patterns. 
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According to a 2011 OECD report, this ‘new middle-class’ – defined as those who spend or 
earn between $10-$100 per day – will grow from 1.8 billion to 4.9 billion between 2009 and 
2030, to over half of the world’s population (Kharas, 2010). The majority of this growth will 
be in China and India, however it was also projected to grow significantly elsewhere too. The 
Middle East and North African middle-class was expected to rise from 105 million (33% of 
the population) to 238 million (54%) over the same period. Egypt in this report was established 
as a key growth area. The German Development Institute concluded that Egypt’s middle-class, 
defined again as those who spend between $10-$100 per day, increased by a factor of four from 
1990 to 2010 (to around 25% of the population, Brandi & Buge, 2014). The African 
Development Bank (2011), using an alternative definition of people who spend $4-$20 per day, 
stated that a rising Egyptian middle class reached 31.6% by 2010. This figure increased to an 
incredible 79.7% if what the AfDB defined as the ‘vulnerable, floating middle’ (those who 
spend $2-$4 per day) was included. 
 
These were figures and projections to be celebrated. The explosion of the middle was held up 
as a sign that previously ‘provincial’ countries and peoples were leaving the “waiting room of 
history” (Chakrabarty, 2000: 8), and finally enjoying the wealth and modernisation that 
globalisation, development, and economic liberalisation promised to bring. It was proof that 
wealth is ‘trickling down’ (Deloitte, 2012), and that economic growth was ‘sustainable’ and 
‘inclusive’ (Das, 2010). It marked the end of a ‘twin peaks’ world (Quah, 1996). Looking into 
the future, this population was projected to drive economic growth further through their 
consumption, and to promote liberal democratic and market values – an aversion to corruption, 
promotion of private property rights, entrepreneurship, and meritocracy – that will help solidify 
democracy and reduce ‘distributional conflict’ (Weitzke & Sumner, 2014), an expectation 
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apparently vindicated by the supposed progressive role played by the middle classes in Europe 
(Glassman, 1995; Ziblatt, 2006). 
 
This was an intensely hopeful story, both for the people and the countries on the march towards 
modernity and progress. But the events of 2011, at least in the Arab World, punctured this 
narrative. Development institutions, the media, and researchers now posit that “middle-class 
frustration fuelled the Arab Spring” (see Kandil, 2012; Zayed, 2014).2 This ‘awakening’ has 
been projected as the manifestation of the democratic demands of a rising middle-class, but 
new economic measurements reveal an alternative story. A 2015 World Bank report concluded 
that Egypt’s middle-class shrank in the years preceding 2011. Defining it as those who receive 
an income of more than $4.9 per day in 2005 terms, it plots that the middle-class declined from 
14.3% to 9.8% between the mid-2000s and the end of the decade, while the number of poor 
grew over the same period (see Ghanem, 2013). The same report also points to a decline in 
“happiness levels” among the middle-classes, not only in Egypt but across the Arab world, due 
to deteriorating living standards, the quality of public services, high unemployment, and 
governance issues (Ianchovichina et al. 2015: 7).  
 
These new accounts, which were only instigated by an event rendering broad discontent visible, 
usefully serve to highlight the politicised nature of previous celebrations. The projection of a 
large middle is utilised as a signifier of healthy and just socio-economic arrangements that are 
benefiting broader populations, not only a few at the top. From a Marxist perspective, the 
middle-class is inherently a construction that, as Slavoj Žižek (2010) has argued, attempts to 
disavow distributional conflict by negating the tensions between capital and labour, by 
establishing a group which resides in between. Thus, for those vested in those arrangements, 
                                                          
2 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/10/21/middle-class-frustration-that-fueled-the-arab-spring 
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projecting a coherent, expanding middle legitimises their project, and in this case a global 
project of economic liberalisation (Heiman et al. 2012).  It is both a vindication of the present, 
and a projection of hope for a future development course that raises the masses along with it. 
Yet, in the aftermath of Egypt’s Uprising, this narrative no longer made sense. The middle-
class, instead of rising, was falling. And the distance between them and the rich was increasing.  
 
Echoing new understandings of the Egyptian context, rival quantitative analysis has exposed 
some of the fissures within this celebratory narrative globally. Ravallion (2009) for example 
posits that only 95 million of the extra 1.2 billion who supposedly entered the middle-class in 
recent years joined the ‘upper stratum’ (PPP$13 per day spending), equating to just 4.3% of 
his calculated middle-class population of 2.6 billion. Similarly, Nancy Birdsall (2010) posits 
that the ‘secure middle-class and rich’ (those who spend above PPP$10 per day) only make up 
8.3% of the Global South’s population, far below the projections of the OECD report. They, 
along with others, demonstrate the emergence of a ‘new middle-class’ that is, for the most part, 
living in insecure conditions and therefore vulnerable to sliding back into poverty – according 
to their economic definition (Banerjee & Duflo, 2008; Weitzke & Sumner, 2014; Kochhar, 
2015). Birdsall et al. (2013) also demonstrate how absolute income gains for the middle-class’ 
upper-strata are actually rising at a faster rate than those in the lower-strata. The number of 
people living the ‘secure’ middle class life defined by Das (2010) is exposed to be extremely 
small. Furthermore, that population is pulling away from the rest.3 
 
Despite reservations, these studies still largely reaffirm a story of populations on the rise, even 
if that rise might be precarious and unevenly distributed. An alternative, much less hopeful 
                                                          
3 Estimates of the size of any middle class are perhaps superfluous – quantitative analyses are plagued by 
problems of differing definitions, data inaccuracies, and manipulation that can produce contrasting stories – as 
in the case of Egypt. Yet, this analysis begins to disrupt the celebrations. 
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story arises when wealth is measured, which is important as it provides a window into the 
ability of populations to afford traditional markers of a middle-class life, such as housing, 
education, and accumulation of property and other assets. Credit Suisse’s 2015 Annual Global 
Wealth Report found that there has been a decline in middle-class wealth in every region of the 
Globe except China since 2000. The distribution of wealth gains has shifted almost universally 
in favour of those at higher wealth levels. This report reveals that Egypt’s middle-class (those 
holding between US$$14,544 and US$$145,440) – which it registers to be only 5% of the 
population – was halved between 2000 and 2015. What was left of the middle lost US$ 7 billion 
during that period, while those above (0.4% of the population) gained US$ 72 billion. This is 
a damning analysis, and it maps on to Thomas Piketty’s (2013) own analysis, which 
demonstrates how all but 1% of the world’s population has seen real wealth fall or stagnate 
since the mid-20th century.4 It disrupts the hopeful narrative of the last 30 years being a period 
to celebrate. Piketty’s work in particular has provided fresh impetus and public exposure to the 
study of the inequalities that have been produced in the aftermath of rapid market liberalisation 
and state retrenchment (Atkinson, 2015; Boushey et al. 2017). Emergent quantitative research 
is now challenging the projection of a large, coherent, growing, and rising middle-class across 
the Global South. Yet the next section discusses how this is not yet reflected in qualitative 
work, which adds an integral processual dimension to understanding the life of the middle-
classes. 
 
Middle-class outcasts of 21st century cities 
 
There are many populations that do not reflect the hope projected within the global middle-
class discourse. Recent economic, political, and environmental arrangements have seen 
                                                          
4 For evidence of these trends in the Middle East see Alvaredo & Piketty (2014).  
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millions pushed into acute social and economic deprivation, with people being thrown off the 
land they had once dwelled on, into precarious dwellings or homelessness (Davis, 2006; 
Ghertner, 2015), and many more being pushed into insecure employment or unemployment as 
growth concentrates in capital-intensive industries and social welfare is stripped away 
(Ferguson, 1999 & 2013; Standing, 2011; Sassen, 2014). Furthermore, millions are being 
pushed into refugee camps, into prison, and into protracted conflict around the world. But, 
research highlighting the destructive effects of capitalist arrangements has overwhelmingly 
gravitated towards the poor.  
 
In terms of the middle-class, whilst there is growing recognition of those facing stagnation and 
decline in the Global North (Hage, 2003; Garfinkle, 2006; Heiman, 2015; Hochschild, 2016), 
the vast majority of research in the Global South remains wedded to the narrative of a ‘middle-
class’ on the rise.5 This has taken the form of numerous contextual studies examining groups 
– labelled as middle-class by authors as a result of both conceptual and vernacular 
understandings of class – that have benefited from recent economic transformations.6 Rather 
than only measuring wealth or income gains, these studies necessarily reintroduce the complex 
theorizations of social class developed over 150 years of scholarship since the writings of Karl 
Marx (Joyce, 1995). What it means to live a middle-class life, and within any class, is not 
reducible to a certain income level or amount of wealth. Marx himself differentiated between 
workers and capitalists, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, according to their contrasting 
positions in the capitalist mode of production. The bourgeoisie own the means of production, 
and extract value from those (the workers) who make commodities. Marx (1997) saw that the 
workers would develop a common ‘class’ identity out of their labour, in relation to those who 
                                                          
5 There is even some speculation that that these contrasting fortunes are linked through the flight of industry 
from Global North to South (Birdsall, 2010).   
6 Caldiera, 2001 (Brazil); Fernandes, 2006 (India); Zhang, 2010 & Pow, 2009 (China); de Koning, 2009 
(Egypt); Liechty, 2003 (Nepal); Cohen, 2004 (Morocco); Sloane, 1999 (Malaysia); Mercer, 2014 (Tanzania). 
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extract value from them. Viewing one’s employment as the predominant means through which 
people understand their class position remains a dominant approach in sociological work 
(Wright, 1976). Yet, the emergence of different types of labour (white and blue collar) long 
ago began to complicate a definitive division between labour and capital.  
 
Max Weber, writing in an early 20th century context when overt struggles between labour and 
capital had begun to wane, the European and American ‘middle-classes’ were growing rapidly, 
and a new mass-production-based consumer society was emerging (Slater, 1997), moved away 
from a Marxist focus on material relations, and instead introduced cultural power as an 
important element to understanding social class. He introduced the notion of social status 
(honour or prestige), which stems from the consumption of goods and services in the market 
(Weber, 1946). He saw that the new ‘middle-classes’ in Europe and the US, though they did 
not own the means of production, were being offered access to other forms of property, such 
as consumer goods, cars, and private homes. They were also one step removed from the 
‘vulgarity’ of production processes through their engagement in tertiary labour (as 
professionals, bureaucrats, teachers, retail entrepreneurs, independent artisans). This enabled 
the assertion of ‘honour’ in relation to both the working classes and the bourgeoisie, stemming 
from one’s lifestyle: education, training, socialisation, material culture, and inherited or 
occupational prestige (Mills, 1951). 
 
Weber noted high correlations between one’s class (economic) standing, and one’s status, but 
he never explicitly laid out a mechanism theorising the links between cultural power and 
material or economic power. Both Marxist and Weberian conceptions of class were restricted 
by static categorisations and dualistic structural oppositions. In the late 20th century, there were 
various efforts to ‘processualise class,’ to theorise class as an ongoing cultural project and 
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practice (Thompson, 1991). The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu represented one particularly 
influential attempt. Bourdieu posited that one’s class position stems from the interrelated make 
up of cultural, social, and economic capital, where each can be ‘converted’ into the other. 
Bourdieu defines cultural capital in three forms: institutionalised (educational certificates or 
specialised knowledge), embodied (personality, speech, or skills), and objectified (certain 
belongings such as clothes or art; 1986: 47). Social capital is defined as “useful networks of 
mutual acquaintance,” i.e. who you know (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 119). Relative 
differences in the distribution of economic, social, and cultural capital enable people to achieve 
distinction – when they become legitimised into ‘symbolic capital’ – over others within 
particular fields, which Bourdieu and Wacquant defined as:  
 
“A network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions. These 
positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determination they 
impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential 
situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) 
whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the 
field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, 
subordination, homology, etc.)” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 97). 
 
One’s ability to acquire cultural and social capital is heavily dependent on wealth or income 
(economic capital) – for example to afford an education, or a certain kind of house – but it is 
not reducible to it. They are part of independent schemas that require contextually grounded 
investigation. Bourdieu did not restrict himself to the realm of production or consumption, but 
looked instead to social relations in general arising out of differing conditions of existence 
(Brubaker, 1985). The precise forms of cultural, economic, and social capital required to secure 
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belonging within a particular class are constantly contested, incomplete, and in flux (Wacquant, 
1991; Liechty, 2003). In each context there exist concurrent and competing notions of class 
belonging in continuous struggle with one another. Various actors play a part in the assertion, 
reproduction, and transformation of class boundaries, including the state, educational 
institutions, private companies, the media, as well as populations themselves. These boundaries 
are also heavily inflected by gender, caste, race, age, sexuality, religion, and notions of morality 
(Lamont, 2002; Savage et al. 2008). Asserting belonging is a continually incomplete 
endeavour, in need of reasserting as the standards of membership – the type of commodities or 
education required – and the abilities of people to reach those standards, fluctuate. As Weber 
pointed out long ago, as a result of its in-between position the middle-class is particularly 
dependent upon education, certain commodities, and access to certain jobs for its distinction. 
As a result of boundary fluctuations, the middle-class is an inherently and uniquely insecure 
social position (Wacquant, 1991). 
 
Studies on the middle-classes in the Global South have taken on these European theorisations 
of class, and the middle-class in particular, and applied them when looking at how certain 
groups managed to take advantage of late-20th century neoliberal economic transformations.7 
Utilising changes in urban labour and property markets (privatisation and commodification), 
the expansion of private service provision such as education and health, the proliferation of 
global commodities and consumer culture, as well as culturally and historically-specific 
classed, gendered, sexualised, racial, and religious inequalities, certain groups have managed 
to forge and lay claim to new markers of middle-class belonging (De Angelis 2010; Ellis 2011). 
These studies attempt to combine European understandings of middle class-ness with 
                                                          
7 These changes are not reducible to one uncontested type, but are broadly associated with the spread of market 
relations, retraction of the state, and expansion of the private sector centered on global financial and commercial 
industries (see Sassen, 2001; Harvey, 2005, and Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007, for a broader discussion on 
changes associated with neoliberalism). 
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vernacular definitions, by focusing on distinction in the realms of employment, education, 
consumption, familial life, sociability, and politics (see Lentz, 2015). Though always context-
specific, markers are often associated with the private sector – in terms of employment or 
amenities – and with certain ‘modern,’ globalised forms of consumption. In many cases, these 
new standards have overlain those associated with the middle-classes that were built on the 
“populist, modernist, bureaucratic, state-driven economic policies of mid-20th century states” 
(Heiman et al. 2012: 14). It was certain segments of those ‘old’ middle classes that were able 
to take advantage of neoliberal economic changes. 
 
These middle-classes are understood to be made up of people who, despite often continued 
rural connections and origins (Mercer, 2017), accumulate and spend their wealth in urban areas. 
Thus, the city has provided a vital ‘platform’ for the emergence of these new middle-classes 
(Centner, 2010). A claim to a middle-class life is a claim to a certain kind of city. It has long 
been a site on which certain ideals, values, and modes of living are projected and contested. 
Thus, new middle-class research has discussed how ‘world-class’ or ‘global’ cities that 
symbolise both a nation’s modern, globalised, capitalist development dreams, and the idealised 
middle-class subject, have been built (Goldman, 2010; Ong & Roy, 2011; Ghertner, 2015). 
Expensive private schools and universities, exclusive gated residences, securitized business 
parks, and glitzy leisure places provide both speedy avenues of capital accumulation, and at 
the same time embody and enable the reproduction of new symbolic middle class boundaries. 
Again, various actors are involved in this building process. Even though these middle-class 
populations are associated in public discourse with privatized lives, in terms of employment, 
education, consumption, and residence, the state plays a vital role in driving and sponsoring 
their urban projects (Ghannam, 2002). The middle-class provides an effective legitimising 
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construct for the erection of these places, as it pertains to represent society’s hard-working, 
modern, liberal ‘everyman’ (Baviskar & Ray, 2015). 
 
Studies on the new middle-classes overwhelmingly suggest that membership is open to 
extremely small numbers. These populations suffer from perpetual insecurity and a fear of 
falling (Caldeira, 2001; O’Dougherty, 2002), and in part driven by this fear, rather than working 
to increase distributional politics, as developmental discourse promises, they intensely protect 
their privilege and their places from those below, from bodies that do not fit the vision 
(Baviskar & Ray, 2015). They therefore actively prevent the march towards modern, global, 
middle-class living for many. But although existing qualitative work has done much to 
complicate the theorisation of class in the Global South, its intense focus on affluent middle-
classes threatens to homogenise what has been exposed to be an extremely heterogeneous 
group, and render invisible other experiences of middle class-ness in the 21st century (Davis, 
2010; Lemanski & Lama-Rewal, 2012). Research on those excluded from this middle-class 
march, as well as the ‘world-class’ cities they inhabit, tends to focus on the vast numbers of 
poor displaced to make way for modern urban developments and capital-intensive growth 
(Davis, 2006; McFarlane, 2011; Schindler, 2014; Ghertner, 2015), and who are pushed into an 
‘informal’ city working in ‘precarious’ forms of work (Standing, 2011; Ferguson, 2015). The 
dual focus on the urban poor, and upwardly-mobile middle-classes produces a depiction of a 
divided city, with the walled off upper/upper-middle class beneficiaries of capitalist 
development inhabiting a city distinct from the masses – increasingly ‘unnecessary’ for 
neoliberal growth, who live more and more ‘informally’ (Sassen, 2001).8 While this produces 
                                                          
8 There is much critique of the notion that middle-class city-building is a “formal” process, in contrast to the 
informality of the urban poor (Mercer, 2014). 
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powerful political imagery (see Figure 1.2), it has the effect of glossing over more interstitial 
experiences in contemporary cities that do not fit these two extremes.  
 
 
 
 
 
This material is unavailable due to copyright restrictions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 - Depiction of a divided world between rich on one side of the fence and poor on the other 
 
Victoria Lawson (2012) recently called for more diversity in middle-class research, on 
populations experiencing hardship in the aftermath of neoliberal reforms (see O’Dougherty, 
2002; Fernandes & Heller, 2006; Davis, 2010). While increasingly accepted in the Global 
North, a focus on such groups in the Global South has been overshadowed by the powerful 
narrative of a middle-class on an upward trajectory. In Egypt – and possibly around the world 
if wealth data are to be accepted – it is decline that seems to encompass the middle-class 
experience for many in recent decades. Yet, decline is not only measurable through changes to 
wealth or income. It must be understood in relation to markers of middle class-ness, to one’s 
ability to obtain a desirable job, afford a good education, or live a good lifestyle. Importantly, 
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these markers may shift upwards, thus inducing an experience of decline even if income might 
have increased. 
 
Many of the studies on the new middle-class do allude to the presence of populations that have 
not managed to make the transition to the globalised, modern middle-classes on which they 
focus. They suggest that members of the ‘traditional’ middle-classes may have experienced 
increased precariousness in the wake of neoliberal changes as the pillars upon which their lives 
were built before the 1980s – a public sector job, a good quality free education, affordable 
housing, and government subsidies – have been stripped away (Cohen, 2004; Davis, 2010). 
Yet, empirical investigation of such groups, the ‘fragile middle’ as they are labelled by Donnan 
et al. (2014) is rare. This is a key contribution of this thesis.  
 
This is a vital endeavour, not only to uncover more interstitial experiences, but because the 
middle-class in recent years has been used to project a narrative of success, a sign that 
neoliberal regimes are carrying large numbers towards prosperity. Yet, in many cases this 
narrative is exposed to be just a narrative. Challenging it can certainly be done through 
uncovering the continued plight of the poor, but exposing declining middle-class groups 
debunks some of its core myths; that nations are becoming more prosperous, fair, and 
democratic. Lawson (2012) argued that investigation of middle-class victims should be used to 
encourage political alliances between the middle-classes and the poor to combat the malign 
effects of contemporary capitalist arrangements. Yet, recent events in the Global North tell us 
that middle-class frustration can be easily directed to less progressive ends. In any case, 
dissatisfied middles have long played key roles in the political, economic, and cultural 
trajectories of nations (Wolf, 1973). It is therefore imperative to understand their 
dissatisfaction.  
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One alternative ‘new’ middle-class garnering attention in recent years is the educated un-
/underemployed emerging in different contexts of the Global South (Jeffrey et al. 2008; Weiss, 
2009; Cole, 2010; Jeffrey, 2010; Mains, 2012; Schielke, 2015).9 These are people who are 
unable to acquire the jobs associated with a middle-class life, and who thus experience 
stagnation rather than hopeful mobility. Although not a new phenomenon, as work by Dore 
(1976) showed, Jeffrey et al. (2008) set out how it has increased in recent decades across the 
Global South. Whilst ever greater numbers continue to gain access to a higher education, 
economic changes associated with neoliberalism have both decreased public sector 
employment, and failed to generate large numbers of the permanent, secure white-collar work 
that they expect. In different contexts, a rising youth demographic contributes to this problem. 
But it is also bound up with the accusation that neoliberal development has produced ‘jobless 
growth’ (Wade, 2004). It has provided some with avenues for rapid wealth accumulation, but 
has simultaneously created masses of surplus, educated labour (Ferguson, 2015). The jobs that 
remain go to those able to mobilise the resources to acquire the best education, a possibility 
perhaps made easier due to the expansion of private educational systems whereby some can 
buy a good quality education (Varghese, 2006).  
 
This thesis adds to this work, by focusing on a middle-class group in Egypt that has experienced 
decline in the context of the country’s economic liberalisation and entry into the ‘global’ 
economy. The following section provides a brief introduction to this group. 
 
 
                                                          
9 There is also literature on this phenomenon in the global North (Kaplinsky, 2005; Livingstone, 2009; Standing, 
2011). 
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Egypt’s ‘middle-class poor’ 
 
 
Figure 1.3 - Illustration depicting the death of Egypt's middle-class (Source: Daily News Egypt, 2016) 
 
This picture (Figure 1.3) appeared in an Egyptian English-language newspaper in late 2016. It 
counteracts rather bluntly the hopeful depiction of a middle-class on the march towards 
prosperity. In Egypt, ‘middle-class’ frustration, and even its death according to commentators 
and ordinary Egyptians, is now considered to have partially fuelled the 2011 uprising (Kandil, 
2012; Zayed, 2014).  
 
As I explore in more depth in Chapter 3, the label ‘middle-class,’ or ‘middle-level’ (al-ṭabaqa 
al-mutawasiṭa), has its origins in a late-19th century state-building project to create a nationalist, 
bureaucratic workforce in Egypt (Ryzova, 2014). But it was under the Presidency of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser (1956-1970), and thereafter Anwar Sadat, when a larger middle-class was created 
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out of the expansion of public education, the provision of government employment to all 
graduates of secondary education and above, the distribution of substantial subsidies (for 
example for fuel and food), and the availability of affordable housing (Armbrust, 1996). 
Middle-class belonging was secured for many out of a stable non-manual job in the public 
sector, a state education, material security aided by subsidies, and a strong sense of belonging 
to a national culture (Armbrust, 1999; Schielke, 2012: 37; Ryzova, 2014). 
 
However, in the aftermath of neoliberal economic changes in the 1980s and 90s, new, 
competing standards of ‘middle class-ness’ began to emerge in Egypt, out of increased 
consumptive possibilities and international mobility, new forms of labour and educational 
options, and historical forms of class distinction. This middle-class distinction has been enabled 
by the government’s ambition to construct a ‘global capital city’ (Ghannam, 2002; Sims, 2014): 
in recent years, Cairo has seen an explosion of internationalised educational institutions, gated 
communities, glamorous new office developments, and upscale shopping malls catering for 
upwardly-mobile Egyptians who have made vast amounts of wealth on the back of economic 
liberalisation.  
 
The lives of this new ‘middle’ – which is often referred to by Egyptians as the ‘upper-middle 
class’ (al-ṭabaqa al-mutawasita al-‘alya) – have provided the focus for two recent contemporary 
studies (de Koning, 2009; Peterson, 2011). However, many have been excluded from this 
transition. Much scholarship has concentrated on the ‘poor’ or ‘popular classes’ residing in 
informal neighbourhoods (‘ashwa’yāt), and working in informal forms of employment 
(Singerman, 1996; Ismail, 2006; Bayat, 2009), or the industrial working classes (Shehata, 
2009). Yet, there also exists an alternative, unexamined middle-class story. Many in the 
Nasserist middle-class did not make the transition to the new middle. Furthermore, their own 
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pathway towards a middle-class life began to destabilise in the aftermath of neoliberal 
transformations which have slashed government employment and wages, led to the 
deterioration of public services, and decreased the stock of affordable housing (Schielke, 2015). 
These problems have all been exacerbated in the context of a rapidly growing youth 
demographic (Brookings, 2016). Asef Bayat (2011) describes the emergence of a ‘middle-class 
poor’ out of these changes, a group he labels the new ‘proletariat’ of the Middle East. Focusing 
on young people, he describes how many are pushed into prolonged periods of unemployment 
after university or into low-skilled, low-status, insecure employment, as street vendors, sales 
persons, supermarket box boys, or taxi drivers (Bayat, 2011), and into Cairo’s overcrowded 
informal neighbourhoods alongside the poor. They now struggle to differentiate themselves 
from shaʿby living. The word shaʿby has been used since the 1940s, by the media before it 
came into daily language (Ghannam, 2002: 79). It comes from the word shaʿb, which means 
people or folk, but is distinct from the word balady (local or popular) – or ibn al-balad, which 
defines an authentic, traditional Egyptian identity (El-Messiri, 1978; Elyachar, 2011; 
Ghannam, 2011). In the aftermath of Egypt’s infitaah, shaʿby, and balady have become 
derogatory terms to describe the lower-classes in upper-middle/upper-class discourse.10 
Throughout the thesis, its myriad meanings will be frequently discussed.  
 
The thesis focuses on members of this middle-class that lost out in the aftermath of late-20th 
century development. It delves into the lives of a group of young men who have just graduated 
from public university, some within Cairo and others in different towns and cities across the 
country. The faculties they attended, mostly commerce, law, and humanities, if they were once 
prestigious, have become infamous for their poor quality and classroom overcrowding in recent 
years. In a system that is increasingly privatised, they have remained dependent on an ever 
                                                          
10 There remain positive associations of shaʿby culture with fun and authenticity within the lower-classes. 
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more uncompetitive public education. Their parents mostly work in low-level public sector 
jobs – jobs given to them by a socialist-era ‘appointment’ policy. But their stagnant wages in 
the face of steady inflation have made sustaining a middle-class life – affording decent housing, 
a good education for their children, or buying a car – progressively more difficult. They live in 
the degraded, overcrowded informal areas of Cairo and other cities (see Figures 1.4 and 1.5). 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Map of Egypt showing origins of interlocutors who moved to Cairo (Map data: Google, DigitalGlobe) 
 
 
Figure 1.5 Map of Cairo showing places where my Cairo-based interlocutors lived (Map data: Google, DigitalGlobe) 
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The thesis’ first aim and contribution is to plot the historical emergence of this middle-class 
condition, to understand the specific events and transformations that led to relative decline. In 
doing so, I want to disrupt hegemonic narratives of middle-classes on the rise in the Global 
South. Chapter 3: The Rise and Fall of Egypt’s Middle-Class, conducts a comparative analysis 
of the relative rise and fall of two distinct middle-class groups in the previous 80 years: one 
that accumulated vast amounts of wealth in the aftermath of neoliberal reforms, thereby 
securing belonging in Cairo’s global city and its ‘upper-middle classes,’ and another that was 
not able to accumulate wealth, and therefore became reliant on poor quality public education, 
low-paid public or insecure private sector jobs, and forced to reside in overcrowded informal 
areas surrounded by the poor. Adding texture to debates on the global middle-classes, the 
chapter explicates the importance of historic rural land ownership, timely investment in real 
estate and import/export, being well-positioned in the state bureaucracy, and international 
migration in the rise of Egypt’s new middle-class. It also reveals how this is economic capital 
was ‘reconverted’ into new forms of cultural capital (private education, language skills, and 
subtle markers of ‘modern’ sociability). Most importantly though, the Chapter reveals the 
plight of another section of the Nasserist middle-class in the aftermath of neoliberal change.  
 
Having established the historical emergence of these two contrasting middle-class groups, the 
rest of the thesis, using eleven months of ethnographic fieldwork in and around Cairo, delves 
into the lives of a group of young men in Egypt’s ‘lower-middle class,’ with the aim of 
understanding how they experience and navigate their difficult transition to the labour market. 
In the rest of this introduction, I map out a conceptual framework through which their lives can 
be grasped.  
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‘All that is solid melts into air’ (Berman, 1982) 
 
A cornerstone of Pierre Bourdieu’s social theory is the proposition that people do not normally 
aspire after lifestyles (or forms of economic, social, cultural, and symbolic capital) they cannot 
reach. Through a process of ‘adjustment,’ in childhood and beyond, there develops a 
congruence between one’s ‘subjective expectations,’ derived from their classed ‘habitus,’ and 
one’s ‘objective probabilities’ in the fields they enter: in other words between one’s dreams for 
the future and the future pathways permitted to them by the capitals they hold (Bourdieu, 1977). 
Bourdieu defines habitus as a “system of acquired dispositions functioning on the practical 
level as categories of perception and assessment or as classificatory principles as well as being 
the organizing principles of action” (1990: 12-13). It is constituted by tacit knowledge, rather 
than a conscious set of rules. A habitus generally corresponds to the social group in which one 
is raised. It is specific to one’s class, as well as one’s gender, race, and sexuality. It is learned, 
for example, through one’s parents, schooling, and the popular culture to which one is exposed. 
According to Bourdieu, this means that the son of a garbage collector is not likely to aspire to 
become a lawyer, because it is perceived to be neither realistic nor indeed desirable (Willis, 
1981). He will perceive that such a job, or indeed the university he would have to attend in 
order to reach it, are ‘not his places.’ For Bourdieu this is the mechanism ensuring stability in 
an unequal social order, as people ‘misrecognise’ where they belong and see their current place 
and future pathway as legitimate. He labels this process, whereby people exclude themselves 
from certain higher social positions, as symbolic violence.  
 
However, Bourdieu has faced much critique for offering up a view of human behaviour, and 
symbolic domination, which is deterministic (King, 2000; Burawoy, 2012). He views people 
as locked into the tastes and dispositions connected to their class positions, trajectories, and the 
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institutionalised trainings to which they are exposed. Recent research within sociology has 
demonstrated, in part by taking Bourdieu’s propositions outside of the mid-20th century French 
context, how individuals often express heterogeneous tastes and dispositions that stretch 
beyond the boundaries of their designated social class.11 For example, focusing on 
consumption, some scholars have noted the increased propensity for the middle-class to be 
cultural omnivorous, whereby they can consume ‘low-brow’ popular culture as well as luxury 
goods and ‘high’ art (Peterson, 1992; Warde et al. 2007). But in the realm of employment 
aspirations as well, there are ever more occurrences of mismatch. Bourdieu admitted as much 
in later work: 
 
“on the one hand, the generalisation of access to education – and the consequent 
structural discrepancy between the qualifications attained, and therefore the 
positions hoped for, and the jobs actually obtained – and of occupational insecurity 
tends to multiply the situations of mismatch, which generate tensions and 
frustrations” (Bourdieu, 2000: 234). 
 
Bourdieu states that the simultaneous expansion of education – which increases aspirations for 
white-collar jobs – alongside increased job insecurity raises the propensity of situations of 
mismatch between one’s ‘habitus,’ or aspirations that are built for a higher social position than 
the one they hold. This might have become a widespread condition in the contemporary 
moment in various contexts, owing to the simultaneous rise in ordinary aspirations, alongside 
a diminution of people’s life chances. 
 
                                                          
11 Dispositions are also heavily dependent upon gender, race, sexuality, and religion (Savage et al. 2008). 
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The decreased availability of affordable housing (Davis, 2006) and stable, well-paid 
employment (Standing, 2011; Honwana, 2012; Sassen, 2014), the stripping away of social 
welfare, and the heightened incidence of economic crisis is, in Bourdieu’s terms, leading to a 
widespread decrease in the ‘objective chances’ of millions, including in the middle-classes, 
around the world (Rank et al. 2016). Yet, at the same time, contemporary capitalism continues 
to stimulate the aspirations for the kind of job, house and lifestyle, and the amount of wealth 
one is able to acquire. As Bourdieu states above, this is in part due to increasing access to 
education. However, it is perhaps a much more generalised condition of ‘modernity,’ as 
processes of globalisation, technological change and even urbanisation around the world are 
exposing people and groups to possible lives they were not previously seeing (Giddens, 1991; 
Appadurai, 1996; Beck, 2000; Bauman, 2011; Weiss, 2009; Ghertner, 2015). To repeat a phrase 
that Marshal Berman (1982) borrowed from Marx, ‘all that is solid melts into air’ in the context 
of the drastic and disruptive social changes brought about by modernity, including the 
pathways wished for by many.  
 
The narrative of a global middle-class on the rise may in itself be stimulating aspirations, as 
people are repeatedly told that prosperity is on the way. Furthermore, the stable stratification 
of aspiration is also being disrupted by contemporary efforts to promote meritocratic ideals that 
encourage a belief in the possibility of social mobility for all (Khan, 2012; Littler, 2013). The 
American dream has long promoted the notion that, as Michelle Obama (and later Melania 
Trump in a comical act of plagiarism) stated at the 2008 Democratic convention: “the only 
limit to the height of your achievements is the reach of your dreams and your willingness to 
work hard for them.”12 Contemporary labour markets are placing more emphasis on continued 
career progression, the end to a ‘job for life,’ and offering up the possibility of moving from 
                                                          
12 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/politics/michelle-versus-melania-who-said-it/ 
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‘rags-to-riches.’ Consumption markets continue to rely on people always yearning to acquire 
more than what they have.  
 
Returning to Bourdieu, this contradictory situation is perhaps increasing the propensity of 
mismatch between the classed employment and lifestyles to which people aspire, and their 
ability to reach them through the ‘capitals’ they hold. In Chapter 3, I will set out how this 
condition developed among young middle-class Egyptian men. Recent studies have observed 
how processes of globalisation and modernisation – the government’s effort to modernise and 
transform Cairo into a ‘global city,’ and increased access to forms of media such as TV and the 
internet – have increased the aspirations of ordinary Egyptians (Ghannam, 2002; Bayat, 2011; 
Schielke, 2015).13 Yet at the same time, dramatic social and economic inequality, widespread 
corruption, and increased unemployment has impacted on the ability of many Egyptians to live 
a respectable life. Asef Bayat (2011) discussed how this mismatch plays out amongst the 
‘middle-class poor.’ He defines this group as people with: 
 
“high education, self-constructed status, wider worldviews, and global dreams 
who nonetheless are compelled — by unemployment and poverty — to subsist on 
the margins of the neoliberal economy as casual, low-paid, low-status, and low-
skilled workers, and to reside in the overcrowded slums and squatter settlements of 
the Arab cities. Economically poor, they still fantasize about an economic status that 
their expectations demand — working in IT companies, with secure jobs, middle-
class consumption patterns, and perhaps migration to the West.”14 
 
                                                          
13 This process is highly gendered, as, for example, men are more able to roam around the city (Ghannam, 
2002). 
14 http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/26/a-new-arab-street-in-post-islamist-times/ 
 41 
 
In Chapter 3, I describe how young middle-class men, such as Gamal, develop aspirations, 
often in conflict with their parents, for a life associated with the country’s globalised upper-
middle classes, as well as those abroad that, evidence suggests, will be difficult to reach. They 
stem from an increased exposure to the places, commodities, and lifestyles of the upper-middle 
classes – both in Egypt and abroad – as they engage in university activities, travel around the 
city, scroll through Facebook, or hear the stories of friends or relatives. But they also originate 
from an exposure to the increased struggle of those around them to lead a dignified middle-
class life, to marry, to look after their families, to find a decent job, to afford a home.  
 
Having established the existence of a mismatch between the subjective aspirations and 
objective chances of young middle-class men in Egypt, the rest of the thesis is concerned with 
the consequences: specifically addressing the questions laid out at the beginning of this chapter. 
These are important questions if mismatch is becoming an increasingly prevalent condition in 
contemporary Egypt and beyond.  
 
The departure of hope 
 
Bourdieu himself does not explicate very fully what happens in situations of mismatch caused 
by social immobility, when aspirations overshoot one’s ability to realise them. In situations of 
social mobility, his concepts of hysteresis and habitus clivé (cleft habitus) have attempted to 
outline how a ‘lagging’ habitus experiences discomfort when confronted with the tastes and 
dispositions connected with a higher class, if this involves a significant jump (Friedman, 
2016).15 But what about a habitus that is built for a higher class, and which experiences social 
immobility? A classic Bourdieu approach might predict a steady process of adaptation of one’s 
                                                          
15 This is related to the psychological concept of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). 
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dispositions to new surroundings. But in the quote set out above regarding mismatches in the 
realm of employment, Bourdieu himself states that it generates “tensions and frustrations” 
(2000: 234). In Distinction (1987), he expands on this somewhat to explore how it might lead 
to a sense of ‘alienation,’ or acts of ‘refusal’ in work. And elsewhere, he mentions that 
mismatch produces a sense of a “lack of a future” (2000: 234).  
 
But, in order to understand how this condition is lived, I want to move beyond the writings of 
Bourdieu, and turn to a focus on emotion. This focus originates in the 17th century work of 
Benedict de Spinoza, and aims to combat a view that the present is always experienced through 
‘rational’ or ‘conscious’ thought processes, suggesting instead that it is experienced through 
emotion. But, what has become known as affect theory distinguishes between personal feelings 
and emotions, and ‘affect.’ Affect describes a transpersonal ability to “affect and be affected. 
It is a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the 
body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 2004: xvii). Affects therefore, in contrast to feelings and emotions, go 
“beyond the strength of those who undergo them ... affects are beings whose validity lies in 
themselves and exceeds any lived” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 164). Affects take on the 
“dynamic, kinetic qualities of the atmos” (Anderson, 2009: 78), emerging as bodies/objects 
encounter one another – this encounter is given the name ‘affection’ (Massumi, 2002).  
 
Personal feelings – and their outward expression as emotion – emerge through these 
encounters. They constitute the conscious ways in which people make sense of, and provide a 
biography and a language to, transpersonal intensities with repeated experience. Massumi 
(2002) describes an emotion as a “subjective content, the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality 
of an experience which from that point onward is defined as personal” (28). Emotions are 
 43 
 
therefore formed through the qualification of affect into “semantically and semiotically formed 
progressions, into narrativizable action/reaction circuits, into function and meaning. It is 
intensity owned and recognized” (ibid. 28). Affect and emotion thus play vital roles in 
determining our subjective experience of the world. They shape how we make sense of events 
and decide to act in response. This thesis argues that a focus on emotion and affect can reveal 
important dimensions to the lived experience of class, and contemporary class immobility or 
waithood in Egypt specifically.  
 
Scholars of affect and emotion have long demonstrated how a feeling of hope is integral to a 
life. Ghassan Hage (2003) defines hope as a sense of existential mobility, a sense that one is 
going somewhere with one’s life. Michael Jackson defines it as a “sense that one may become 
other or more than one presently is or was fated to be” (2011: xi). It rests on motion, what 
Hirokazu Miyazaki (2004) terms a sense of ‘prospective momentum’ towards what is 
considered a ‘good’ future. Hoping is distinguished from the act of dreaming – in the sense of 
the sleep-dream – by its future orientation. To dream is to conjure up “desires smouldering 
from the past” (Allison, 2013: 8), whereas to hope is to direct consciousness towards the future. 
Dreaming can also be future orientated, particularly in Egypt, where the word ‘dream’ (ḥilm) 
is used synonymously with the word ‘aspiration.’ The dream is not “only something that 
happens inside one’s head,” but acts as something to pursue into the future (Schielke, 2015: 
152). Hoping though is distinguishable from dreaming, aspiring, or even desiring. A desire, 
dream, or aspiration can all be objects of hope. Hope therefore might be defined as a sense that 
a future dream, aspiration, or desire is becoming yours.  
 
The use of the term hope, instead of other terms similarly orientated towards the future – 
confidence, belief, optimism, positivity, expectation, promise, anticipation, faith, or possibility 
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– is deliberate. I use hope for both empirical and conceptual reasons. ‘Min ghīr al ’amal mafīsh 
ḥayāt’ (without hope there is no life) is a common phrase in Egypt. Hope, unlike other words, 
defines a more basic sense of having something to live for. It is a prerequisite to life. Its opposite 
is despair (y’ās). It is therefore more definitively directed towards something desired, a feeling 
that it might happen, whereas some of the other terms, such as optimism or confidence, define 
more generalised senses that outcomes will be positive. The boundary between hope as a 
feeling and the other words mentioned above is porous and difficult to pin down. Hope (’amal 
in Arabic) though is distinguishable from confidence (thiqa – which can also be translated into 
trust), even optimism (tafā’wl), since hope is haunted by both a fear and anxiety that what is 
hoped for will not come to pass. It is more fragile, and less sure of itself. The flip side of this 
is that it thrives on less. Throughout the thesis, it will become clear that a generalised sense of 
mobility towards a good future is sometimes felt as confidence, and sometimes as less assured 
hope. But what underpins this is a need to keep moving.  
 
Why then do people want to go somewhere? What drives this yearning for movement? 
According to philosophers Hannah Arendt (1958) and Ernst Bloch (1995), a hopeful sensibility 
is an intrinsic part of human consciousness. It is a product of a “not-yet conscious,” a 
consciousness formed in anticipation of the future, “towards the side of something new that is 
dawning up, that has never been conscious before” (Bloch, 1986: 13). It is therefore fuelled by 
a sense of promise and potential transformation in the appearance of the new as the future 
unfolds. Yet this sensibility, according to Jackson (2011; xii), is also fuelled by a sense that 
something is missing in the present, a sense that there is “more to life than what exists for us 
in the here and now.” This sense of insufficiency is perhaps foundationally connected with a 
Lacanian notion of desire. Lacan understands desire as being fuelled by a perpetual sense of 
lack, a lack of recognition from others. According to this notion, “desire’s raison d’etre is not 
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to realise its goal, to find full satisfaction, but to reproduce itself as desire” (Žižek, 1997: 38). 
It rests on separation between the desiring subject and the object that is desired. By contrast, 
anxiety arises if there is nothing left to be desired (ibid. 1997).  
 
But a sense of insufficiency must also be understood in the context of dominant systems of 
value within which people orientate themselves. It has been described as a hallmark of 
capitalism, which requires perpetual investment and growth, and fuels a sense that one cannot 
be satisfied with what one already has (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2001). There is always 
something more to be done, to be bought or experienced in order to find fulfilment. This 
aspirational sensibility is also inflected by age. The life-stage of youth holds within it an 
inherent sense of incompleteness, in which aspirations for employment, marriage, and family 
life remain in a state of not-yet.16 These aged aspirations are always dependent on one’s social 
class, as well as gender, race, sexuality, and religious belief. We can therefore understand the 
individualised class project to possess a temporal dimension. It is always future-orientated, and 
incomplete. This is perhaps more intensely felt in the life stage of youth, as youth chase jobs 
that can provide marriage and a desirable lifestyle. But people have to constantly re-assert (and 
improve) their class position, striving for better-paid jobs, better lifestyles, and more 
commodities. In Rachel Heiman’s (2015) words, people are always ‘driving after class.’ Samuli 
Schielke (2015; 22) notes that this is particularly pertinent in the middle-class, as a status 
always “a step short of the upper-classes.” He defines a life guided by these ‘grand schemes’ 
as an “aspirational sense of existence, where one must always reach for more than what one 
has, a sensibility that is essentially dependent on its being dynamic and growing” (ibid. 23).17 
 
                                                          
16 Schielke also states that religious salvation and romantic love have similar qualities, in that they are always 
perpetually unfinished endeavours. 
17 Sara Ahmed (2010) describes how happiness becomes attached to certain normative modes of living that 
drive action, such as marriage, or a healthy body. 
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Hope then defines a feeling that one is moving towards this desired future. In this way, we can 
understand it to be an integral feeling for the class project. According to Hage, the ability to 
affect hope for the future in a population – to “maintain an experience of the possibility of 
upward social mobility” (2003: 13) – is essential for a nation-state’s capacity to govern in the 
face of entrenched inequalities and the inter-generational reproduction of class locations. This 
means that each person has the opportunity to move towards self-realisation, the realisation of 
their classed, gendered, aged, and racialized dreams. Returning to Bourdieu’s language, in a 
situation where one’s subjective expectations line up with objective chances, it is possible to 
keep alive a sense of movement, or hope, towards a desirable future.18 In this context, people 
wait for a good life to continually arrive. However, their patience, their feeling of hope, is 
dependent upon the perpetual movement of the ‘queue’ (Hage, 2003).  
 
What Hage (2003), along with many others, now claims, is that for huge numbers of people 
that sense of prospective movement towards a desirable future is becoming increasingly 
difficult to sustain. Neoliberal society, he claims, has no commitment to affecting hope. A sense 
of prospective mobility is instead being replaced, including for many in the middle-classes, by 
a sense of ‘impasse’ (Berlant, 2011), ‘stuckedness’ (Hage, 2003), ‘limbo’ (Jansen, 2015), and 
‘abjection’ (Ferguson, 1999), as a result of an inability to move forward within normative 
classed, aged, and gendered systems of value. People are being forced into extended periods of 
‘waithood’ (Honwana, 2012). This, as I argued above, results from a dramatic upscaling of 
ordinary aspirations, alongside a diminishment of the possibility of achieving a dignified life. 
Some studies have traced the emotional dimensions of immobility. This condition could stem 
from an inability to gain employment, get married or find love, acquire a home, achieve 
                                                          
18 This is similar to what Appadurai (2004) labels a “capacity to aspire,” the ability to form aspirations and 
know how to move towards them. 
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economic independence, or engage in certain forms of consumption. It is experienced in highly 
gendered ways, as the expectations placed upon, and aspirations developed by, women and 
men differ (Osella & Osella, 2000; Silberschmidt, 2004). In the realm of employment, 
ethnographic work has variously uncovered the frustration and anger (Jeffrey, 2010; 
Hochschild, 2016), boredom (Ralph, 2008; Schielke, 2015; O’Neil, 2017), shame (Sennett & 
Cobb, 1972; Mains, 2007), and purposelessness or detachment (Bourdieu, 2000; Berlant, 2016) 
that circulate among people who are unable to locate fulfilling jobs.19 Arlie Hochschild (2016), 
for example, reveals how American middle-class men and women in Louisiana develop 
feelings of frustration and anger out of endlessly awaiting the arrival of the prosperity, 
fulfilment and security that is supposed to follow a lifetime of hard work.  
 
This work shows that, for millions of people around the world, that vital feeling of hope, that 
sense that there is something to look forward to in life, is being stripped away. These accounts 
add much needed texture to literature that asserts ‘uncertainty,’ (Zeiderman et al. 2015) and 
‘precarity’ (Standing, 2011) as the defining conditions of the 21st century. They reveal the 
emotional experience of classed, aged, and gendered immobility. However, we need to go 
beyond the loss of hope uncovered by this literature, to understand the consequences of the 
generation of anger. The next section reviews literature which has examined the dramatic 
political events emerging from hamstrung frustration, but finds their focus on exceptional 
moments of upheaval wanting.  
                                                          
19 Craig Jeffrey (2010) describes how a sense of immobility is always funnelled through the experience of 
temporality (Guyer, 2007). The way time is experienced is one of the principal differentiations of the power one 
holds within society (Bourdieu, 2000). A person who is highly valued experiences a perpetual shortage of time, 
whereas someone whose time is devalued (the unemployed for example) experiences an excess of time, a 
sensation where sometimes time hardly seems to move at all. There is nothing to orientate the self towards, 
nothing to look forward to, and nothing to wait for or invest in. For Jeffrey, there are multiple registers in which 
time can stand still, firstly in the sense of “clock time” as days become drawn out and left empty by the vacation 
of normal rhythms, but also due to both lagging behind the “historical possibilities of modernity” (Felski, 2000; 
82), and the expectations of independent adulthood.  
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Hopeful Resistance 
 
Ghassan Hage (2003), discussing the Australian white middle-classes, saw a rise in what he 
termed ‘paranoid nationalism’ because of a ‘scarcity of hope.’ He saw that people who stopped 
experiencing a sense of mobility in their lives became “self-centred, jealous of anyone 
perceived to be ‘advancing’ while they are stuck, vindictive and bigoted and always ready to 
‘defend the nation’ in the hope of re-accessing their lost hopes” (ibid. 21). Thirteen years later, 
people are observing a similar phenomenon in the form of the right-wing movements in the 
Western context which brought about Brexit, the close-fought election contests in France and 
The Netherlands, and the election of Donald Trump in 2016. Thus, Hochschild (2016) also 
observes how Trump supporters in Louisiana direct their frustrations at the racial minorities 
and women being helped to ‘cut the line’ that leads to the American dream. Hage (2003) 
understands that in a context where people develop feelings of frustration in their own lives, 
modernist narratives of future progress lose their ability to affect people. Instead, a racialized, 
masculinist politics develops an affective quality that generates feelings of anger and fear, by 
directing blame towards outsiders, ‘scroungers,’ and the liberals who ‘help’ them. This politics 
is geared towards protecting ‘ourselves’ from threats, rather than building a better future 
(Guyer, 2007; Zeiderman, 2016; Mbembe, 2017). 
 
In this context, there is a desperate attempt from those on the Left to replace this ‘politics of 
fear’ with a ‘politics of hope,’ to promise a better future rather than to protect from a threatening 
one.20 But, there has not been enough recognition of how these right-wing narratives affect not 
only feelings of fear, but hope too. Their strength lies in offering up people who have lost a 
                                                          
20 The direction of this political movement is perhaps specific to the Global North, which has historically-
constituted a racial and gendered other – and which “liberalism” is designed to help. This is not as readily 
available in the Egyptian or Middle-Eastern context. 
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sense of hope, and power, a temporary avenue through which to renew it, which of course 
comes at the expense of the hope of many others. The task therefore is to redirect people’s 
anger towards the systems that keep wealth and power in the hands of a few, and away from 
other ‘victims.’ Yet, this debate underlines the importance of understanding the affective 
dimensions of political events (Demertzis, 2013). For people who experience feelings of 
frustration at their own immobility, encounters with political narratives of radical change hold 
the potential to affect them with particular emotions.   
 
Much critical scholarship is therefore geared towards locating alternative ‘spaces of hope’ 
(Harvey, 2000), or ‘concrete utopias’ (Dinerstein, 2016), which symbolise a more progressive 
challenge to the economic and political systems imperilling so many (Bloch, 1986; Lefebvre, 
1996; Zournazi, 2002; Back, 2015). They see that immobility, and the frustration that arises 
with it, is an emotional state that holds imminent potential for radical change (Hage, 2009), as 
people engage in acts of resistance which provide renewed hope.21 Even Bourdieu – famous 
for under-recognising the potential for social change – states that the “falling out of line” of 
aspirations and chances can “leave a margin of freedom for political action aimed at reopening 
the space of possibles” (2000: 234).  
 
There are various forms that resistance can take, ranging from full-scale revolution, 
engagement in protest, workers’ strikes, institutional and informal political claims-making, to 
more everyday forms of defiance (Scott, 1985). Unemployed, disenfranchised young men are 
seen as especially susceptible to participation in revolt, and violence (Jeffrey, 2010; Chalcraft, 
2012; Enria, 2015). Within urban geography, literature on resistance is overwhelmingly 
                                                          
21 There are a wide range of explanations for the occurrence of resistance, stemming from the theorisations of 
contentious politics (Tilly et al. 2001). 
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concentrated on the practices of the poor. Scholars have exposed how urban metabolisms open 
the space for struggle over material resources that sustain employment and livelihoods – and 
thereby a sense of hopeful movement towards a good life – such as housing (Holston, 2008), 
amenities (Bayat, 2009), and infrastructure (Lancione & McFarlane, 2016). This focus on 
material conflict stems from an assertion that the sustained disconnection between capital and 
labour – where capital is accumulated without massive labour requirements – has rendered 
symbolic conflict defunct (Schindler, 2017). Contemporary cities are therefore seen as divided. 
Those in ‘informal’ or lower-class areas do not aspire after social mobility – for example 
participation in ‘global’ or ‘world-class’ cities. Instead of struggling over access to certain 
lifestyles or employment, the urban poor fight for a stake in the city’s metabolic configuration. 
In this thesis, I want to refocus attention on symbolic struggle in the urban Global South. There 
are people who aspire after the employment and lifestyles that have been made available to 
some in ‘world class’ cities. Their struggle is both material and symbolic, and it is imperative 
to understand how it plays out.  
 
Asef Bayat (2011) argued that Egypt’s 2011 uprising was stimulated by a widespread sense of 
stagnation within the population, and particularly amongst the young middle-classes who 
struggled in the years preceding this event to access a good education, find a decent job, and 
afford a house.22 The revolution for many ordinary Egyptians provided a moment of powerful 
hope, a space to conceive of a better future for themselves and the nation (Soueif, 2012). The 
atmosphere of Tahrir Square during those days, and for months and years afterwards, held an 
affective quality of hopeful momentum. Yet, more than three years after, when I met young 
men like Gamal, the revolutionary hope it stimulated had long faded away. As most do in the 
                                                          
22 There have been a plethora of other types of explanation for the events of 2011, which stem from the 
theorisations of contentious politics (Beinin, 2015; Ismail, 2012; Ketchley, 2017). Yet, many agree that middle-
class stagnation played an important role.  
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aftermath of revolutionary events, or indeed elections, Egyptians have returned to the daily task 
of trying to reach a good life, by educating themselves, obtaining a fulfilling job, and beginning 
preparations for marriage. These were the stunted pursuits that induced a sense of ‘stuckedness’ 
and led to an outpouring of anger in 2011. Prolonged economic stagnation, political turmoil, 
and a return of authoritarianism have only made those pursuits harder in the past five years, 
and ensured that the promise of early 2011 is now a distant memory.  
 
Returning to the research questions, the literature on resistance provides one answer by 
demonstrating how a mismatch between one’s aspirations and chances, in other words class 
immobility, can lead to the relocation of hope through narratives and practices that signify 
radical change, or incremental ‘encroachments’ (Bayat, 2009). However, this focus threatens 
to homogenise the myriad everyday ways people escape the frustration and anger thrown up 
by ruptured pursuits into the label of ‘resistance.’ Despite the continuation of Muslim 
Brotherhood, anti-Coptic, and price protests and violence, Egypt is overwhelmingly 
experiencing stability at present. The country has witnessed the return of an authoritarian 
regime. According to Schielke, stability is an aspiration for many ordinary Egyptians. Yet, the 
‘stability’ he defines is dependent upon perpetual growth (Bourdieu, 2000), which is hard to 
find for many in contemporary Egypt. This leads on to the final research question introduced 
above, about the maintenance of stability in the context of a denial of movement towards 
classed, gendered, and aged dreams? In order to address this, I turn to ethnographic work that 
pays much closer attention to everyday life, to the mundane ways in which people who are 
“seemingly marginalised and immiserated” by political-economic structures keep alive a 
feeling of hope for a good life (Simone, 2004: 407).23 
                                                          
23 This work stems from a desire to combat a tendency to view the lives of the destitute as only a “passive 
experience of suffering” (Masquelier, 2013: 475). 
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Mundane hope-making 
 
In recent years, there has been a wave of ethnographic studies focused on various groups who 
have been cast aside from normative modes of life-building (unemployed youth, the homeless, 
refugees, those living in disaster zones). It investigates the everyday work that goes into 
reintroducing a sense of ‘prospective momentum’ (Miyazaki, 2004) for a desirable future 
(Wacquant, 1998; Vigh, 2009; Mains, 2012; Pedersen, 2012; Jansen, 2015; Ralph, 2015; 
Turner, 2015; Elliot, 2016; O’Neil, 2017). This work builds on a wider literature examining 
what people (young men in particular) do during periods of ‘waithood’ (Jeffrey, 2010; Ralph, 
2008; Newell, 2011). It speaks against a philosophical notion of hope as an intrinsic aspect of 
human consciousness (Bloch, 1986), and instead tries to pinpoint how this emotional state is 
‘affected’ in bodies through certain routinized, gender, class, and age-specific practices. They 
include playing the lottery, putting faith in God’s rewards, watching films, and consuming 
drugs. These practices invoke a reorientation of consciousness, what Miyazaki (2004: 52) terms 
a ‘temporal reorientation’ of knowledge, which reopens the possibility of a good future – for 
class mobility, migration, or finding a job. This in turn invokes a shift in transpersonal intensity, 
in affect, which is felt as personalised hope. Daniel Mains (2012: 54-55) for example described 
how watching films and chewing khat enabled young men in Ethiopia to repetitively dispel the 
“anxieties associated with unstructured time, introspective thought, and hopelessness,” and to 
reimagine, albeit transiently, positive futures.24  
 
Bourdieu (2000: 226) himself briefly describes this as the attempt of those who have nothing 
to look forward to, to escape into fantasy and the imaginary: people act “as if, when nothing 
                                                          
24 This has also been framed by some as an ability to ‘trick time’ (Flaherty, 2010; Ringel, 2016).  
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was possible, everything became possible, as if all discourses about the future – prophesies, 
divinations, predictions, millenarian announcements – had no other purpose than to fill what is 
no doubt one of the most painful of wants: the lack of a future.” Bourdieu has been criticised 
for underplaying the deliberate and logical attempt of people to reorient their temporal 
experience, or affect a change in their own emotional states, in response to an unwillingness to 
accept one’s ‘objective chances’ (Pedersen, 2012). Yet, all of these studies demonstrate how 
people cope emotionally with being thrown into class, age, and gender ‘stuckedness’ outside 
moments of resistance.  
 
This work can help develop literature in geography that overwhelmingly focuses on the 
material practices through which structurally disenfranchised people forge respectable lives. 
Thus, Craig Jeffrey (2010) describes how educated young men in rural India with dismal job 
prospects engage in ‘creative improvisation’ (jugaad) by acting as political brokers in 
university; Colin McFarlane (2011) asserts how displaced populations in urban India ‘make-
do’ on the urban margins; and Tatiana Thieme (2017) plots how young men in Nairobi ‘get by’ 
through engaging in ‘hustle’ as they negotiate their lack of access to services, the loss of an 
income stream, or an unexpected bill. These studies highlight the generative possibilities of the 
uncertainty and precarity thrown up by capitalist arrangements (Cooper & Pratten, 2015) in 
that uncertainty engenders the poor’s adaptive capacity (Vigh, 2006). But the practices on 
which they focus can also be examined through the lens of emotion. They are practices that not 
only keep alive a material existence, but a vital psychological existence. 
 
In Chapters 4-6, I take forward literature on hope-making, using it to analyse how young 
middle-class Egyptian men struggling to find a good job sustain hope. This, I argue, constitutes 
an important dimension of the experience of class immobility. Yet, I also wish to critique this 
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literature in certain ways. It has overwhelmingly focused on people who have experienced a 
prolonged rupture in their ability to find a job, obtain a house, or get married. They therefore 
become ‘inactive.’ I will apply the same conceptual approach to people who continue to be 
active, who continue the pursuit of a ‘normal’ life (Schielke, 2015). Many people develop 
mismatches between their aspirations for desirable jobs and their ability to reach them, yet do 
not experience the same intensity of rupture felt by the long-term unemployed, the homeless, 
and refugees. I want to examine their more ‘ordinary’ practices of hope-making (Robinson, 
2005), by shifting focus to practices such as applying for jobs, reading about entrepreneurship 
or self-help, praying to God, and engaging in self-study. I argue that these practices become 
strategies of hope-making for young middle-class Egyptian men over time. I also want to add 
an important temporal dimension to ethnographic studies of hope, which overwhelmingly 
concentrate on one period. In situations of structural disenfranchisement, the relocation of 
prospective mobility is never final. Journeys are tormented, as people are thrown between 
“flight into the imaginary, and fatalistic surrender to the verdicts of the given” (Bourdieu, 2000: 
221), between feelings of hope and feelings of despair, anger, and fear. Their positions require 
much emotional work in order to maintain forward momentum.  
 
However, I also depart from ethnographic work on hope in another important way, by focusing 
on the ‘objects’ which act to keep hope alive. Along with scholarship on resistance, a common 
thread of this work is the assertion that capitalist formations have ‘cast aside’ vast numbers, no 
longer offering them hope (Hage, 2003). In celebrating the agentive capacity of the structurally 
disenfranchised to locate hope through mundane practices, ethnographic work neglects how 
their hope continues to be caught in webs of power. Ghassan Hage (2016) recently criticised 
ethnographic work for focusing too much on the subject’s production of hope, and not enough 
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on the ‘spatial terrain’ within which hope comes into being.25 In the final section, I describe 
how returning to affect theory can help reintroduce the transpersonal dimension of feeling and 
emotion.  
 
Meritocratic industries of hope 
 
There are several ways that power is neglected in literature on practices of ‘getting by’ or hope-
making. First, by concentrating on how groups challenge structures of power, for example state 
disciplinary power, through appropriating resources or avoiding state regulation, attention is 
drawn away from the ways these actions also reaffirm them. Bayat (1997), for example, argues 
that the ‘quiet encroachment of the ordinary’ can also reaffirm the unequal formal distribution 
of amenities. Second, the fact that some urban dwellers, as Thieme (2017) states, lose 
aspirations for ‘formal adulthood’ is an effect of power in Bourdieu’s sense, in that they adapt 
their aspirations in accordance with social position. Furthermore, focusing on the capacity of 
the individual to ‘adapt,’ or ‘manage risk’ shifts attention away from social relations that 
govern adaptive capacity. What about those who refuse, or struggle to hustle or hope? Are they 
blamed, or do they blame themselves? Gamal, for example, blames someone for jumping from 
a bridge and refusing to hope. Might these frames of action therefore reproduce hierarchies, by 
valorising those who get by and ignoring the differential capacity of people – according to 
class, gender, race, or age – to hustle, improvise, or hope (see Young et al. 2016)?  
 
Finally, there is little recognition of the ‘moral terrain’ that shapes one’s propensity to engage 
in practices of ‘making-do,’ or ‘hoping,’ only an assertion that people are forced to do so 
                                                          
25 Jansen (2016) similarly criticized this work for not examining how hope is “produced, distributed, and 
embedded in particular social relations” (451). 
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through material conditions of precarity. The focus is on the practices of the individual. But is 
there no moral pressure from without to hustle, hope, or improvise? This could be from others 
within communities (Lamont, 2002) – informal economies are ridden with hierarchical chains 
that shape the possible actions of people within them (Suckling, 2016) – or from various 
institutions that attempt to encourage certain behaviours, such as resilience, or 
entrepreneurialism (Elyachar, 2005).  
 
In this thesis, I switch focus to the spatial and moral terrains of hope. I call for examination of 
how the structurally disenfranchised are encouraged to hope for a better future. The 
theorisations of affect theory can help reintroduce a focus on the transpersonal terrain of 
emotion. Kathleen Stewart (2007) describes practices of hope-making as the ‘daydream of 
being included in the world’: 
 
“This is the daydream of a subject whose only antidote to structural 
disenfranchisement is a literal surge of vitality and mobility. A subject whose 
extreme vulnerability is rooted in the sad affect of being out of place, out of luck, or 
caught between a rock and a hard place, and who makes a passionate move to 
connect to a life when mainstream strategies like self-discipline or the gathering of 
resources like a fortress around the frail body are not an option. A subject who is 
literally touched by a force and tries to take it on, to let it puncture and possess one, 
to make oneself its object, if only in passing. A subject for whom an unattainable 
hope can become the tunnel vision one needs to believe in a world that could include 
one” (116).  
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Stewart describes how people attempt to harness the affective intensities of the world around 
them, to incite a surge of feeling. She therefore shifts attention to the transpersonal intensities 
roaming the world. This returns us to affect theory, which suggests that emotion and feeling is 
induced through the “movement of affect on the body” (Anderson, 2006: 236). Affect, a non-
discursive sensation, is omitted by objects, places, and discourses as they are encountered by 
bodies.26 It inhabits a transpersonal terrain, what Ben Anderson (2009) labels an ‘atmosphere,’ 
in which subjects and objects encounter one another. Anderson’s label represents an attempt to 
escape the subject/object binary (affect as impersonal and objective, emotion as personal and 
subjective). Atmosphere is indeterminate with regard to this distinction, it can be at once 
collective and at the same time felt as intensely personal. The emergence of affect from “the 
relations between bodies, and from the encounters that those relations are entangled within, 
make the materialities of space-time always-already affective” (Anderson, 2006: 736). 
Seigworth (2000: 232) describes this space-time as a “ceaselessly oscillating 
foreground/background or, better, an immanent ‘plane’ (i.e. this is an in-between with a 
consistency all of its own).”  
 
The affectual plane comes to be experienced intimately, and intensely personally, as feelings 
and emotions by bodies that move within it. Feelings emerge within the ‘encounter’ between 
bodies and the objects, places, and discourses they interact with and inhabit (Navaro, 2009). 
As Anderson (2006: 736) states, “movements of affect are expressed through those 
proprioceptive and visceral shifts in the background habits, and postures, of a body that are 
commonly described as ‘feelings’.” When one feels angry, one feels the passage of anger, and 
                                                          
26 I use a Foucauldian definition of discourses, which understands them as “ways of constituting knowledge, 
together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges 
and relations between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute 
the 'nature' of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern 
(Weedon, 1997: 108). 
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bodily heat, through one’s body (Katz, 1999). The shape of such feeling or emotion is 
dependent upon the affected body’s existing condition to be affected. Both the objects, places, 
and discourses that omit affects, and the way they are received as feelings, are the product of a 
diverse set of historical relations (ibid. 1999).  
 
The relationality of this approach to emotion opens space to analyse the objects, discourses, 
and places which ‘affect’ people with hope. Hope in ethnographic studies arises from 
‘encounters’ with lottery tickets (visa or monetary), refugee resettlement documents, drugs, 
television, the city, or religious narratives that emphasise the need for perseverance. Yet these 
objects and discourses receive little attention, in favour of a focus on the creative abilities of 
the destitute to retain the indeterminacy of the future. These objects and discourses are all 
attached to certain industries and institutions, such as development or religious organisations. 
Ignoring their role stems from a belief that refugees, the unemployment, the homeless, and 
those living in conflict zones are ‘left behind.’ But these groups remain subject to various 
institutions and logics which promise to improve their near future (Li, 2007; Kohl-Arenas, 
2015; Zeiderman, 2016). Hage (2009) recently argued that, even in situations of extended 
crisis, people are encouraged to exercise ‘perseverance,’ ‘resilience,’ and ‘endurance.’  
 
We therefore need to focus on the objects, discourses, and places that invoke certain affective 
intensities, and thereby feelings of hope, for people who experience class, age, and gender 
immobility. Reflecting my focus on a more ‘ordinary’ pursuit of ‘middle-class’ jobs, I examine 
places such as training centres, employment fairs, entrepreneurship events, and objects such as 
self-help literature, film, religious stories, the internet, CVs, and business cards. These objects 
and places form part of a meritocratic infrastructure of labour market institutions and industries 
(training organisations and self-help, recruitment agencies, the entrepreneurship scene), that 
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span the fields of development, government, and private sector. This infrastructure operates as 
a spatial terrain of hope for young middle-class Egyptians. I position this infrastructure within 
the broader spatial formation of Cairo’s global city, as it advertises the city’s jobs and wealth, 
and offers up the knowledge required to secure them. I therefore argue that Cairo’s global city 
operates as an atmospheric landscape that affects a sense of hope for middle-class Egyptians 
who dream of belonging. 
 
I therefore build on work which recognises that capitalist regimes around the world, despite 
pushing millions into acute deprivation, continue to churn out, and sell, a powerful promise of 
happiness (Ahmed, 2010; Davies, 2016). A promise is a declaration or assurance that one will 
do something or that a particular thing will happen. It thus creates expectancy, or hope for the 
future. Lauren Berlant, in her 2011 book Cruel Optimism, discusses various ‘good life 
fantasies’ – such as intimacy, dieting, voting, and a belief in meritocracy – which she defines 
as pillars of liberal-democratic notions of the good life in post-war, neoliberal America. Berlant 
explores how, despite continual collapse, this ‘cluster of promises’ retains its power as the poor 
maintain an optimistic attachment to it because its very presence in their lives continues to 
represent the possibility of happiness. The makeup of these fantasies is highly context 
dependent. Chapter 3 describes the exact shape of these aspirational markers among men in 
middle-class Egypt. They are also always sold in particular places and through particular 
objects, in schools and universities, in casinos, and through lottery tickets. Various studies have 
examined how these places are designed in ways that generate, and sell, affective atmospheres 
of hope (Clotfelter & Cook, 1991; Krige, 2012; Schüll, 2012; Posecznick, 2017).  
 
The strength of ‘good life fantasies’ in many cases rests on the notion that achieving them 
depends on one’s willingness to work hard, rather than inherited privilege, or where someone 
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is born. A key discursive shift associated with neoliberalism in different contexts has been the 
intensification of focus on the individual, the creation of individual ‘entrepreneurs of the self’ 
who can take charge of their own life chances through exercising certain behaviours, such as 
‘resilience’ (Lemke, 2001; Dardot & Laval, 2013; Bröckling, 2016). This has been coupled 
with the construction of a system that rewards those behaviours: meritocracy. Having started 
out as a critique of a system that rewards those already ‘gifted’ (Fox, 1956), it was picked up 
by the New Right in the 1980s to create a system that accepts high inequality, but in which 
social mobility is fostered through breaking down established hierarchies (Littler, 2013). 
Within this ideology, no matter what your class, race, gender, or sexuality is, you can ‘make 
it’ if you acquire the right skills, or ‘human capital.’ Shamus Khan (2012) points to the irony 
and contradiction that, despite rising inequalities and stagnant social mobility in the US, the 
meritocratic myth is only becoming more entrenched. There are ever greater efforts in 
education and the labour market to encourage social mobility, eradicate discrimination, and 
disrupt ‘backward’ notions of where people belong. This is continually backed up by ‘rags-to-
riches’ success stories on our TV screens (see Savage, 2015).  
 
There is little research on the extension of meritocratic logics outside the West. In Egypt, 
outside the globally visible events of 2011, there has been in recent decades an alternative, 
quieter revolution taking place. This is summed up by what Talal Asad (2015) labelled the 
‘liberal incitement to individual autonomy.’ Asad describes how, following processes of 
privatisation and economic liberalisation, and as the state stepped back from its role in social 
reproduction, there has been a shift in ‘moral authority,’ particularly among Egypt’s middle-
class, towards the ‘conscience’ of the autonomous individual. ‘Self-fashioning’ (takwin an-
nafs) is an increasingly important lens through which Egyptians pursue the goal of “finding 
wealth and a place in life” (Schielke in Simcik-Arese, 2016: 229). Various scholars have 
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explored how this has manifested in the increased propensity of self-help literature (Kenney, 
2015), entrepreneurship and empowerment programs (Elyachar, 2005; Atia, 2013), and desires 
for private property (Simcik-Arese, 2016). Others have noted a concurrent process in the realm 
of Islam, as Muslims increasingly conceive of the cultivation of their own moral behaviour as 
essential for securing God’s satisfaction, and self-realization (Mahmood, 2004). In the chapters 
that follow, I uncover how a ‘modern’ shift towards meritocracy is being proliferated in a 
labour market that is perceived to be ‘backwards.’ This, I will argue, represents an updated 
version of what Timothy Mitchell (2002) labelled the ‘rule of experts’ in Egypt. 
 
The myth of meritocracy has repeatedly been debunked in different contexts (Putnam, 2016; 
Frank, 2017). This includes Egypt, where the instance of social mobility has declined in recent 
decades (World Bank, 2012; Binzel & Carvalho, 2016). However, despite repeated 
demystification, it continues to be held up as a sanctified discourse. Indeed, if it were to be 
fractured anywhere, Egypt would provide a fertile place in the aftermath of an uprising railing 
against corruption, inequality, and protracted unemployment. Shamus Khan (2012) 
demonstrated how the privilege of American elites is legitimised through a meritocratic terrain, 
as they come to perceive their success as deserved, acquired through certain character traits 
rather than upper-class backgrounds. It thus normalises inequality, and legitimises blame, and 
punishment, on the poor (Wacquant, 2009). But this terrain also has important effects 
beforehand, on those pursuing privilege and social mobility.  It encourages the belief that, 
whoever you are, you can achieve your dreams, whatever they are. It therefore holds within it 
an affective quality that invokes feelings of hope, bringing ‘agency’ back to the individual 
(Miyazaki, 2004). 
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I will argue that the extension of meritocracy in Egypt acts to invoke a sense of hope for the 
future among young middle-class men living in a condition of waithood that arises as they 
aspire for more than they can reach. I will argue that this enables the exercise of a form of 
power, by labour market institutions and industries, which is distinct from Bourdieu’s notion 
of symbolic domination that rests on inducing an equivalence between expectations and 
chances. I follow Michael Burawoy’s (2012) call for a ‘shallower’ conception of domination 
to that extended by Bourdieu; that is, a shift towards a Gramscian notion of hegemony that 
considers the specific set of, sometimes unexpected, relations that produce ‘consent’ or 
‘compliance.’27 Following recent theorisations of affect theory, we need to look at the ways in 
which power can be exercised on and through emotion (Ahmed, 2004; Berlant, 2004; Stewart, 
2007; Berlant, 2011; Wilson, 2016). Existing research uncovers how certain emotions, or 
affective states, such as fear, empathy, or anger are directed in particular ways to suit particular 
interests (Butler, 2009). I focus on hope as one such emotion that secures what I call a form of 
‘affective compliance’ among middle-class young men chasing difficult dreams. I favour the 
word compliance because it is not dependent upon the active belief of the subject (Scott, 1985).  
 
Ironically, in Pascalian Meditations, Bourdieu offers a useful language through which to 
approach this alternative form of power, briefly describing how ‘waiting’ might also be “one 
of the privileged ways of experiencing the effect of power” (2000: 228). It rests on “delaying 
without destroying hope, on adjourning without totally disappointing, which would have the 
effect of killing the waiting itself,” and is particularly salient in cases that “depend significantly 
on the belief of the ‘patient,’ and which work on and through aspirations, on and through time, 
by controlling time and the rate of fulfilment of expectations” (ibid. 228). He finally describes 
                                                          
27 Gramsci describes hegemony as the “spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population to the 
general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is historically caused 
by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position in and 
function in the world of production.” (Gramsci, in Jackson-Lears, 1985: 568) 
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it as an “art of turning down without turning off, of keeping people motivated without driving 
them to despair” (ibid. 228).  
 
This form of power is always exercised within particular places (Crampton & Elden, 2007).28 
It is exercised, I argue, upon middle-class Egyptian young men within training centres, 
entrepreneurship events, and employment fairs that constitute the labour market infrastructure 
of Cairo’s ‘global city.’ In arguing this, a final task of the thesis is to reposition literature on 
‘world-class’ or ‘global’ cities. Work on those marginalised by contemporary city-making 
overwhelmingly concentrates on groups residing in an ‘informal’ city, far away from ‘world-
class’ urban production. Even those exploring more educated groups either focus on people 
outside urban centres, or those who are pushed into the ‘informal’ city (Jeffrey, 2010; Mains, 
2012). It is assumed they do not compete for the lifestyles offered up by ‘world-class’ cities. 
When relations are explicated, they usually fit into existing frameworks: of conflict between 
informal dwellers or workers and the middle-classes (Schindler, 2014); or low-level service 
workers required by the middle-classes (Ray & Qayum, 2009). This trend stems from a view 
that ‘world-class’ or ‘global’ cities are sites of exclusion, and disconnection between the 
exclusive new upper/upper-middle classes and the vast numbers of the urban poor displaced to 
make way for modern urban developments (Davis, 2006; McFarlane, 2010; Schindler, 2014). 
But they are not just sites of exclusion that stimulate the anger of ordinary urban dwellers, they 
are sites of inclusion that stimulate their hopes (de Boeck, 2011). Ghertner (2015), 
demonstrated how the world-class city can operate as an object of aspiration for marginal urban 
dwellers. He argues that this stimulates political claims-making. But I make the opposite 
argument; that the stimulation of aspiration operates as an avenue for securing compliance. 
                                                          
28 Javier Auyero (2012) took on Bourdieu’s insights to document how they are affected upon Argentina’s poor 
seeking state services. Their ‘subjective submission’ is produced through enforced periods of waiting. 
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This is achieved through the generation of a material and discursive terrain that induces a 
feeling of hope that those aspirations can be realised.29 This keeps the wheels turning of an 
Egyptian capitalist-authoritarian system that denies access to a dignified life to so many.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This introduction began by questioning the prevailing hopeful narrative of a rising middle-class 
across the Global South. Instead, introducing Pierre Bourdieu’s approach to class and 
theorising it as an imminently forward-looking project, I called for literature to recognise 
middle-class populations who are experiencing immobility, an inability to move towards 
normative aspirational markers of middle class-ness (as well as masculinity/femininity, and 
adulthood). This stems from a dramatic upscaling of ordinary aspirations, even as the 
possibilities for achieving them are being diminished. I then proposed two research questions 
stemming from a gap in contemporary class theory, around what happens when a mismatch 
develops between aspirations and chances.  
 
To build a conceptual framework that could provide an answer, I turned to work that pays 
attention to the emotional dimensions of everyday life. Using this literature, I posited that a 
feeling of hope is integral to the individualised class, and youth project. It is this vital sense of 
hope that is lost as people are thrown into extended ‘waithood,’ with this emotion replaced by 
frustration, boredom, and anger. Many scholars have examined how these emotions, and 
therefore ‘mismatch,’ might lead to acts of ‘resistance’ and support for political narratives of 
radical change. However, I called for a departure from this focus, out of an observation that 
                                                          
29 This builds on recent work recognizing that modern urban developments might obtain the acquiescence of 
marginal urban dwellers, not only their resistance – for example through discourses of national progress (Melly, 
2013), or aesthetic beauty (Harms, 2012). 
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widespread class immobility is not leading to ‘resistance,’ but rather stability. This led to the 
final research question, which, in order to answer I turned to ethnographic work which 
examines how structurally disenfranchised groups sustain feelings of hope for prospective 
mobility through routinized practices. But, using contemporary theorisations of affect, I 
criticised this literature for its lack of attention to the objects, places, and discourses that induce 
hope (and therefore the relations of power that infuse its social life). I finished by calling for 
use of affect theory to understand how certain objects, discourses, and places ‘affect’ hope in 
structurally immobile groups, and thereby secure their compliance. I finally posited that 
meritocracy, and ‘global cities,’ might be objects of hope.  
 
Overall, the chapter demonstrated how a focus on emotion and affect can help conceptualise 
the contemporary experience of class immobility. In turn, it informs us as to how waithood is 
navigated in specific contexts, crucially by both people and institutions. In the chapters that 
follow, I show how the continual provision of meritocratic hope constitutes the lived 
experience of young middle-class men in Egypt who are unable to move towards markers of 
respectable adulthood, middle class-ness, and masculinity. The next Chapter will outline the 
methodological process that went into producing this research project, and Chapter 3, as 
explained above, sets out the historical constitution of the contemporary condition of mismatch 
within Egypt’s middle-class. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 then follow a group of young Egyptian men 
as they pursue lives that are difficult to reach. Each Chapter works through how hope is given, 
lost, and held on to.  
 
In Chapter 4: Hopeful city, I show how Cairo’s global city, as a terrain of objects, places, and 
discourses, extends an affective atmosphere of hope for future middle-class belonging. As 
aspirational young men move around the city, they encounter various labour market institutions 
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spanning public, private, and developmental spheres – training centres, employment fairs, and 
the entrepreneurship scene – that are designed to bridge the gap between the labour market and 
job seekers. Within these places, and as they encounter their objects and discourses, young men 
are affected with a euphoric sense that their global, middle-class aspirations are realisable. The 
Chapter recasts literature on global cities, everyday hope-making, and the lived experience of 
class immobility, by arguing that compliance is secured through making people hope.  
 
Chapter 5: Being hopeful, analyses the tormented pursuit of the promise sold to young men in 
the hopeful city. It tells the story of living in a flat with three men who had moved to Cairo in 
search of a better life. The flat oscillated between an atmosphere of frustration, fear, confusion, 
and anger, and satisfaction and hope. The chapter shows how these men foreclosed negative 
emotions arising from their stagnation in low-paid, insecure jobs through engaging with objects 
and discourses which distract – making jokes, talking about girls, buying a new item of 
clothing, or watching television – and through engaging with objects and discourses which 
recreate hope for future mobility. They repetitively return to stories of successful friends, and 
stories they have read in self-help books and religious texts, which prove that success is 
possible through hard work. These stories enabled these men to blame both their own, and 
others’, lack of hard work for their immobility, and thus create a blueprint for hope through the 
promise to work hard. The Chapter therefore contributes to literature on everyday hope-making 
among immobile populations, revealing how hope can be sustained through a moral economy 
that rests on self-blame.  
 
Chapter 6: Cruel hope, shows how, over time, cynicism and anger overcomes young men 
because of repeated rejection and disappointment. The city, and its meritocratic myths, 
therefore produce different emotions. They no longer affect hope, but anger. Echoing previous 
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literature on the political consequences of a loss of hope, one might expect this to lead to acts 
of resistance, or, according to Bourdieu inspired analysis, adaptation. However, adapting 
Lauren Berlant’s (2011) notion of cruel optimism, the Chapter shows how, even in the face of 
mounting familial pressure to accept their lot and prepare for marriage, these young men return 
to the objects, places, and discourses of hope that have harmed them. They shift back into these 
fantasies, not because they continue to hold a deep belief, but because the alternative of letting 
go is too much to bear, it would lead to ‘death.’ This returns to a conception of hope as an 
intrinsic necessity. I also discuss the implications of this for thinking about the way compliance 
is secured affectively.  
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Chapter 2 Methodology 
 
This Chapter tells the story of the eleven months of ethnographic fieldwork that went 
into the production of the four empirical chapters to follow. This fieldwork was conducted over 
a period of 25 months from June 2014 to September 2016 in and around Cairo. Reflecting the 
structure of the thesis, the Chapter will be framed chronologically. It will begin by setting out 
my entry point that enabled access to lower-middle class youth. Thereafter, I will describe how, 
and why, I expanded and narrowed the group of research participants, in order to both avoid 
and acquire specificity in the research. This includes a narrowed focus on men. The Chapter 
then moves on to describe the methodological practices, decisions, and justifications that went 
into the four empirical chapters, which explore middle-class histories and aspirations (Chapter 
3), the logics and affective workings of the hopeful city (Chapter 4), and finally, the tormented 
pursuit of the good life by a group of lower-middle class men (Chapters 5 & 6). While 
discussing these chapters, I will give attention to the difficult practice of researching affect and 
emotion. In the final section, I will explore some of the methodological torments that arose 
through the development of close, and complex relationships between these young men, and 
me, as a friend, researcher, and foreigner. In particular, I explicate how my raced, gendered, 
and classed body came to affect my participants with the hope that I was at the same time 
attempting to understand. This discussion will focus on the affective dimensions of the research 
process, both for researcher and the researched, which often get written out of methodological 
accounts in favour of a disinterested, rational discussion on research bias and ethics. I will 
argue that emotion not only constitutes a vital part of research processes, but it can also help 
elucidate the political and ethical impasses that litter them.  
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The entry point 
 
I arrived in Cairo in June 2014. Before setting foot in the city, I planned to conduct 
prolonged ethnographic fieldwork on the country’s educated youth who were struggling to 
locate fulfilling employment, in order to understand how they experienced and negotiated this 
struggle. This would build on existing studies of educated unemployed people that take an 
ethnographic approach to understanding how they experience frustration as a result of an 
inability to move towards hegemonic norms of adulthood, masculinity, and modernity, and 
how they attempt to accrue ‘value’ or ‘respect’ through their daily practices (Jeffrey, 2010; 
Mains, 2012; Cole, 2010; Weiss, 2009). My immediate concern was finding a gateway through 
which to obtain access to this group. I set about contacting various non-governmental 
organisations working in the field of youth unemployment, using internet searches and through 
asking interviewees for other organisations of which they knew. I quickly conducted interviews 
with six different organisations, exploring their perspectives on the main issues facing educated 
young people in Egypt, the reasons why those issues exist, and how they can and are being 
solved. These interviews quickly led me to the Graduate Training Organisation (GTO), an 
international employment training organisation designed to help unemployed university 
graduates obtain jobs – through teaching them the ‘soft skills’ they were missing in order to 
achieve success in Egypt’s private sector.30 After meeting with the manager to explain that I 
was doing research on issues facing educated youth, I managed to secure permission to attend 
classes.  
 
                                                          
30 Graduate Training Organisation (GTO) is a synonym, used in order to prevent identification of the 
organisation. All of the names of people used in the thesis are also synonyms.  
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I had not originally planned to conduct a study on a training course. In all research processes, 
and perhaps particularly in ethnographic research, rather than exercising active, rational 
decision making, researchers respond to opportunities that arise and close up before them as 
specific people respond and others do not, and specific places or data sources become 
accessible and others close down. It is part of the ethnographic method to follow the avenues 
that appear interesting to us (Burawoy, 1991). Thus, I decided to continue with this 
organisation, firstly as a way of accessing the group I was seeking: young graduates who were 
struggling to locate fulfilling employment, and secondly because I became interested in the 
language and logics shaping this developmental intervention.  
 
Over a period of three months, I attended three two-month classes, each containing between 20 
and 40 young male and female university graduates from both inside and outside Cairo. GTO 
advertises that it wants ‘underprivileged’ graduates, a group it defines as graduates of public 
universities, who have been unemployed for more than six months – though this turned out to 
be a flexible rule. They had to possess some knowledge of English – though again this varied 
– be able to pay a small ‘commitment fee,’ and take a two month full-time course (affording 
uniform, travel, and sometimes rental costs). What I found inside the organisation were young 
people – all aged between 22 and 27 – who had in recent months and years graduated from one 
of Egypt’s public universities. The vast majority came from the so-labelled ‘kullyāt al shaʿb’ 
(faculties of the people): commerce, humanities, and law, which are known for their low-
quality and classroom overcrowding, and thereby for producing thousands of graduates who 
are prone to un/underemployment. Most had been employed before, as call centre agents, 
accountants or lawyers in small firms, or as informal salespersons. But they yearned for better: 
for more skilled jobs in multinational companies or large Egyptian companies, to be 
entrepreneurs, or to migrate abroad. They therefore seemed to constitute a minute fraction of 
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an educated un/underemployed population which had been previously uncovered (Assaad & 
Kraft, 2014), and also the ‘middle-class poor’ defined by Asef Bayat (2011). They had been 
pushed into low-status, low-skilled, low-paid jobs in the private sector, but dreamed of 
participation in Cairo’s globalised economy.  
 
I introduced myself to them as a researcher who was interested in the difficulties faced by 
educated youth in the labour market, to which the response would come, rather tellingly: “oh 
well you are in the right place!” I would then begin having conversations with them about the 
course, and their backgrounds, before asking the people with whom I developed closer relations 
if they were comfortable being part of the research. 
 
Specifying the field 
 
I very quickly knew that I needed to extend the network of participants beyond course 
participants, in order to overcome the problem of specificity arising from my ‘entry point.’ 
This certainly reflects a common complaint made against qualitative research: its un-
generalisability (Payne & Williams, 2005). Yet, its specificity is a strength, enabling a 
grounded, rich understanding of social, political, economic, and cultural processes. However, 
the ways in which what one is observing might be particular must be explicated, alongside the 
ways in which it also reflects broader phenomena.  
 
GTO in Egypt is a small organisation. It has trained around 2000 young people since its 
inception in 2009. The vast majority of Egypt’s tens of thousands of graduates never hear about 
it, and many who do, do not come. What then had led these young men and women to GTO? 
Gamal, who was introduced in the introduction, graduated from the faculty of law (Arabic 
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section) in 2012. After witnessing his cousin obtain a job in an international refugee 
organisation, he developed the dream of working in an international law firm and migration 
abroad, and leaving his job as a family lawyer in his local neighbourhood. He was told by his 
cousin that, if he perfected his English he could obtain a good job. After looking for cheap 
English courses, he enrolled in one in an upmarket neighbourhood of central Cairo. At the 
course, he was told to approach foreigners in order to practice English. Through doing that, he 
met an Italian woman who had a friend working as an instructor at GTO. This person told 
Gamal about the affordable GTO course. She said it could help him be successful. 
 
As Gamal’s story shows, the encounter between these young men and GTO contained much 
serendipity – others came across GTO on Facebook as they searched for job or training 
opportunities, or heard from friends who had previously attended – yet it also reflects the 
particular social position of these youth. Like Gamal, all participants experienced an intense 
mismatch between their aspirations for the internationalised employment and lifestyles of 
Cairo’s ‘global city,’ or migration abroad, and the current and previous employment enabled 
by their social and cultural capital. I describe this condition more fully in the next chapter. 
There is an important spatial dimension to this. Around half of the participants came from areas 
outside Cairo, in the Nile Delta and sometimes beyond. In their small towns they had less 
access to the high-status employment they craved. They also came to perceive that overcoming 
this mismatch was possible through their own actions, for example through taking a training 
course. GTO was advertised as a solution to their troubles. Finally, they possessed both an 
ability to take the two-month long course, as well as an inability to afford more expensive 
courses.  
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There are many graduates though who would not end up at GTO. Saami, a GTO course 
participant who had left a job in translation in order to enrol, had a younger brother who got 
engaged while he was still in university after meeting a woman he loved. Saami judged his 
brother for not prioritising his career, and thought he would have difficulty in the future putting 
in the resources necessary to develop his skills. Saami though also said he might have made a 
different decision had he met a girl he liked. Thus, graduates who focused their resources on 
marriage instead would perhaps not enrol in GTO. The same might be said for graduates who 
were able to obtain access to better employment through their superior education or 
connections; graduates who did not develop the same disposition that rendered jobs as 
salespersons, local lawyers, or accountants unsatisfactory; graduates who were prevented from 
attending by financial constraints, unable to leave jobs or afford daily travel, uniform, or rental 
costs if they needed to live in Cairo; female graduates who were unable to make the long 
journeys alone (half the participants were women, and the course ended early to ensure they 
did not have to travel at night); graduates who were able to afford more expensive courses; 
graduates who did not believe obtaining better employment was possible; and finally graduates 
who decided to put up with the employment they hold.  
 
Extending 
 
I attempted to overcome the specificity of GTO participants by asking to meet friends, 
colleagues, and friends of friends. Over the course of eleven months, I spoke to 49 young men 
(of whom 23 had attended GTO), and 18 young women (of whom 16 had attended GTO) in 
Egypt’s lower-middle class. I chose this form of ‘sampling’ purposefully, in order to meet 
people in a similar socio-economic situation, who might also be struggling to reach what they 
considered to be fulfilling jobs. Research on the prevalence of educated un/underemployment 
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suggests this is afflicting a large number of Egypt’s educated population (Assaad & Kraft, 
2014). Yet, even through meeting friends and colleagues, I encountered young people who 
were in better jobs which satisfied them, some who were in lower-status jobs and not itching 
to escape, and some who were already focused on marriage. However, I met many more who 
were waiting for and working towards a different life, towards employment that met their 
ambitions. This is the group upon whom I would focus, though their more privileged, and less 
aspirational others would have important effects upon them.  
 
I also met some who wished for better, but did not believe it was possible. But, again, most 
were actively working for better employment. Though they had not been to GTO, there were 
many other avenues through which they were exposed to similar meritocratic logics and 
knowledges. First, this type of training was far from unique. Based on an International Labour 
Organisation survey of youth employment projects conducted in 2015, at least 30 out of 233 
offer soft skills training specifically for educated youth, which translates into at least 160,000 
graduates of higher education.31 Many organisations advertise their services at employment 
fairs, and some are attempting to roll out their programmes to all public universities. Thus, 
some young men had taken soft skills courses in university, or within different organisations 
in Cairo and beyond. Others had taken some of the many other courses available in Cairo – 
accountancy, English, HR, computer training, business administration – that are offered by 
universities, local and international NGOs, foreign cultural centres, and private entities ranging 
from large international corporations to self-employed ‘career coaches’ and teachers. Still 
others accessed forms of training, knowledge, and self-help through less formal channels: 
within entrepreneurship events, employment and scholarship fairs, student organisations, as 
they applied for jobs which advertise that application processes reward skills, through self-help 
                                                          
31 http://www.youth-employment-inventory.org/ 
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books or online quotes or articles, through videos and films, through advice from friends, and 
finally within religious discourse.  
 
I argued in the previous chapter that the affective condition of these young middle-class 
Egyptian men might reflect a much broader phenomenon. It stems from developing aspirations 
which are difficult to reach, yet still trusting that those aspirations are reachable. To reiterate 
briefly, waithood is something common to all human consciousness. It stems from the 
necessary presence of desire for something yet to come. This manifests itself in particular 
classed, gendered and racialized forms within capitalism, an economic system which is 
dependent on perpetual growth, and within youthhood, a transitory life-stage in preparation for 
adulthood. However, in the contemporary moment, this waithood is being rendered more 
fraught, uncertain, and prolonged, as endless possible lives are being offered up, at the same 
time as they are being made more difficult to achieve. Concurrently, there is an ever-greater 
emphasis in labour regimes on the individual as the determinant of success, on the behaviours 
and practices which need to be implemented in order to succeed in a hyper-competitive 
environment. Thus, throughout the thesis, I will discuss how the emotions and practices of 
these young men are far from unique.  
 
Narrowing 
 
Over time, I developed a prolonged, intensive interaction with 13 young men (of whom eight 
were GTO graduates) as they tried to find a good job, career, and livelihood. They were all 
aged between 22 and 27, and were recent graduates of public universities in the faculties of 
commerce, English literature, law, translation, history, and computer engineering. They were 
all self-defined Muslims, although, as will become clear throughout the Chapters, they 
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expressed varying degrees of religiosity.32 Six were from outside Cairo – from Sohag, Zagazig, 
Zifta, and Mahalla, and had travelled to the city to find work, and take training not available in 
their hometowns. Seven were from neighbourhoods in Cairo which housed a mixture of poor 
and lower-middle class residents: Ezbet al Nakhl, Faysal, Abu Numrus, Helwan, and Haram. 
The parents of these men all worked as either low-level bureaucrats, or small-scale informal 
traders, and owned family homes – signifying a middle-class status. They all possessed dreams 
of better jobs than those currently held, or held in the past: as informal salespersons, call centre 
agents, accountants in small businesses, customer service agents, and translators. They 
dreamed of working as accountants in bigger businesses, in business administration or HR, as 
lawyers, entrepreneurs, bankers, and of migration abroad, either to the West, or the Gulf. Both 
the middle-class background and status of these young men, alongside their aspirations, will 
be discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.  
 
Thus, alongside extension of the research network beyond GTO, over time there was also 
significant narrowing. The most noticeable narrowing entails the dropout of female 
participants. Though this gender bias is common for male researchers in Egypt (Schielke, 
2015), it was a source of personal frustration, as I had originally planned to conduct research 
with women as well. The women I met in GTO possessed similar internationalised private 
sector employment aspirations as the men. They had also come to GTO in the hope of acquiring 
the skills that would lead them to those aspirations. However, as I developed more prolonged 
relationships, I quickly developed deeper interactions with men. In part, this was because I 
could meet them alone. Meeting with women alone might signify the beginning of romantic 
relations. Indeed, on one occasion I travelled to the home of one woman, and was subsequently 
                                                          
32 Coptic Christians make up around 10% of Egypt’s population. Though I got to know many, none were in the 
group of 13 whom I followed closely. Some of the practices in the Chapters to follow are specific to Muslims, 
but many were also conducted by the Christians I met.  
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asked by two male participants if “there was anything happening.” Men would often actively 
organise meetings with me in their homes, in cafés, or walking around the city, whereas my 
contact with women was restricted to brief conversations during group outings. My rapport 
with men also felt more comfortable and open, in part because I was able to spend more time 
with them, but also because I felt more comfortable about the appropriate way to interact with 
them, for example which type of humour or physical contact was acceptable. Because of these 
experiences, after one month I decided to concentrate on the lives of young men.  
 
Yet, even during the brief meetings and conversations that I held with women, the gendered 
nature of both their aspirations, and their pursuit of them, became clear. This reflects what I 
mentioned throughout the opening chapter, namely that aspirations, the experience of being 
unable to move towards them, and attempts to reclaim that movement are all highly gendered. 
Early on, two young women stressed that, though they were pursuing a career now, after 
marriage or engagement they would stop working and concentrate on looking after the home. 
Many men indeed did not want their wives to work, as it would symbolise a shameful inability 
to support a family alone. According to some of my male participants, this impending retreat 
into the home relieved pressure on women, as they did not have to find a high-status job, or 
save money for marriage. However, this expectation of retreat can in itself be a source of 
frustration for some women. Furthermore, during the time I spent with women, there was 
discussion of the type of man they wished to find, and the type of lifestyle they wished to live. 
They too yearned for social mobility, through marriage. This opens the possibility of frustration 
arising from the inability of finding a husband to secure those wishes, or even from the inability 
of finding a man who can afford marriage.  
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However, as I said, most of these women were at this stage focused on the individualised 
pursuit of desirable work. But, they were more restricted in their pursuit. For example, 
relocating to Cairo was made more complicated by having to find a family member with whom 
they could stay. Furthermore, certain kinds of jobs were not accessible because of late shifts, 
or long transport routes. Women also held gender specific relationships with their parents. 
Many of the male participants actively disobeyed their parents, either refusing the job 
suggested to them, or refusing to start preparations for marriage. Some men thought that the 
same ability to disobey would not, and should not, be open to women.  
 
Although the research focuses on young men, women are not completely absent. At various 
points, I explicate the relations of participants with women, and specifically how women came 
to influence their pursuit of employment. Having explained how I narrowed the focus down to 
thirteen young men, as well as how I consider the experiences of these thirteen to resonate more 
widely, I will now go on to describe how the research process unfolded.  
 
The Research Process 
 
Middle-class histories 
 
The first aim of the research was to understand the historical events that have led to the 
contemporary condition of the Egyptian middle-class. I wanted to understand how one middle-
class has experienced a destabilisation of their middle-class status – and according to some 
now reside in the ‘lower-middle class’ – while another group has experienced a rapid 
accumulation of wealth that has secured a life in Cairo’s ‘global city,’ and membership of the 
‘upper-middle class.’ I conducted a series of family history interviews with my lower-middle 
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class young male participants, and thirteen upper-middle class men and women who work in 
multinational companies and in the entrepreneurship scene – the kinds of jobs to which my 
interlocutors aspired. These interviews were mostly conducted in November 2015, towards the 
end of my fieldwork. I located the ‘upper-middle class’ interviewees through friends of the 
Europeans with whom I lived during the first months of the fieldwork. This avenue of access, 
when compared to how I accessed my main interlocutors, was extremely symbolic of the 
distinct class position they held.  
 
The interviews worked through familial social trajectories before and during Egypt’s socialist 
era, and in the aftermath of economic liberalisation. I asked about jobs, education, earnings, 
and property of parents and grandparents, and finally about the education and employment of 
the interviewees themselves. By acquiring this information from grandchildren and children, I 
opened myself up to data inaccuracies. This was especially difficult when it came to earnings, 
which was complicated further by Egypt’s currency inflation, and the fact that people were 
sometimes hesitant about revealing incomes. To combat this, I tried to restrict information to 
simple facts, and where there was doubt I would ask them to check with their parents and 
inform me later. I traced the social trajectories of these families by contextualising their 
information within previous research that plots the historical changes within Egypt’s middle-
class.  
 
There are two approaches to life history analysis: one takes data as a symbolic narrative 
representing the contemporary lifeworld of an individual, and another takes data as an accurate 
description of an individual’s life trajectory in social contexts (Bertaux & Kohli, 1984). Here, 
I took the second approach, yet recognise that narrative is impossible to completely remove. 
To this end, I would attempt to get interviewees to refrain from asserting their own perspectives 
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on the class position of their families, though I sometimes found this insightful. Instead, I 
understood their class positions by comparing class markers such as employment, education, 
earnings, property and landownership, consumption activities, against previous research 
outlining understandings of Egypt’s middle-class, alongside broader theorisations of class and 
middle class-ness. The labels ‘lower-middle’ and ‘upper-middle’ stem from the wordings of 
the young interviewees themselves.  
 
Chapter 3 also traces the origins of the aspirations among my lower-middle class interlocutors. 
This required using the alternative approach to life histories, which takes data as a symbolic 
narrative reflective of an individual’s lifeworld. I would ask them about the experiences which 
led to them developing a desire to become an entrepreneur, to work in a multinational company, 
or migrate abroad. In return they would relay memories of student initiatives that had 
stimulated their passions, or hearing of friends or family who had become ‘successful,’ and 
who they therefore wished to emulate. This recollection might neglect important aspects of the 
formation of aspiration, but the process of choosing moments is important in highlighting what 
they consider to have been formative.  
 
Following a tormented pursuit 
 
The remaining three chapters follow 13 young men, with seven providing the major focus, as 
they pursued employment. I would meet each at least once a week, and some almost daily. I 
would go to their homes to eat, chat, or watch films, meet them in cafés, restaurants, and 
shopping malls, or go for walks. I would also follow them as they looked and applied for jobs, 
training, educational scholarships, or entrepreneurship funding, in fairs, events, online, or 
around the city, and as they learned skills, English, entrepreneurship, accountancy, law, or HR 
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in events and lectures, courses, or in their homes. There were times when these meetings would 
take place in the evenings after work or a training course, and times when they would take 
place during the day, as their time was more flexible due to being unemployed. I would 
sometimes hang out with their friends, but would often try to meet them alone in order to open 
up conversations about their pursuit of employment. Topics of conversation were varied: it 
included much discussion of their dreams, and pursuit of them, their plans for finding a job, 
acquiring skills, migrating abroad, and establishing entrepreneurship projects. We would also 
discuss experiences that induced frustration, a job rejection, or a prolonged period spent in 
undesirable employment. More generally, we would discuss the problems with Egypt’s 
economy and government, as well as a diverse range of other topics: girls they liked – including 
with a few about their views and experiences of sex, their yearning for particular commodities, 
their favourite TV programmes and films, their opinions on world politics, Egyptian or 
European football, and funny situations they had encountered. These conversations were 
conducted in a mixture of Arabic and English. This reflected the fact that participants wanted 
to practice English, and also the progression of my Arabic over time. In the last six months of 
the fieldwork, we would predominantly communicate in Arabic.  
 
I quickly became interested in the emotional dimension of their pursuit of good jobs. I began 
to notice the visible fluctuation in these young men between feelings of hope, confidence, and 
happiness, and frustration, fear, confusion, anger, and depression. Negative feelings arose in 
response to particular events, such as a job rejection, or a prolonged period spent in undesirable 
employment. Positive feelings emerged through certain practices and conversation. I began 
mapping out, and focusing in on the practices through which these young men were over time 
keeping alive a feeling of hope, or prospective momentum, towards a desirable job and future. 
The ethnographic method was vital in enabling me to see and hear about these feelings and 
 82 
 
emotions as they arose in socio-spatial configurations. I would access their emotions through 
a mixture of observation, for example noting their excitement in response to talking about a 
possible new job or scholarship, and also through talking to them about their feelings in 
particular moments. I discuss some of the difficulties that arose as I attempted to do this below.  
 
The fieldwork period extended over more than two years. It began with six months in the 
second half of 2014. I then left for a period of five months, returning to Cairo in May 2015 for 
three months, again in November 2015 for one month, and finally in September 2016 for a 
further three weeks. These breaks enabled me to follow the pursuit of these young men over a 
prolonged period. This produced a longitudinal perspective that ensures the empirical chapters 
demonstrate their transition from feeling intensely hopeful about the future in 2014, to 
becoming more and more sceptical and angry as time passed, and they were standing still.  
 
Objects of hope 
 
By following these young men around the city, I became attuned to how their emotions were 
responsive to particular places, objects, and discourses which they encountered (Hansen & 
Verkaaik, 2009). I therefore developed an interest in those objects, places, and discourses that 
were providing hope for them. This brought forth the important dimension of affect, as distinct 
from feeling and emotion (see Chapter 1). I became interested in the affective atmospheres held 
within particular places, such as employment fairs, entrepreneurship events, and training 
courses, and produced by certain objects and discourses, such as a business card, a CV, or a 
film. This provides the focus for Chapter 4, which explores how the ‘hopeful city’ acted to 
induce feelings of hope for these young men as they interacted with it. Yet the focus on objects, 
and therefore affect, continues throughout the thesis. Affective intensities that inhabit particular 
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objects and places are rendered visible as they pass through bodies, and materialise in feeling 
and emotion. Thus, methodologically I retained a focus on my participants, but through 
observing their emotional reactions, I was able to say something about the affective dimensions 
of the spatial terrain they were encountering. I also always tried to note my own emotional 
reactions to particular places and events.  
 
My interest in the places of the hopeful city was shaped by where the research began, within 
the GTO course. But these places included employment fairs organised by recruitment agencies 
in partnership with government ministries and development donors, international scholarship 
fairs organised by training centres, entrepreneurship events and lectures organised by the 
donors, platforms, and entrepreneurs that constitute Cairo’s entrepreneurship scene, and finally 
shopping malls. Within each space, I observed the interaction with these young men, 
specifically focusing on the emotions enacted by inhabitation. I also though conducted 
numerous interviews with those involved in the construction of these places, with employees 
of training organisations that were running soft skills programmes, recruitment agencies that 
organise employment fairs, and entrepreneurship platforms that run events and lectures. I 
interviewed twelve people, three working in the entrepreneurship ‘scene,’ three working for 
recruitment companies, and six working for training organisations. The aim of these interviews 
was to understand the ‘expert’ logics that provide the foundations for the construction of these 
places (Mitchell, 2002): for example regarding how success is presented within Egypt’s labour 
market. I was also attentive to the ways in which these places were being designed to induce 
particular emotional responses (Schüll, 2012). 
 
I would only attend these places with participants. Overall, I went to three employment fairs, 
one scholarship fair, three entrepreneurship events, and several times to different shopping 
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malls. These events were predominantly held over one day only, but I attended the GTO course 
every day for almost three months in 2014. My experience in GTO therefore requires more 
extensive discussion. I would sit in lessons observing and writing notes on classroom activities, 
information they were learning from teachers, and student behaviour and reactions. I would 
sometimes participate, for example through helping a group with an English exercise, or 
responding to a question from a teacher; however for the most part I tried to stay in the 
background. This quickly became a microstudy on the course itself, its logics, its practice, and 
the way it affected participants. Accordingly, I began engaging in conversation and conducting 
more formal interviews with the trainers and managerial staff to understand the origins and 
motivations of the course. With participants, I began having casual interactions during breaks 
and after class. This was easiest with those most talkative, and those who were most competent 
in English: yet this was circumvented as my Arabic became more advanced. Thereafter I joined 
one group of around 10 students as they went out to eat, relax, or look for jobs. As I hung out 
with these young men and women I would respond to what they wanted to discuss with me, 
but also attempt to engage conversations about the course, their aspirations and attempts to 
realise them, their previous employment, their experience of education, and their perceptions 
about the problems faced by educated Egyptians in general. These conversations 
complemented the participant observation in the classroom, which gave me intimate access to 
the performative effects of exercises, and the discourses extended by trainers and the material. 
 
My presence in GTO, and all of these places, introduced methodological dilemmas arising from 
my role as a foreign researcher. As I spoke with participants about the GTO course, after 
initially fearing that I might be acting on behalf of the organisation, they began to open up 
about some of their frustrations. One female participant began expressing anger that teachers 
were pushing participants to apply for customer service and call centre jobs, rather than the 
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jobs they actually wanted. She asked me to speak with them because she felt I could wield 
some influence. Though I empathised, and criticise this employment focus in the thesis, I felt 
unable to help, or even to offer advice; both because of my dependency on the organisation for 
access, and a sense that this would constitute tampering with the field. I was there, as a 
researcher, to observe, to listen, to write up, and to analyse. This early experience caused me 
to question the project of research. It brought forth a sense of worthlessness, in that I was 
observing the problems of the organisation in order to write about them from afar many months 
(and years) later. I told myself that I could send work to them, or bring up my concerns with 
the organisation once I had left. Yet, the discomfort arising from the feeling of ‘passively 
observing’ frustrations in the moment never went away. To observe without influence is in any 
case impossible, something to which I will return below. This opens up important questions 
for researchers, about how ‘we’ try to alter the social phenomena we witness and criticise, and 
help the people we observe who might be victim. 
 
Into the home 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 describe how these young men attempted to sustain the sense of hope that had 
been affected by the hopeful city. They set out how they actively returned to objects, places, 
and discourses of hope over time. Chapter 5 focuses on my experience of living with three 
young men, who formed part of the 13 participants. When I returned to Cairo in May 2015, I 
had arranged to live with them in their flat in Faysal, a lower/lower-middle class neighbourhood 
in western Cairo. I shared a room with Eslam, someone I had met in the GTO course six months 
earlier. Eslam was from Sohag in Upper Egypt, and had decided to stay in Cairo after the 
course, taking a job in a call centre and renting a cheap flat with colleagues. I lived with these 
young men, with a few other people coming and going, during the final five months of the 
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fieldwork, which was stretched over more than a year. This experience enhanced the research 
(Ring, 2006). In the initial six month stay in 2014, I lived with a group of Europeans, who were 
working in international NGOs and private universities, in an upmarket area in central Cairo. I 
was therefore located a long distance from the city, and social world, inhabited by my lower-
middle class participants. Furthermore, the spatial terrain inhabited, and social life enjoyed, by 
Cairo’s upper/upper-middle classes and foreigners can quickly feel disconnected, and 
claustrophobic. I wished to escape this, and embed myself in a different urban lifeworld. In 
2014, most of my meetings with participants took place outside their homes, and often their 
areas. They would therefore constitute a highly exceptional experience for them. I wanted to 
become a more everyday presence, and access their day-to-day lifeworld. Being in the house 
enabled me to do that. I saw the everyday frustrations conjured up by difficult jobs and living 
conditions. I also witnessed everyday attempts to overcome these feelings, through distraction, 
or relocating hope through looking for jobs and courses, self-learning, reading and talking 
about self-help, and calling on religious divination. 
 
Before moving on to some of the ethical issues that arose during this fieldwork process, I want 
to briefly set out how I went about note-taking and analysis. Note-taking was sometimes 
difficult. I developed a method whereby I would write down reminder words of the 
conversations and observations I would have throughout the day. This was sometimes hidden 
and sometimes done with the active knowledge of participants. At the end of each day, often 
after 12am, I would write up notes of the day’s events on my laptop. Some of the quotes 
therefore reflect a paraphrasing of conversations. Recording conversations was not an option 
because it would have altered the open relationships I wanted to develop. Notes were taken in 
English, but I made sure to include the Arabic words that were used where necessary.  
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When I returned to the UK in between fieldwork periods, I conducted a thematic analysis on 
my day-to-day notes using NVIVO software. The process of analysis was messy, imperfect, 
and at times infuriating. But I tried to focus on the themes which had arisen during the 
fieldwork. This meant splitting my notes into moments within which participants expressed 
feelings of hope and happiness, and moments in which they expressed anger, fear, despair, and 
confusion. The empirical chapters will describe the moments in which these feelings expressed 
themselves, along with the affective intensities held within the “atmosphere” that induced 
them.  
 
Tormented Methodologies 
 
Ethnography always constitutes an ‘unruly dialogic encounter’ between the researcher and the 
researched, where ethics and bias are constantly destabilised (Clifford, 1988: 90; Fine, 2003). 
The process of following young men in their pursuit of the good life was fraught with 
methodological difficulties and tensions, arising from my complex positionality as both 
researcher, friend, and foreigner. Looking back on the fieldwork experience, it is the situations 
that induced particularly strong emotions, in both the participants and me, which provide the 
most vivid memories in this regard. But the affective dimensions of the research process are 
too often written out of academic production, in favour of a disembodied, disinterested, rational 
account of methodological decision-making, specificity, ethics, and bias. As more scholars are 
identifying, emotions not only need to be recognised as an integral part of the fieldwork 
process, but elucidating them can also help us to think through the ethical and political 
complications of research, and the shape of the data itself (Monchamp, 2007; Davies & 
Spencer, 2010). I will show in this section that it was moments of self-doubt, frustration, guilt, 
confusion, and discomfort that provide avenues through which to hold important discussions 
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on the ethical, researcher bias, and political implications which arose through this research 
project. In particular, I examine how my body became implicated in efforts to sustain hope.  
 
Barely one week into the fieldwork, a female participant of GTO initiated a conversation with 
me on Facebook. I saw this as a good opportunity, particularly as I had not interacted very 
much with women, to ask questions, such as “why did you do the course,” and, “what kind of 
job do you hope for afterwards.” This instigated a question from her, asking whether I was 
studying them, to which I replied “yes, I am doing research on youth and getting jobs.” The 
woman then asked “what about you?” before suggesting I am a “youth” as well, who 
experiences the same issues and has the same dreams. After criticising my perspective on 
Egyptian youth – I had outlined the difficulties I thought they were facing – she asked if I knew 
to whom I was speaking. I had not known the woman’s name as I had not communicated with 
her before. She told me I should have asked or checked, to which I agreed, and said sorry. She 
responded:  
 
“You are not interested in our names, our friendship or anything. I started the 
conversation with a friend and I ended it with a researcher, I feel really sad, I added 
a friend not a researcher, you do not see us.”  
 
My approach to this interaction had been to place this woman in the category of research 
participant, whereas she had wanted to be treated as a ‘friend.’ Talking to an ‘agnaby’ 
(foreigner) was something she had sought out, via Facebook rather than in person, as this 
perhaps represented a more acceptable form of communication. Communicating with 
foreigners on Facebook is a common activity for young Egyptians, and one that can induce 
excitement. It is an aspirational practice for people who aspire after cosmopolitan connection, 
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and perhaps migration abroad to Europe. I would often be introduced and shown off by 
participants as a “friend,” to friends, family, and on Facebook. However, on this occasion, I 
had converted this relationship into one of researcher-researched. I had asked too many 
questions that revealed my instrumental interest in her for research purposes. This instigated a 
quite different emotional reaction, one of sadness. To be an object of research operationalises 
a relationship of inequality, perhaps especially so when that researcher is a western foreigner 
in Egypt. I, as a researcher was there to understand the struggles of these young people, and 
they, as the researched, were there to be discovered and, perhaps, helped (Ralph, 2015). 
 
One might say that my mistake here was being too eager to acquire information, viewing this 
relationship too instrumentally, and therefore neglecting to establish relations that constitute 
friendship and equality, or to establish properly my role as a researcher. This shame-ridden 
experience certainly gave me an abrupt lesson in how to carry out ethnographic fieldwork. I 
needed to create mutual relationships, where I might share my struggles as well. However, I 
was never able to fully overcome the tensions it symbolised: of being both a (foreign) 
researcher and friend. This is a problem that arises specifically in ethnographic fieldwork, as a 
method that depends on developing prolonged relationships with participants, and within which 
‘data collection’ takes place in ambiguous settings, in homes, in cafés, that blur the boundaries 
between research and friendship. Indeed any conversation can become data in ethnographic 
fieldwork. Thus, though I asked the permission of the 13 young male participants to conduct 
research, they wanted to hang out with me as friends. This desire indeed enabled so much 
access for me. But this tension caused a number of issues throughout the fieldwork process.  
 
First, I often found myself trying to hide my researcher status out of anxiety of inciting negative 
feelings. This meant that I was often hanging out while trying to ‘collect data.’ Perhaps this 
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symbolises the exploitative nature of the ethnographic enterprise. One is always taking 
something from participants, and the lack of delineation renders this act more concealed. On 
some occasions the act of taking data ruptured the benefit they garnered from being friends 
with me. Second, at the beginning I felt pressure to ask many questions about their labour 
market struggles, in order to obtain information. However, I could sense the agitation this 
caused. Indeed, on one occasion I received an angry response from a young man I wished to 
meet to discuss his prolonged struggle in a call centre job. After a period of trying to contact 
him, he told me over WhatsApp that he saw no point in my research, that I would not be able 
to help him. He told me to leave him alone. I was subsequently told by this man’s friend that I 
had been too insistent in trying to get him to speak about topics that made him upset. Others 
would simply change the topic to one they preferred to talk about. Although I initially became 
agitated by this myself, I quickly understood it as an important practice of distraction from their 
struggles and feelings of frustration. Hanging out with me, a foreigner, was a good way of 
achieving this. But my recourse to discussions of their labour market struggles acted to 
puncture that distraction. It reminded them of where they were, perhaps especially in 
comparison to a foreign PhD student. At times, I would notice that they would tell me they 
were feeling fine, when perhaps they were not. They just did not want to talk about their 
frustrations. This represented a constant challenge to my attempt to understand their undulating 
emotional journey. Even though they might have experienced certain feelings, these were not 
expressed explicitly through emotion. However, feelings induce certain bodily reactions that 
act as signals to the observer. I thus tried to be attentive to these signals. Furthermore, it is 
important to understand why people might want to hide emotions in particular settings: to avoid 
showing ‘weakness’ (for men), to escape difficult feelings, or because one does not feel 
comfortable with certain people (Goffman, 1967). I tried to circumvent these inconsistencies 
through developing close relationships with participants. I was even told by some participants 
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that they felt they could share their aspirations and worries more with me because, unlike their 
friends or even family, I would not judge them.  
 
Throughout the research, my presence served to influence the emotional journeys of these 
young men. The most significant effect was my becoming an active ‘object’ of hope for a good 
future. In the last few days of my stay, Gamal said to me: “I could have given up a lot of times, 
you were very important for me not giving up, you supported and encouraged me a lot, I might 
have given up a long time ago without you.” Gamal was chasing a job in international law. 
Over the two years I knew him, he worked in three unpaid jobs in law firms and local NGOs, 
leaving each after the promise of a future salary was broken. Gamal faced much criticism from 
his family for not earning a wage, and becoming independent. He would often come to me with 
worries, or questions about whether he should give up and accept their calls for him to take 
“any job which brings money” in his local area. Knowing Gamal’s fervent desire to work in an 
international setting, I did not feel comfortable advising him to give up, which, as he described, 
would result in “death.” Furthermore, I perceived that my role as a researcher was to listen. I 
would therefore listen, and sometimes uncomfortably respond positively about the prospect of 
things working out. My attempted passivity therefore had a significant affect. Gamal would 
often say to me how “every time I meet you I feel stronger than before,” or how “I like your 
positivity, I always feel happy after meeting you.” This emotional reaction did not only come 
from my positivity, but from being able to hang out with a foreigner with whom he could 
practice English, have conversations about things he would not usually discuss, go to places he 
would not ordinarily go, and sometimes even meet other foreigners. He also saw me as a 
potential avenue through which he could move abroad, repeatedly asking if I could find him 
an English woman to marry. 
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Thus, for the participants, my own body came to create an affective atmosphere which induced 
a feeling of hope within them. First, my status as a foreigner represented a potential key to that 
life. They could practice English with me, find a useful connection through me, get help with 
applications and CV writing, or obtain an invitation to come to visit, study, or work in the UK. 
Second, hanging out with a foreigner is a symbol of elite living in Cairo, and thus hanging out 
with me felt good, symbolically suggesting that this world and lifestyle was not only accessible 
in the future, but also being lived in the present. This often involved taking selfies, which would 
later be posted on Facebook or shown to friends and family in order to provide a ‘cool’ memory. 
Socialising with me therefore became incorporated into their daily performances of trying to 
inhabit the global city they desired. When participants were frustrated by their failed attempts 
to obtain desirable jobs, spending time with me would provide a brief distraction or source of 
hope for future achievement, through practicing English together or simply by hanging out.  
 
Finally, I came to incite hope by being positive, or avoiding negativity. Sometimes, for 
example, I would be asked to help participants fill out application forms for scholarships or 
jobs. On one occasion, Mostafa, who wanted to apply for university in the UK, asked me for 
help. As we sat searching for options, I felt pessimistic about his chances. This intensified when 
he informed me reluctantly that his grade had not reached the minimum required. However, 
instead of openly speaking about that, I (and he) felt compelled to let it slide. I found myself 
grasping at the sentence on university websites which said work experience could make up for 
grades, even though I did not quite believe it. As soon as a potential barrier arose for Mostafa, 
disappointment and panic would rush across his face. In these moments, I felt compelled to 
reintroduce positivity. We therefore engaged in a performance, full of miscommunication, 
which kept alive his sense of hope. At times during our search I also became excited about his 
chances, momentarily forgetting how difficult it would be. I wanted to be hopeful. Though this 
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brings forth complex questions of validity, such intimate experiences taught me much about 
the emotional dynamics of hope about which the reader will read in Chapter 6, namely that the 
compulsion to hope can overcome ‘rational’ reasoning.  
 
On other occasions, I would be asked for advice by participants. For example, I would be asked: 
“how can I reach my goal quickly?” or “what piece of advice would you give me from your 
research?” They would also ask, following a disappointment, whether I thought they should 
give up their dreams. These questions always brought forth great discomfort, as I considered 
that these young men were severely inhibited by factors beyond their control – their lack of 
nepotism, or private education for example. Yet, they wanted actionable advice: practicing 
English, acquiring a particular skill, or making good connections. I would initially try to avoid 
answering, asking them how they felt about it. But, following repeated questions, I sometimes 
found myself repeating the same phrases which were extended in the ‘hopeful city,’ discussed 
in Chapter 4, such as how one can ‘learn from failure.’ I did this because I felt obligated to feed 
their need for positivity, for hope. I would reluctantly therefore feed into the reproduction of 
the ‘hopeful city,’ that I was at the same time beginning to criticise.  
 
This again instigated questions regarding the usefulness of research, as, by simply criticising 
this discursive arrangement I was not helping the young men from whom I was learning. Yet, 
there was one moment where I could not stand by. In late 2016, after the fieldwork period had 
finished, Gamal obtained a job offer in Saudi Arabia. The process of acquiring a work visa is 
long and expensive, with various documents and medical checks required. Gamal could not 
borrow the money he needed from his parents, and had unsuccessfully tried to borrow from 
friends. He reluctantly asked me “as a friend” if he could borrow the money and pay it back 
later. After deliberating, I decided to do it. Setting aside any fears of ‘tampering with the field,’ 
 94 
 
I felt obligated to help. On this occasion, I had not only discursively acted to sustain hope, but 
materially as well.33  
 
Conclusion 
 
The observations laid out here remove any pretension that the researcher does not influence the 
field. I, as a foreign researcher and friend became heavily implicated in the emotional journeys 
of these young men. Most of the time, I could not make a tangible difference to their lives, yet 
I played an important role in affecting hope. I attempted to overcome this by becoming a more 
everyday presence, through moving into the home, and being there as they came back from 
work watched television, and chatted about girls, football, and jobs. Through doing this, and 
throughout the ethnographic experience, I saw the myriad practices, objects, and places through 
which a hopeful present was maintained. When I left, their lives returned to ‘normal,’ in that 
they had little contact with foreigners. However, they retained the same aspirations they had 
developed before they met me, and the same difficulties in reaching them. They therefore also 
retained the same experiences of disappointment, and the same practices of reclaiming hope. 
In the following chapters, we will delve into them. But before that, in the next chapter, I will 
return to the past, to uncover the historical processes that have led to this contemporary 
condition. 
 
In this chapter, I have set out the process through which I collected the data that enabled the 
writing of the empirical chapters. This involved securing access to interlocutors, and both 
expanding and narrowing the research focus. I then described how I went about developing 
                                                          
33 My presence also acted as a source of frustration. Seeing me might remind my participants of their lack of 
mobility, particularly if my spending potential was laid bare, though they would try to insist on paying. 
Discovering that I could not help them obtain an invitation to travel abroad, provide a useful contact for a job, or 
affect substantial change in language skills sometimes caused disappointment. 
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relationships with participants, and became interested in their daily struggles to locate a good 
future. I have shown in this chapter how this process is always laden with ethical and political 
complications, but especially so as I, a foreign male researcher entered into the lifeworld of a 
frustrated Egyptian middle-class. It was the moments which brought forth the most intense 
emotions, in both me and the participants, which seemed to best represent these complications. 
Through examining some of these moments, I hope to have encouraged other scholars to reflect 
on the affective dimensions of their research processes. By doing so, perhaps we can begin to 
think about how we might overcome the difficult ethical problems thrown up during our 
research encounters.  
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Chapter 3 The rise and fall of Egypt’s middle-class 
 
Ibrahim and Amr were both 24-years-old when I met them in 2014. I met Ibrahim at a soft 
skills training course for unemployed university graduates in Cairo. Amr was a friend of a 
flatmate of mine who worked at the American University of Cairo (AUC). He used to visit our 
apartment, inhabited by people originally from Austria and the Netherlands, to attend an 
academic reading group. The contrasting places in which I met these two men reveals 
something about their respective positioning in Egypt’s socio-economic landscape. Ibrahim 
lives with his parents in a self-built house in a small village in the governorate of Sharkia, 1.5 
hours to the north-east of Cairo in the Nile delta. Its population is made up of farmers, small-
scale traders, low-level government workers, and factory employees who work in a nearby 
industrial town. Ibrahim’s father works as a teacher in a local Islamic government school – a 
job given to him by the government upon graduating from technical education – and his mother 
stays at home. His father tops up the family’s modest income by operating as a land broker in 
the village, and making ceramic tiles as his own father had done. Ibrahim attended a local 
government school, before taking a bachelor’s degree at a local government university in the 
Faculty of Commerce, now known colloquially as one of the ‘kullyāt al shaʿb’ (faculties of the 
people). Since graduating, he has struggled to locate a job, his only work since finishing 
military service in 2013 being in a call centre, infamous as a place one ends up if you have no 
other choice. Amr on the other hand lives with his parents in Mohandiseen, an upscale district 
of Cairo on the Nile with one of the most expensive real estate markets in the country. Amr’s 
parents are both professors at Cairo University, jobs gained through the government 
appointment system. Like Ibrahim’s father, they have topped up their modest public sector 
income, but in more lucrative ways, through operating a private clinic and buying and selling 
upmarket properties in the city. When I met Amr in 2015, the family were about to move to an 
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exclusive gated community outside Cairo. Amr attended a private language school – which 
explains his perfect English – and thereafter studied Economics at the AUC, which had yearly 
tuition fees of US$10,000. Thereafter, he began working in a tech start-up as a ‘creative 
manager.’ He is now on his way to starting his own business, a mobile app that maps Cairo’s 
complicated web of microbus routes. He also plans to do a Master’s degree in France.  
 
Ibrahim one day told me about a conversation he had with his uncle. They were talking about 
what had happened to Egypt’s middle-class in the last 60 years:  
 
“He told me there were two classes before the 1952 Revolution (which 
bought military general Gamal Abdel Nasser to power). A high or rich class (ṭabaqa 
‘alya) which was for the pasha (governors, dignitaries, and generals), effendiyya 
(civil servants), and al ekta‘iyyn (aristocracy). And another one was the popular 
classes (al shaʿb). Then when Nasser was President, he created a new class called 
the ‘muwaẓafiyyn’ (employees), the middle-class (al-ṭabaqa al-mutawasiṭa), people 
who work in the government as teachers, doctors, or engineers. The ‘muwaẓafiyyn’ 
worked to educate their children to be better than them. Then President Sadat began 
the infitaah (economic opening which began in the 1970s), and the ‘muwaẓafiyyn’ 
disappeared. The infitaah broke up a lot of structures. The ‘muwaẓafiyyn’ 
transformed into other classes, the doctor or engineer transformed from the middle-
class to a high or rich class. The opening was a double-edged sword, some people 
used it to be richer, and it was unfair with others, they became poorer.”  
 
Ibrahim thought his family were part of the middle-class that has become poorer in the 
aftermath of the infitaah, perhaps moving into what Bayat (2011) termed the ‘middle-class 
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poor’ – though Ibrahim described it as the “first level of the middle” (auwwil ṭabaqa al-
mutawasiṭa). By this, he meant the bottom of the middle-class, and therefore from here on in I 
label this group as the lower-middle class. Amr’s family occupied a very different social world. 
They would be considered members of what has been labelled as the ‘cosmopolitan upper-
middle class’ (de Koning, 2009), perhaps even leaving the ‘middle’ to become members of the 
upper-classes. But Amr described himself as upper-middle class (ṭabaqa al-mutawasiṭa al 
‘alya). This chapter addresses the question of how this social chasm developed between the 
“auwwil ṭabaqa al-mutawasiṭa” and the “ṭabaqa al-mutawasiṭa al ‘alya.” By extension, I want 
to examine the trajectory of Egypt’s middle-classes in the 20th and 21st centuries. To do so, I 
call on data gathered during twenty family-history interviews with young people, thirteen who 
belong to the contemporary upper-middle class, and seven who belong to the lower-middle 
class. I focus throughout the chapter on Ibrahim and Amr’s families, but will also bring in 
others in order to illustrate certain points.  
 
I apply Bourdieu’s class theory to the family trajectories, which tells us that what it means to 
live in a certain ‘class’ (ṭabaqa (level) in Arabic) is not reducible to a certain income level or 
amount of wealth (economic capital). It is instead attained through one’s acquisition of certain 
social and cultural markers (institutionalised, embodied, and objectified), in the realms of 
employment, education, consumption, familial life, sociability, and politics (Lentz, 2015). The 
chapter describes how these two groups were differentially able to secure the markers that 
define middle-class belonging over the 20th and early 21st century, with this ability shaped by 
both macroeconomic changes, their accumulation of economic resources, and the changing 
nature of what it means to live an Egyptian middle-class life.  
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Their historical trajectory represents the shape of an hourglass. The first section describes how 
in the early 20th century these two groups occupied very different socio-economic positions in 
Egypt’s polarised neo-colonial class structure; the contemporary upper-middle class were 
members of both the traditional landed elite and new bureaucratic middle-classes, and the 
contemporary lower-middle class inhabited the social world of the popular classes. Thereafter, 
I explain how these groups were brought closer together in the mid-20th century, by a modern 
state-socialist project aimed to create a coherent, nationalist, state-dependent middle-class 
based on government employment and education. In the third and fourth sections, I set out how 
economic liberalisation from the 1970s onwards caused these two groups to diverge once again. 
One set of families used their historical privilege to take advantage of new avenues of wealth 
creation, and thereby secure belonging in Egypt’s ‘cosmopolitan,’ ‘privatised’ upper-middle 
class, and Cairo’s ‘global city’ (Ghannam, 2002). Simultaneously, families who were pulled 
up into the middle-class under Nasser experienced downward mobility, as the stable, well-paid 
government employment, good quality public education, subsidies, and affordable housing 
they relied on were stripped away. Therefore they struggled to hang on to their middle-class 
lives.  
 
The chapter contributes to literature on the global middle-classes in a number of ways. It first 
uncovers the historical structural privileges, such as land ownership, that have enabled their 
accumulation. I also illustrate the important role of international migration, and the political 
and legal remnants of the state-socialist project in their rise. But finally, departing from the 
narrative of much literature on the middle-classes in the Global South (Heiman et al. 2012), 
the chapter explicates the emergence of an alternative middle-class that has not benefited from 
neoliberal change, but instead has been victim of it, the rising inflation it caused, its capital-
intensive growth, state retrenchment, and the dilapidation of public services (Mitchell, 2002).   
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Despite the chasm that exists between Ibrahim and Amr, they both had the same ambition; to 
establish a technology start-up in Cairo’s modern entrepreneurship scene. Amr is well on his 
way to achieving this. Ibrahim on the other hand is far away from realising his dream. Thus, in 
the final part of the chapter, I want to tackle the question of why, despite the social chasm that 
exists between these two groups, have they developed similar aspirations in contemporary 
Egypt? Young men like Ibrahim, who grow up in the lower levels of Egypt’s middle-class no 
longer look to the state, but are instead developing aspirations for new, classy (rāqy) global 
(‘alamy), private markers of middle class-ness. I show how this is due to both increased 
exposure to these markers, as well as exposure to the struggles of those in their middle-class 
level to lead a dignified middle-class life. These struggles are pushing them into shaʿby living. 
This view challenges a cornerstone of Bourdieu’s theory, that aspirations normally correspond 
to chances of reaching them (Bourdieu, 2000). I show how this congruence is being destabilised 
within the Egyptian middle-class. It has been pulled apart under a process of neoliberalisation.  
 
Pre-Nasser divisions 
 
According to writers such as Perlmutter (1967) and Ryzova (2014), in the 19th century, Egypt 
did not have a middle-class. Egypt’s ‘elites,’ or ‘bourgeoisie,’ consisted of the religiously-
educated, urban merchants, and rural landlords (al-umada). This elite, as a result of British and 
French colonisation, developed a connection with European (ifrangy) stylization. Local 
(balady) cultural practice signified the popular classes – who mostly worked as petty traders 
(al-shaʿb), and in rural areas as peasant farmers (el-fellaheen). In Cairo, elite Egyptians were, 
along with an increasing foreign-born population (75,000 in 1907), separated from the popular 
 102 
 
classes both legally and spatially.34 They lived in the ‘classy’ (rāqy) areas of Downtown, 
Zamalek, Heliopolis, and Maadi, whereas the popular classes resided in the crowded 
‘medieval’ Arab core of what is known as Islamic Cairo (Reynolds, 2012). This bifurcation 
began to change in the mid-to-late 19th century, as a new class – labelled the effendiya – 
emerged out of the development of a secular education system under the stewardship of 
Muhammad Ali, and later King Farouk (Ryzova, 2014). The effendiya were to serve as the 
civil servants of a new state bureaucracy, as bureaucrats, lawyers, doctors, architects, teachers, 
journalists, intellectual and cultural producers, and army officers, jobs which many of the old 
elite secured for their children (Perlmutter, 1967). This is the first time the label ‘middle-class’ 
(ṭabaqa al-mutawasiṭa) emerges in Egypt. It was associated with a modern, national culture and 
identity, as well as modern state-building. It was also connected to public employment and 
education, and therefore distinct from a European industrial middle-class. But Ryzova (2014), 
pointing to a Weberian distinction between status and material existence, emphasises that many 
expressed the culture without enjoying the employment. According to Ryzova, the effendiya 
joined forces with old merchant and artisan families, shop owners, private sector employees, 
and small and middle-scale entrepreneurs to constitute a diverse Egyptian middle-class. They 
also formed partnerships with rich landowners, who still dominated politics, finance, and 
administration in urban areas.  
 
Amr’s paternal grandfather worked as a doctor in Cairo, and lived in Shubra, a northern suburb. 
Amr was quick to stress that this was a ‘respectable’ middle-class area, not shaʿby like it is 
today. His mother’s father was a Professor at Cairo University, before becoming regional 
director of the World Health Organisation in the 1950s and 60s. Originally from Mansoura – 
                                                          
34 They were exempt from certain laws, such as tax duties, and ordinary Egyptians were prevented from entering  
elite areas (Reynolds, 2012). 
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where they owned land – Amr’s grandfather was educated in Germany in the 1920s. Other 
grandfathers of my upper-middle class interlocutors lived in upper and middle-class 
neighbourhoods of Cairo, and also occupied professional public sector jobs, as a military vet, 
agricultural engineer, lawyer brokering land deals, university professor, inspector of technical 
schooling, treasurer to the King, a top security official, banker in a government-owned bank, 
English teacher, and high-ranking military officer. Others represented the urban merchant class 
of the colonial era: one owned clothing stores in Saudi Arabia before moving to Egypt and 
setting up an ifrangy store in Downtown, one worked as the general manager of a bourgeois 
department store, Omar Effendi, one accumulated vast wealth trading Egyptian antiquities with 
Europe, and one worked as a fish merchant, owning multiple shops. Many of these 
grandparents enjoyed some form of international mobility or connection, whether through 
education abroad or in foreign-language schools in Cairo, through working abroad – one 
grandfather worked in Kuwait as a doctor, or through trading with European institutions. Many 
families also had rural origins, which included some form of landownership. Arafa’s 
grandfather, who worked as an agricultural engineer, belonged to a family that owned a large 
amount of land in what is now suburban Cairo. They were part of the landed elite that took 
advantage of new forms of employment in cities.  
 
From these testimonies, we can see that the families of my upper-middle class interlocutors, 
like Amr’s, were straddling the old elite of urban merchants and landowners, and the new urban 
middle-classes. They very often owned significant amounts of land, or merchant capital, and 
enjoyed international connectivity, which all signified bourgeois status. However, many had 
taken the public sector employment that rendered them part of the effendiya, and thus the new 
middle-class. As Perlmutter (1967) pointed out, it was often the children of the old elite who 
managed to secure this new bureaucratic employment. Through this, they developed an 
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identification with a ‘middle-class.’ By contrast, the families of my contemporary lower-
middle class interlocutors occupied very different positions in Egypt’s neo-colonial structure. 
Ibrahim’s paternal grandfather worked as a ceramics trader in the village, and his mother’s 
father was a primary school teacher in a nearby village. Neither family owned any land outside 
the houses in which they lived. Other grandparents lived in towns and villages outside Cairo, 
or in popular areas of the city, and worked as farmers, fishermen, barbers, curtain makers, 
factory workers, coffee shop owners, tailors, and small-scale traders. They also did not own 
land. Though their employment sometimes secured good money, along with their lack of land 
and education, it signified membership of the popular classes described above.   
 
Having established the historical divisions that existed between these two groups, the following 
section will describe how they were brought closer together through the socialist reforms of 
the mid-20th century into a more coherent ‘middle-class.’ 
 
The Nasser convergence 
  
The rise of the effendiya eventually led to the overthrow of Egypt’s colonial-era regime 
(Ryzova, 2014), their nationalist ideology directly conflicting with the regime’s dependence 
on the West (Kandil, 2012). In 1952, an officer named Gamal Abd el-Nasser led a military 
coup against the monarchy. He immediately cut off ties with the West and oriented Egypt 
towards the Soviet Union. After taking power – after the brief rule of Mohamed Naguib – 
Nasser initiated wide-ranging social reforms. His first target was the landed class, who 
effectively controlled parliament before the coup (Helal et al., 1986). Nasser attempted to 
sequester land from the largest landowners and redistribute it to farmers (Jankowski, 2000). 
Yet, this redistribution was far from transformative. By the 1980s, only 14% of agricultural 
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land owned by the largest landowners had been redistributed to 10% of agricultural households 
– usually wealthier peasants (Bush, 1999). Dispossessed landowners received compensation, 
and powerful landlords found various ways of retaining their land. Ray Bush (1999) concludes 
there was ultimately little shift in the balance of political and economic power. However, the 
families of my upper-middle class interlocutors were affected by these reforms. Many 
described how their family lost land, in their words it was “stolen.” They managed to keep 
everything under 200 feddans (211 acres) before 1965, and under 50 after.  
 
Furthermore, the rent these families took from property was also curtailed by a rental law 
introduced by Nasser that enforced a cap on rents and ensured tenants could keep the property 
under the same fixed price, despite inflation, for two generations. Arafa described how his 
father could not make money on the property he owned on his land throughout the 20th century. 
By 2015, the rental price had become extremely low (10LE (US$1.25) - 50LE (US$6.25) per 
month in 2015). Finally, the income gained from employment was also capped for those 
working in the government (Waterbury, 1983). Some people even lost employment as a result 
of the coup. Hamza’s grandfather, who worked in the organisation in charge of the King’s 
assets, lost his job – he only managed to avoid prosecution because he had gone to school with 
Mohamed Naguib’s brother. This incidentally illustrates the interconnections between the 
effendiya and traditional elites. Thereafter, Hamza’s grandfather lived off the rent from the 
land he owned in the delta.  
 
The 1952 Revolution therefore had the effect of curtailing the wealth, or economic capital, of 
the pre-Nasser elite. Their land was taken, their property rents limited, and their government 
wages were capped. But, Nasser’s socialist ideology also had at its heart the idea to create a 
much larger middle-class who could provide the workforce for the country’s economic 
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development. Nasser expanded access to education to many more Egyptians. People previously 
working as petty traders, agricultural labourers, and factory workers gained access to school 
and university education (technical, academic, and religious) – university enrolment tripled 
between 1952 and 1970 (de Koning, 2009). Every student graduating from secondary school 
and university was guaranteed a government job – with university graduates assured an office 
job. These jobs became available in the aftermath of an ambitious programme of 
industrialisation geared towards import substitution, and nationalisation.35 Nationalisation was 
in part a response to foreign and local capitalists refusing to invest money in industry, keeping 
it instead in land and real estate. The state assumed an increasingly dominant role in the 
economy and became its main employer. Public employment swelled from 770,000 to 1.1 
million between 1962 and 1967 (Brooks, 2008: 72–3). By the early 1980s over half the non-
agricultural workforce – and upwards of 20% of the total workforce – was employed by the 
state (Richards and Waterbury 1996: 184; Rutherford 2013). 
 
Both the children, and sometimes the grandparents themselves who resided in the ‘popular 
classes’ working as petty traders, factory workers, or agricultural labourers, benefited from this 
newfound access to public education and employment. Ibrahim’s father attended a newly 
established public school in the village, and went to an institute of religious education in the 
nearby town. His mother also attended school, thereafter entering the faculty of sciences at the 
University of Zagazig. Ibrahim’s father, after a period of working in ceramics with his father, 
took a job as a teacher in the country’s religious school system, Al-Azhar, with what he 
                                                          
35 By 1962 the private sector had been limited to land ownership (although a co-operative system monitored and 
controlled it), buildings (though rents were controlled and heavily taxed), construction and contracting, light 
industry, 25% of national exports, and 75% of internal trade – under state guidance (Zaalouk 1989). The 
government controlled infrastructure, heavy and medium industry, institutions of foreign trade, and financial 
operations.  
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described as a “good salary.” This income was aided by various state subsidies for food and 
fuel. He quickly built an apartment and married, with Ibrahim’s mother looking after the home.  
 
Other children of the popular classes also obtained government employment, in the distribution 
of food subsidies, as a train station official, and in a local tax office. These jobs all followed a 
technical education, which was lower than university level. They were considered to have given 
“good” salaries – 12LE (US$30) per month in the case of one father, which, according to him 
“easily” covered family expenses. After obtaining employment, parents generally quickly 
married and began looking for an old rental law property, or building an apartment or house 
with the help of parents. One father did manage to acquire a higher-level university education. 
Gamal’s father, the son of a barber, entered the faculty of engineering, before obtaining an 
engineering job in a government-owned company.  
 
These families were lifted up into a new Egyptian middle-class, that was based on “public 
sector jobs, Arabic state education, and a strong modernist and nationalist sense of belonging 
to an avant-garde of national culture” (Schielke, 2012: 37). This new definition of middle class-
ness was very much driven by the state, over a short time period. It reflects middle-class 
emergence in many Global South contexts in the mid-20th century, as a result of populist, 
developmentalist, modernist, state-driven economic policies (Davis, 2010; Heiman et al. 2012; 
Weiss, 2009). Historian Walter Armbrust laid out an intricate definition of what it meant to be 
middle-class in Egypt on the back of Nasserist reforms:  
 
“Middle class does not correlate with a material standard of living. Egyptians 
who have at least a high school education, and therefore basic literacy and familiarity 
with how modern institutions work, generally consider themselves middle class. 
 108 
 
Egyptians who think of themselves as middle class expect a lifestyle free from 
manual labour. In the media, the ideal of middle class is often associated with 
modernity, bureaucracy, and office work, and it is portrayed as having a degree of 
familiarity with an ideology of national identity that seeks to balance local Egyptian 
and classical Islamic cultural referents” (1999: 111). 
 
The middle-class did not only encompass public sector workers, but also more affluent sections 
of the self-employed, and owners of small businesses (Amin, 2000: 31-37, Abdel Moati, 2002). 
It straddled discourses which viewed the poor as suspect because of a failure to adjust to 
modern institutions, and the wealthy for a rootless cosmopolitanism and moral looseness 
(Armbrust, 1999: 112; see Lamont, 2002). Important also was adherence to a reformist notion 
of Islam as a clear set of rules, rather than the more mystically orientated traditions of the lower-
classes (Schielke, 2015). These families were not necessarily lifted up through increases in 
economic capital – indeed Ibrahim’s grandfather rejected a government job in a train station in 
favour of continuing in ceramics on these grounds. This was a symbolic rise, which rested on 
cultural markers of middle class-ness, on an educational certificate, a white-collar government 
job, and a rāqy (classy), educated sociability. They provided people with a sense of ‘comfort’ 
(raḥa), and ‘respectability’ (iḥtirām). These markers were strongly gendered, with men 
overwhelmingly responsible for providing income, and women taking control of the home, and 
styles of religiosity (Schielke, 2012).  
 
Various efforts have been made to estimate the size of this expanded middle-class, though as 
outlined in the Introduction this is notoriously difficult. Galal Amin (2000: 31-37) has 
estimated that Egypt’s middle-class increased from 19% in 1955 to 45% of the total population 
in 1986, a six fold increase. He based his measurement on income per family, and thus falls 
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foul of the same critiques levelled at other quantitative analyses (Wacquant, 1991). The middle-
class in 1986 encompassed families who earned between 300LE (US$420) and 10,000LE 
(US$14200) per month, a varied populace incorporating extreme affluence and modest living 
(ibid. 34). However, perhaps this fits with Walter Armbrust’s (1999) argument that identifying 
with a middle-class post-Nasser did not necessarily imply a minimum standard of living. 
Rather, education and non-manual employment were more significant. Reflecting this, Anouk 
de Koning (2009: 12), in her attempts to measure the middle-class in Cairo, took her definition 
from the share of professional and technical labour, concluding that this class made up about 
30% of Cairo’s population in 1999. 
 
It is widely agreed that during the 1950s and 1960s Egyptian society underwent a process of 
convergence. Economic, cultural, and consumptive disparities decreased, and the social 
opportunities available to many Egyptians expanded (Jankowski, 2000; Abu-Lughod, 1971). 
In a similar way to many parts of the world, conditions were put in place to enable a greater 
proportion of Egypt’s population to reach for and achieve middle-class respectability and 
comfort. This is reflected in the family histories of my interlocutors. Many who had resided in 
the popular classes were being pulled into a middle-class through access to education, stable 
government employment with a decent income, and access to healthcare, subsidies, and 
housing, while the traditional elites were in some ways restricted in their accumulation of 
wealth. Their land was partially sequestered and their property rents limited. Many were also 
positioned in government employment that restricted the opportunities for income growth.  
 
Older divisions however did not disappear. Elites used their pre-existing economic, cultural, 
and social capital to acquire a better education, and thereafter better public sector jobs. Amr’s 
father, born in 1938, began attending school before Nasser-era reforms. He went to what Amr 
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described as a well-known public school in Cairo. While at school he joined the scouts, which 
enabled him to travel to Lebanon. Amr’s parents both attended Cairo University. His father 
entered the faculty of medicine, and his mother the faculty of English literature. After 
university, they travelled abroad for further study. His father specialised in ophthalmology in 
London, and his mother – in part supported by money from the land her family held – did a 
Master’s degree in Leeds. After they returned to Egypt in the 1970s, each entered their 
appointed public sector jobs as professors at Cairo University. This carried a modest salary at 
the time of around 30LE (US$80) per month. They began renting an apartment in Mohandiseen 
under the Nasser-era old rent law.  
 
Most of the parents of the contemporary upper-middle class enjoyed a similar public education, 
attending what were described as “famous” public schools in Cairo and Alexandria – although 
one father went to a private British school in Cairo – before enrolment in government 
universities. Of the twelve fathers, seven entered the faculty of engineering – the most 
competitive to enter, four the faculty of commerce, and one the faculty of law. This secured 
access to higher-status government employment, such as landscape engineering, petroleum 
engineering, and work in a government bank. All of the mothers were also educated to 
university level. Although many subsequently did not take work after marriage, some entered 
government jobs, for example as an administrator in a government university, or as a bank 
employee.  
 
This reflects how the pre-1952 elites and effendiya were well-placed to capitalise on new 
avenues of employment in state institutions (Abdel-Fadil, 1980; Zaalouk, 1989). Bureaucrats, 
large and middling landowners, and urban merchants of the previous generation were able to 
send their children to the best schools – thereby securing high-levels of cultural capital – and 
 111 
 
thereafter ensure enrolment in university. This later led to higher-status public employment; 
engineers, doctors, and military officers in particular were becoming the heroes of the nation 
during this period. What is also evident is continued markers of elite status, such as connectivity 
with Europe, of which those lower down the social ladder may have been critical. Thus, even 
though they were incorporated into a Nasserist middle-class identity, divisions remained. As 
Egypt embarked on a process of opening up its economy in the decades that followed, their 
higher levels of economic, cultural, and social capital would enable this group to pull away 
again from the rest of Egypt’s middle-class, who themselves would experience increased 
instability. The following section explores this divergence.  
 
Neoliberal economic divergence 
 
Anwar Sadat took power in 1970 after Nasser’s death. While continuing the policies of 
extending education and government employment, the socialist developmentalist project began 
to unravel. Even before Nasser’s death, in the context of economic stagnation in the late-1960s, 
John Waterbury (1983: 222) describes how the goal of “extending basic services to all was 
quietly abandoned.” The state gradually began to accept growing income inequities, the neglect 
of basic welfare programs, and mounting discrepancies between social services. Furthermore, 
Zaalouk (1989) notes that government technocrats began to utilise their power over both private 
and public resources to serve their own business interests and increasingly lavish lifestyles with 
European goods. This group, along with the private sector bourgeoisie with which they 
developed partnerships, began in the late-60s to call for less state control of the economy, and 
greater space for private sector activity. 
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But it was under Sadat when the country began to change direction. During the 1970s he fast-
forwarded a discontinuous process of economic liberalisation and rapprochement with the 
West. A series of new laws were introduced under the label of ‘infitaah’ (opening), to make 
Egypt more attractive to international capital, and to give the local private sector both more 
freedom domestically and more encouragement to work with foreign enterprise (Jankowski, 
2000: 171). These policies seemingly represented common sense in response to a stagnating 
economy and rising government debt, which was worsened by two wars with Israel. By 1975 
the public deficit was LE1.3 billion (US$3.3 billion) and the trade deficit was LE1 billion 
(US$2.5 billion) (Zaalouk 1989: 55).  
 
As a result, opportunities for investment suddenly opened up to foreign and domestic capital, 
mainly in commercial, foreign-orientated, capital-intensive sectors rather than the industrial 
sector of the economy (Zaalouk, 1989). While the relative share of investment directed towards 
industrial and production activities (excluding petroleum) declined from 47% to 35.2% 
between 1973 and 1975 (Cooper, 1982: 111) – with the consequence that exports declined – 
the importation of consumer durables increased six-fold between 1975 and 1976. Bringing in 
luxury consumer goods promised high profit margins, but few employment opportunities. 
Aspiration was slowly redirected towards consumption: as captured by Sadat’s proclamation 
that “the goal of every Egyptian should be to have a car and a villa” (cited in Ghannam, 2002: 
29). The state also wanted to encourage saving and entrepreneurship, by introducing 
concessions on rent controls, higher-wages for some bureaucrats, and tax exemptions on certain 
company profits (Cooper, 1982). 
 
Liberalisation continued into the late-20th century, as the government faced further shortfalls 
in revenue, in part because of military expenditure to the US, defaults on loans to wealthy 
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entrepreneurs, and falls in oil prices in the wake of the 1990-91 Gulf conflict, which reduced 
the worker remittances being received from Egyptians who had migrated to the growing Gulf 
economies (Rutherford, 2013; Mitchell, 2016). In 1991, Hosni Mubarak – who became 
president after the assassination of Sadat in 1981 – agreed to impose IMF-sponsored economic 
reform and structural adjustment policies. The state began implementing “financial austerity 
measures, a depreciation of the exchange rate, elimination of price controls and subsidies, and 
public sector reform and privatization” (Kienle, 2001: 144). State expenditure was reallocated 
away from welfare and towards the private sector in the form of loans to businessmen from 
public banks, tax holidays for business ventures, and investments in infrastructure that 
benefited new production sites (Mitchell, 2002). By June 2000 the government had sold 
controlling interest in one third of its enterprises (Rutherford, 2013: 197). Egypt also joined the 
World Trade Organisation in 1995 with the requirement that the government reduce tariff and 
nontariff barriers to trade.  
 
The official IMF account paints a story of low inflation, reduced government deficit and foreign 
debt, and reasonable growth figures during the 1990s. But, Timothy Mitchell (2002) 
demonstrates how these figures were only enabled through influxes of speculative financial 
injections in real estate, which led to a construction boom geared towards a small number of 
wealthy Egyptians, instead of revived production or export expansion, which would have 
created jobs for the wider population. The economy therefore experienced growth in areas that 
served a wealthy ‘elite’ who had ties to the government. Various scholars have therefore noted 
that this period produced dramatic changes in Egypt’s social structure (Cooper, 1982; de 
Koning, 2009). An al-iqtiṣadi (the economy) editorial on November 15th 1976 stated that: 
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“the consumption liberalisation, and what it entails in the way of explosive 
inflation, has changed the structure of Egyptian society dangerously. After being 
divided into a poor class, a large middle class and a rich class, it has now become 
composed of a destitute class and a rich class, while the middle class has been 
transformed into a treadmill, straining on the path to maintain a minimum standard 
of living” (in Cooper, 1982: 107). 
 
The opening of the economy enabled the traditional bourgeoisie of the pre-Nasser years (large 
landowners and merchants), the bureaucratic and military strata of the Nasser period, and the 
commercial nouveaux riches performing new activities to accumulate capital (Zaalouk 1989; 
de Koning 2009). One set of my interlocutors managed to take part in this accumulation of 
wealth. In some ways their strategies reflect those of other ‘new middle-class’ populations in 
the Global South in the context of the growth of the private sector, property markets, and 
consumption (De Angelis, 2010; Ellis, 2011). However, in certain ways they depart from this 
narrative. Historical rural landownership, international migration, and the legal and political 
remnants of state socialism were vital in their rise.  
 
First, high-status government employees used their positions to take advantage of new avenues 
of wealth creation. Amr’s father, soon after entering the university, opened a private eye clinic 
in the early 1970s. His government salary in 2015 had reached 10,000LE (US$1250), but the 
private clinic has long provided his ‘main’ income. This is one example of government workers 
utilising their position to venture into the private sector. Government doctors began to serve 
clients who no longer wanted to attend ever more dilapidated public hospitals. Amr’s father 
opened his clinic in downtown Cairo, acquiring an apartment through the old rent law; an 
interesting illustration of how a legal remnant of socialism facilitated ventures into the market. 
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I asked Amr how his father afforded the machines he needed. He told me he had “saved money 
for himself and worked very hard.” He had used his cultural capital – in the form of 
qualifications – and economic capital from his job, while being facilitated by access to cheap 
property. Later, Amr’s mother also secured another income. In the late 1990s she was “loaned 
out” to October 6th University, which was the first national private university in Egypt, opening 
in 1996. This strategy is also reflective of new avenues of wealth production, this time 
stemming from the establishment of a private education system – which is discussed in more 
detail below. Although this also provided Amr’s mother’s main income, both parents ensured 
they remained at Cairo University because of pension and security benefits that continued to 
come with public sector employment.  
 
Other fathers were part of that bureaucratic segment which enjoyed increased salaries as a 
result of the infitaah. The petroleum engineer’s salary, for example, reached 30,000LE 
(US$7500) per month by 2000. However, most parents of my upper-middle class interlocutors 
had not entered government employment. They were entering the labour market in the mid-
1970s to early 1980s, and, reflecting socio-economic transformations that were already taking 
place, they entered employment in Egypt’s expanding private sector. Four fathers entered jobs 
in industries that were experiencing rapid growth: as a civil engineer for a petroleum company, 
a logistics manager in a US construction company, an engineer in a Lebanese construction 
company, and a lawyer in a private bank. These jobs afforded high salaries, with parents 
sometimes returning to education in order to enhance them. Kareem’s father, a petroleum 
engineer, took an MBA at AUC, with a cost of 20,000LE (US$6700), in the 1990s, which 
greatly increased his earnings. He could afford this degree through selling an apartment owned 
by his parents in Heliopolis, an upmarket area which was inhabited in the pre-Nasser years by 
traditional Egyptian elites and Europeans. This shows how these families were able to use their 
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inherited privilege in order to take advantage of new forms of economic capital flooding into 
the private sector. This form of inherited wealth, a property in an upmarket area, was unleashed 
by the expansion of a private property market. On this occasion, it was reconverted into a 
distinguished form of cultural capital (an AUC certificate), which enabled greater earning 
potential.  
 
A similar strategy was used by Hamza’s father, who worked as an engineer in a Lebanese 
construction company. In the mid-1990s he was earning 700LE (US$205) per month as vice-
manager. In order to enhance earnings that were declining in reach due to inflation, he decided 
to “go it alone,” using the contacts he had established. In order to fund the initial outlays he 
borrowed money from his parents, who sold rural land they owned in Mansoura. Thus, again, 
historically-owned economic capital, held in rural land, enabled this family to take advantage 
of new avenues of capital accumulation opening up in construction.  
 
Owning private companies was something five fathers of my upper-middle class interlocutors 
managed to achieve in the late-20th century. Two had grown companies their parents had run; 
for example the son of the fish merchant expanded the company into high-end food and 
beverage imports. This is a sector which, as I mentioned, experienced rapid growth in the late-
20th century. Abeer, his daughter, described to me how her father had been lucky, “in the right 
place at the right time.” Another father managed to open a company as a result of a brief period 
spent earning money abroad. As Egypt was opening itself up to the world in the 1970s and 80s, 
there was an explosion of employment opportunities in the Gulf due to soaring oil prices. For 
a period, this offset the declining number of jobs in Egypt’s industrial sectors, as well as the 
inflation afflicting the real incomes of middle-class salaried workers (Amin, 2000). Five of the 
twelve fathers of my interlocutors travelled to the Gulf in the 1980s.  
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Yusuf’s father only travelled for a short period, but it made a drastic difference to his life. He 
grew up in a small apartment in Giza, a lower-middle class area. His father was a military 
officer, but his parents divorced when he was young. His mother, who did not work, had to 
raise six children in an apartment his father had previously bought. She made money renting 
out rooms under the old rent law. Though this provided some money, the rent became almost 
worthless. They therefore lived in difficult conditions, but Yusuf’s father managed to enter 
Cairo University’s faculty of engineering after graduating from a famous government school 
in Giza. Only three of the six brothers entered university. Yusuf said his grandmother valued 
education, and his father was often the highest performer in school – but he admitted free 
education helped. In the second year of university, in the early 1980s, Yusuf’s father travelled 
to Iraq for the summer, missing one semester. His older brother had gone to Iraq to work as a 
carpenter, and so he went to help him. Because of the strong Iraqi currency, at this time one 
dinar was equivalent to three US dollars, he managed to earn a lot of money. Upon returning 
to Cairo he opened a copy shop at the university. He apparently went from being one of the 
poorest students to the richest, even buying a car. Upon graduating in 1984, along with a partner 
he opened a business importing computers from abroad and selling or renting them to 
companies inside Egypt. The company was extremely successful, one of the three biggest in 
the field until the early 2000s. 
 
This set of events shows how a brief period in the Gulf enabled people to take advantage of 
avenues of wealth accumulation in Egypt, in the context of the import boom that followed the 
infitaah. Yusuf’s father had managed to travel due to his good quality education, and his social 
connections. Two other fathers travelled permanently to the Gulf, because of the vastly superior 
salaries. Fathi’s father travelled to Saudi Arabia after graduating from the faculty of commerce, 
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Ain Shams University, with the help of his brother who worked in the Bin Laden Company. 
He worked in a construction company as an accountant. His salary in 2016 was 15,000 Riyal 
(70,000LE) per month. The company also pays half the family rent.  
 
I have described above the different ways in which these families managed to accumulate large 
amounts of capital through their employment activities as Egypt opened up its economy. They 
used their cultural capital (a good quality education), social capital (familial connections used 
to secure migration or business ownership), and economic capital (inherited land and property) 
to take advantage of opportunities in an expanding private sector, both in Egypt and abroad. 
Although all of the fathers held employment, nine out of the thirteen mothers remained in the 
home; this indeed enabled fathers to earn wages. However, some women contributed 
significant funds themselves through work outside the home. One worked in a private bank – 
earning in 2015 between 20-30,000LE per month, and one even opened a business in the 
importation of pharmaceutical and chemical raw materials. Even if they did not hold 
employment, many mothers also contributed in the form of land they had inherited.36 This leads 
us on to a discussion of a final avenue of wealth accumulation for these families, investment in 
real estate. 
 
Opportunities for real estate investment resulted from a massive construction boom that was 
enabled in the 1980s by the lifting of rent controls, restrictions on foreign companies and 
individuals buying property, the release of state-owned land, and subsidised cement and steel 
(Sims, 2014). Arafa described to me how old rent contracts on properties his father owned 
finally ended in the mid-2000s, which provided an avenue of rapid wealth accumulation as 
                                                          
36 Female inheritance is not guaranteed, which leads to many women being excluded due to fears of it going to 
their husbands (Hussein, 2017) 
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some properties were sold, and others were rented out at a more “sensible” market price. Even 
during the rent control period the rents doubled his modest government salary, but opening the 
property market now enabled inherited forms of privilege to be transformed into a strategy of 
accumulation. After marrying, Amr’s parents soon became interested in property. This was 
facilitated by public universities giving professors the chance to buy land below market price 
– again highlighting how high-status public employment opened opportunities for capital 
accumulation in the private sector. In the late 1980s they bought a house on Egypt’s north coast, 
and another apartment in central Cairo to rent out. Buying, renovating, and selling property 
became what Amr described as a “retirement plan,” overseen by his mother who worked part-
time. By the time that I met Amr, they had done this with six properties. In the early 1970s, his 
father bought land in the desert in what is now an exclusive new town replete with gated 
communities. Back then it was empty farmland, and cost less than the price of a car. His father 
had no idea it would later be the site of massive redevelopment, “it was just luck,” Amr said.37 
They built two houses on this plot into which the family would eventually move, and a third 
small house for a farmer who works the land. They also inherited land in Nasr city, a middle-
class district in eastern Cairo from his dad’s brother. In the late 1990s they began renting houses 
to families and foreigners, making tenants pay in foreign currency, which was now allowed. 
They still have the marital apartment they rented under the old rent law, which they also rent 
out at market rates. They bought another in 1992 in another upper-middle class district in 
central Cairo, and a third in 2000 in Sheikh Zayed. Amr emphasised how the “crazy” property 
boom of the 1980s had enabled his family’s real estate exploits, which has seen prices increase 
between 44% and 148% per year in some upper-middle class areas (Shawkat, 2016).  
 
                                                          
37 The frequent reference to ‘luck’ gives lie to the upper-middle classes’ insistence, which is illustrated in the 
following chapter, that social mobility is possible through hard work. 
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Though these families have privileged backgrounds, their fortunes shot upwards in the second 
half of the 20th and early 21st century. They used their pre-existing capitals (or privilege) to 
take advantage of new avenues of wealth accumulation. I will describe in the next section how 
this economic capital was reconverted into forms of cultural capital to enable the assertion of 
new markers of middle class-ness, based on private education and employment. But first, I will 
explain how those who had been lifted into the middle-class under Nasser experienced the 
opposite trend. Almost immediately following the infitaah, the value of Egypt’s currency began 
declining and inflation took hold. This was directly related to the wealth accumulation of the 
upper-classes, as lagging production and fast expanding consumption devalued the Egyptian 
pound. In the mid-1970s the Egyptian pound was equal to US$2.5. In the mid-1990s this had 
more than reversed, the dollar was equal to 3.4 Egyptian pounds. By 2011, the pound had 
dropped to US$6, before declining after the Revolution to over US$8 by 2015 – it has since 
declined even more. 
 
This currency devaluation had a large effect on the relative reach of many Egyptians. While 
some found ways to increase their income and wealth, those in the lower echelons of the 
middle-class were experiencing a stagnation of both. Ibrahim’s father began working as a 
teacher in 2000. He originally earned 800LE (US$200) per month. By 2015, his salary was 
2000LE, which equalled only US$250 per month. The salary of Nabawy’s parents was even 
less, at 1200LE (US$150) per month – this had been increased from 800LE before the 2011 
Revolution. These parents remained in the government employment to which they had 
originally been appointed, but in lower-level jobs in which salaries did not increase after the 
infitaah. Through rounds of liberalisation and privatisation, the government continued to 
employ a relatively large percentage of the workforce – upwards of 20% in the mid-1980s 
(Rutherford, 2013) – as well as extend food and fuel subsidies (Assaad, 1997). This represented 
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an effort to allay the structural unemployment and inflation caused by liberalisation as capital 
concentrated in non-productive sectors. Though designed to provide a buffer against 
impoverishment, stagnating wages pushed many people towards it. The 2016 World Bank 
report measured the middle-class as those earning US$4.90 (LE29) per day in 2005, and found 
a decrease from 14.3% to 9.8% between 2000 and 2010. Nabawy’s parents were pushed outside 
this bracket.  
 
A dual labour market thus emerged in the aftermath of economic liberalisation (de Koning, 
2009). Internationally-orientated sectors – including multinational companies, large Egyptian 
corporations such as telecoms companies and commercial banks, agencies that offer business 
producer services to multinationals, NGOs with foreign funding, and private firms delivering 
services to an affluent clientele such as doctors in private clinics or architects – provide wages 
on average five times higher than comparable firms outside the internationally-orientated 
segment (de Koning 2009: 74; Abdelrahman 2007). In 2002 a secretary in a small office of an 
Egyptian company would earn LE250 per month as opposed to LE2500, for an executive 
secretary in a large company. Similarly, an engineer in a small business earned a salary of 
between LE500-1500 compared to LE5000 in a multinational or local up-market construction 
company (LE1000 equalled between 200-250 Euros) (de Koning, 2009: 75).  
 
These two sets of families followed divergent paths within this labour market. However, the 
lower-middle classes also engaged in additional activities to supplement their salaries. 
Ibrahim’s father still sometimes makes ceramic floors, operates as a broker for land deals in 
the village, and raises and sells birds. These activities provide additional funds for the family. 
With this money Ibrahim’s father recently bought a piece of land on the edge of the village that 
will be used to build homes for his grandchildren. However, unlike Amr’s family, this move 
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into real estate was not an immediate accumulation strategy, but rather provided security 
against rising house prices. Another father ran a curtain-making business in the evenings after 
finishing work at the train station. Though these activities were important income sources, they 
represent extremely different ventures from those of the upper-middle classes.  
 
Thus, the trend reflected here is one of rising economic inequality. While some accumulated 
vast wealth, national Egyptian figures demonstrate that, by the mid-90s a quarter of the 
population were poor, with another quarter living on the margins of poverty (Assaad and 
Rouchdy, 1999: 11). The story that emerges out of neoliberalisation is therefore the arrival of 
a dual economy (Singerman and Amar, 2006). This economy was orientated towards 
commercial enterprise, and away from productive sectors, thereby leading to increasing 
deprivation outside an exclusive group. In the following section, I demonstrate how the 
newfound discrepancies in economic capital described in this section led to discrepancies in 
cultural capital amongst these two sets of families. One converted their economic resources 
into new legitimate markers of belonging to a globalised upper-middle class, and another 
struggled to hang on to the state-dependent middle-class lives they had been provided under 
the Nasser regime.  
 
But before that, I want to emphasise that it could have been different for some families. 
Ibrahim’s father travelled to Saudi Arabia in 1980, before taking his appointed teaching job. 
He stayed for three years, working in ceramics and earning a good salary. He saved enough 
money to build an apartment in the village and marry. However, he suddenly had to return to 
Egypt because his father had become ill. This move drastically decreased his earning potential. 
He could have been reaping the benefits of a prolonged salary in the Gulf, but instead had 
become dependent on low public-sector wages in Egypt. Gamal’s father had a similar 
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experience. Having graduated from engineering and starting work in a private company, he 
suddenly had to leave. As the oldest, after his father became ill, he had to support his younger 
siblings. Engineering would not provide enough income in the short-term, so he left to start a 
small furniture business in the popular/lower-middle class area in which he lived with his wife. 
Gamal described how his father sacrificed a career in engineering, and a better salary. 
According to Gamal, he remains regretful and angry to this day. Gamal’s aunt now works as a 
successful lawyer, and his uncle works as a newspaper editor, both jobs which offer a better 
salary, and middle-class prestige. These stories show how sometimes it is decisions or events 
outside the realm of class that have a bearing on socio-economic trajectories. These two 
families could have benefited from the same avenues of wealth accumulation as those in the 
upper-middle classes, but instead they were pushed into a precarious lower-middle class. 
 
Growing up in different middles 
 
Immediately upon meeting Amr and Ibrahim, the difference between their social worlds was 
clear. When I met Amr, I gave him the greeting I would always give Ibrahim, a kiss on both 
cheeks. Amr though recoiled in shock, saying: “no one has done that in ages.” This act was not 
something men in his social circles engaged in, it was considered shaʿby. Amr had suggested 
we meet in a new restaurant in Downtown called ‘‘aish w’ malaḥ’ (Bread and Salt), a trendy 
spot that sold a mixture of European food for 70LE (GBP6) upwards. It is a place I felt 
comfortable in, but Ibrahim would never have gone. It was both ridiculously priced and the 
atmosphere too uptight. Ibrahim preferred to meet in noisy aḥāwy balady (local cafés) on the 
street. ‘aish we malaḥ was also full of women either not wearing headscarves or wearing them 
in fashionable ways. By contrast, women in Ibrahim’s village wore a long black galabiyya 
(dress). One also often heard English in the restaurant. Amr himself described English as a first 
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language – we would never speak in Arabic. Ibrahim, although still able, often made mistakes 
and struggled with fluency. His strong accent rendered visible his Arabic education.  
 
The capital accumulation of their parents enabled their children, my upper-middle class 
interlocutors, to acquire ‘new’ cultural markers of distinction that define belonging to Egypt’s 
‘upper-middle class’ (de Koning, 2009; Peterson, 2011). In Bourdieu’s terms, they converted 
their economic capital into institutionalised (education or specialised knowledge), and 
embodied (personality, speech, and skills) cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986). Since the infitaah, 
the Nasserist middle-class identity based on public sector employment, public education, and 
nationalist politics has been overlain by another, centred on “global connection, versatility, 
metropolitan tastes, language skills, and well-paid professional jobs in the private sector” 
(Schielke, 2012: 37). The state, educational and employment institutions, the media, and people 
themselves have all contributed to this shift. It represents a shift in the way Egypt is governed 
and represented, and in the way the modern is defined, away from the nation and towards the 
globe – and predominantly the West. It also reflects the state’s ambitions to bring Egypt into 
the ‘first world.’ These markers echo those described in other parts of the Global South that 
define membership of the global middle-classes on the back of neoliberal reforms: private 
sector employment and amenities, and globalised forms of consumption (Liechty, 2003; 
Fernandes, 2006; Zhang, 2010). However, crucially, these markers are often not new – global 
connectivity has signified a high-status in Egypt since colonialism.  
 
A plethora of new urban places have emerged which reflect, and enable the acquisition of, these 
markers. Cairo has seen an explosion of internationalised private educational institutions, gated 
communities, new office developments, and upscale shopping malls that reflect the Egyptian 
government’s ambition to construct a ‘global capital city,’ as well as providing rapid avenues 
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for capital accumulation (Ghannam, 2002; Sims, 2014). In this section, I move away from a 
focus in the literature on consumptive performances amongst middle-class populations in the 
Global South (Liechty, 2003), and instead describe how new forms of education and 
employment enabled Egypt’s upper-middle classes to distinguish themselves from others, as 
modern, open-minded, educated, and cultured. However, I also reveal how these ‘new’ lines of 
distinction rest on historically formed privilege.  
 
Growing up global 
 
Amr, along with all of my other interlocutors, described himself as upper-middle class rather 
than ‘upper-class’ or ‘elite.’ They described Egypt’s upper-class, or contemporary elite, as 
people who had ‘million pound mansions,’ owned huge businesses, and who were connected 
to high-ranking government officials. Egypt’s elite is now understood to consist of a small 
group of politically connected individuals who became extremely wealthy in the Mubarak era 
on the back of favourable government loans, land and industry sales, and tax breaks (Kandil, 
2012). The label upper-middle class defines a wider population who enjoy the markers defined 
above. However, the boundaries are difficult to pin down: the parents of some of my 
interlocutors indeed owned businesses. Their self-labelling also reflected an unwillingness to 
label themselves as part of an elite or upper-class. I have therefore chosen to use the term upper-
middle class because of their labelling, and because they reflect the upper-middle class 
definitions utilised in previous literature (de Koning, 2009; Schielke, 2012). Furthermore, even 
though huge gulfs in wealth emerged between them and the lower-middle classes – thus 
questioning the legitimacy of positioning them in the same ‘class’ – this upper-middle class 
label reflects the notion that Egypt’s middle-class does not correspond to a precise material 
standard of living (Armbrust, 1999).  
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My interlocutors all grew up in upmarket neighbourhoods. Amr was raised in Mohandiseen, 
an area which was associated with a Nasserist professional middle-class, but which is now 
known for its fashionable cosmopolitan shops and restaurants, and, as stated, has one of the 
country’s most expensive real-estate markets. Others lived in Giza – close to the Nile where 
real estate prices are highest, Nasr city – a newer middle-class neighbourhood where ‘new 
money’ accumulated in the Gulf is invested, and Heliopolis – an older, more established area 
where Egyptian elites and Europeans lived under colonial rule. Some were either already living, 
or about to move, to properties in exclusive gated communities that have sprung up in the 
outskirts of the city (Zhang, 2010; Ballard & Jones, 2011). These properties played an 
important part in accumulation strategies, but they also provide the upper-middle/upper-classes 
with the ability to escape inner-city areas which they describe as becoming overcrowded, noisy, 
and dirty. 
 
Amr, unlike his parents, did not attend government school. He attended a private German 
school costing thousands of pounds each year, in which he took the German abitur – in a 
mixture of German and English. While all of the parents, except one set, attended free Arabic 
government schools in the 1960s and 1970s, every one of their children attended fee-paying 
private schools in foreign languages. These included Islamic or secular language schools where 
one studied an Egyptian curriculum in English and French and experimental language schools 
that represent a government attempt to offer non-Arabic education for a lower fee, but the 
majority went to more expensive international schools which taught English, French, German, 
International Baccalaureate, or American curricula. For this population, private international 
schooling has become a necessary marker of class belonging. Indeed, de Koning (2009) goes 
so far as to measure the size of the ‘upper-middle class’ from the percentage of students 
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enrolled in private secondary school education. She posited that it makes up 15-20% of Cairo’s 
professional middle class, and between 5-7% of all Cairenes. While not necessarily accurate, 
this correlates with Mitchell’s (2002) position that only 5% of Egypt’s population can afford 
the consumption of upscale goods and services – like private schools. 
 
Under Nasser, most schools were nationalised to give the state control over the curriculum. 
Government schools, especially those in big cities, were renowned for their quality. But a dual 
consequence of Egypt’s economic liberalisation has been their drastic decline in quality, along 
with the growth of private alternatives. By 1999/2000, 20% of ‘thanawiyya ‘amma (high 
school) students were enrolled in private schools in Cairo, and they totalled 10% of Egyptian 
schools (7,000 – a hundred of which are international schools). In the late-70s the state 
decreased expenditure on a range of public services, including health care and education, while 
the numbers using them continued to rise. At the same time, in response to increasing demand 
for alternative education options, the government began to stimulate private investment, 
through tax incentives and relaxing (de facto) control over curricula. This was in part a response 
to a realisation that a deteriorating public education system could not meet the demands of the 
international commercial economy (Mehrez, 2008). It also reflects a trend repeated around the 
world in the context of neoliberalisation, of a decline in direct government investment in public 
services, and increased privatisation. There was also an influx of international development 
assistance into education in this period, with donors prioritising western norms and interests, 
thus directing education towards international socialisation (ibid. 101).  
 
The price of schools attended by my interlocutors ranged from 5000LE (US$1500-830) to 
35,000LE (US$10000-5800) per year in the 1990s and 2000s.38 This was afforded through the 
                                                          
38 The prices in USD reflect conversion rates in the year 1990 and 2000.  
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economic capital they had accumulated over the years. Ali for example attended an 
International General Certificate of Secondary Education (IGCSE) school in the mid-2000s, 
costing 15,000LE per year. This equalled four months of his father’s salary as a logistics 
manager at an Egyptian clothing company. In order to afford the education, his father took a 
bank loan, and repaid it over time by selling a piece of land inherited from his parents. This 
reflects again how historical rural landownership enabled the reproduction of class belonging 
in the 21st century. Ali’s parents also entered a ‘gama‘eya,’ a rotating credit scheme shared by 
family and friends. This reflects similar schemes around the world (Bouman, 1995), but it is 
important to recognise they are differentially accessible to people, and successful, depending 
on their wealth and the wealth of those they know.  
 
When I asked why my interlocutors had not attended government schools, I would receive 
laughter in response. Going to private school is now something ‘everybody does.’ Kareem 
attended an Islamic private school that taught both an Egyptian curriculum and a British one in 
English and French. He described the difference between the two: “in English in the Egyptian 
curriculum we were basically learning ABC at GCSE, while in the foreign one we were reading 
Owen and Dickens, it was crazy.” English fluency is therefore a significant marker of 
difference between contemporary private and government education. However, Arafa, who 
went to the same school, described to me – in perfect English – how there were many other 
problems with government schools that meant upper-middle class families had to avoid them: 
 
“It’s really important the way you are educated, and not just because it’s in 
English, that’s irrelevant. In the public school you are 50-60 students in class. 
Teachers don’t pay attention to students. In private schools its better…education 
itself is very different. In public schools for example, you get to 10th grade and they 
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can’t read or write. It’s that bad, especially ones outside Cairo. Plus it’s dangerous, 
kids fight all the time, so parents of the upper-class, upper-middle class usually send 
their kids to private schools.” 
 
Arafa went on to describe how the mentality one acquires in private school is important:  
 
“it’s more the mentality that makes a difference rather than content…you are 
prepared to be successful, and think about how to be successful in your career, other 
kids are caring about carrying a knife, and being badass. This matters from an early 
age. Richer kids are trained to channel competition into sports, not being a gangster. 
In my class people were trained in looking for a career, other parents train their kids 
for being street-smart and tough.”  
 
Unlike when their parents attended school, government schools in Egypt are now considered 
by the upper-middle classes to produce people who are not only uneducated, but violent, and 
prepared for the toughness of the streets rather than a ‘career.’ Arafa also described how the 
privately-educated develop a “questioning mentality,” or critical thinking. Government 
education does not get people to “think for themselves,” it is based on memorising material for 
an exam. They also do not provide labour market skills such as presentation, or communication, 
which require self-confidence. In private schools these are learned through student activities. 
Another man described how government education “kills ethics,” as it is easy to cheat in exams 
and get away without studying. These impressions are also reproduced in development 
documents. A UNDP Arab Human Development Report describes government schools as 
providing programmes “dominated by didactic not interactive instruction with a drive to install 
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loyalty, obedience, and support for the regime in power, besides being drenched in social 
inhibitions and religious taboos” (Mehrez, 2008: 101).  
 
In these descriptions of the deficiencies that stem from government education, these privately-
educated men are also saying something about themselves. They are marking their distinction 
as respectable, professional, critical, ethical, and educated. Michelle Lamont (2002) labelled 
this practice as ‘boundary-work,’ the attempt of one social group to demarcate themselves over 
others and acquire ‘self-worth.’ It represents the conversion of economic capital into embodied 
cultural capital that enables distinction within the field of employment, a process made easier 
by new divisions in education (Bourdieu, 1986). It also reflects what Shamus Khan (2012) 
recently noted in US private schools, how privilege becomes crystallised into certain individual 
character traits. In turn, these upper-middle class young men and women are exercising what 
Bourdieu termed symbolic violence over the publically-educated, positioning them as people 
who belong in the streets, not professional settings.   
 
In universities too, new lines of distinction have opened up. Again, every parent attended 
government universities. But when Amr told his parents he wanted to study law at public 
university, they laughed because “people in this faculty are considered losers as they only 
achieved 80% on the thanawiyya ‘amma (high-school exam).” Amr went to the AUC instead 
to study Economics. Of the 13 men and women I interviewed, eight went to private universities 
– three to the AUC to study Economics, and five to the German University to study computer 
and electrical engineering. The fees, when they entered in the mid-2000s, ranged from 
35,000LE to 70,000LE per year. The AUC is one of the oldest universities in Egypt, established 
in 1919. But the GUC, opened in 2003, reflects a recent wave of private university openings; 
in 2015 there were 35. In 2012/13, 22,000 students were enrolled at more than 20 private 
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universities, out of 2.3 million students (CAPMAS, 2015).39 This decision was again stimulated 
by many of the discourses described above. In the UNDP report, public universities were also 
subject to scrutiny. They are reported to “lack adequate financial, human and material resources 
and provide poor-quality education that is at once mediocre, dogmatic and conservative” 
(Mehrez, 2008: 95).  
 
However, although suspicion of public universities is embedded in an upper-middle class 
disposition, and widely shared, the picture remains complicated. When these young men and 
women were leaving high school, private universities remained limited in number, and 
extremely expensive. Thus, five attended government universities, yet the faculties entered, 
pharmacy and engineering, reveal their privilege. There remain some departments in 
government universities with a good reputation, namely engineering, medicine, pharmacy, 
political science, as well as certain language departments. Intense competition has developed 
for these faculties – with near perfect scores on the high-school exam required. Therefore those 
with good quality schooling hold an advantage.  
 
But, even those who did not get the grades managed to circumvent a bad result by paying 
money. Three attended faculties in public universities that now charge fees. In the 1990s 
universities began opening French and British language sections, which teach the same 
curriculum, but require a previous language education to enter (Amin, 1999). Arafa got 89.7% 
in the high school exam – which he said was not high. He was rejected from his first choices, 
so applied to study commerce in a public university. He quickly stressed this was the English 
section, which had a good reputation; he did not think about going to the Arabic section. To 
                                                          
39 http://arabdevelopmentportal.com/sites/default/files/publication/852.egypt-statistical_yearbook_2015_-
_education.pdf 
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enter, one had to have attended an English school, and pay 5000LE per year. Arafa described 
the campus as fancy and posh (rāqy in Arabic). It was separated from the Arabic section, but 
men from the Arabic section would come to look at the “non-hijab wearing women,” Arafa 
said. This was a proper university Arafa stressed, “where they take attendance and you have to 
do a dissertation, way different to the Arabic section where you don’t have to turn up.”  
 
Arafa, again, alludes to new lines of distinction that have opened up in Egypt’s university 
system. The Arabic section of the faculty of commerce, along with law and humanities, though 
once prestigious have now become known as the country’s ‘kullyāt al shaʿb’ (faculties of the 
people). Some of the parents of my upper-middle class interlocutors attended these faculties, 
obtaining professional jobs afterwards. But now they are widely-known as faculties where 
people go “just to get a certificate,” and struggle to find jobs afterwards. This situation has 
resulted from continued expansion in enrolment – in 2000/2001 20% of the college age 
population (17-22) were enrolled in higher education compared to just 6.9% in 1970 (de-
Koning, 2009: 48) – alongside chronic underinvestment. Consequentially, those who cannot 
get the evermore impossible grades to enter prestigious faculties are bundled into the faculties 
of the people. The upper-middle classes avoid them through a mixture of cultural capital 
acquired in school, and added injections of economic capital that enable them to enter private 
universities, or fee-paying sections of public universities.  
 
These educational trajectories enabled the upper-middle classes, through the institutionalised 
and embodied cultural capital, and social capital they had gained, to enter what has become 
high-status employment matching their global dispositions. After the infitaah, “Nasser-era 
celebrations of the professional middle-class, symbolised by the engineer and the doctor, have 
made way for iconic images of young professionals in the hyper-modern offices of 
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internationally-orientated companies” (de Koning, 2009: 37). Entrepreneurs have also been a 
recent addition to this (Schielke, 2012). It is now these workers that are depicted as the ideal 
representatives of the country’s modern ambitions. Thus, when Amr graduated he no longer 
looked to the government for employment. He had joined the entrepreneurship society at AUC. 
This led him into Cairo’s budding entrepreneurship scene. In an event that poignantly illustrates 
his social capital, upon graduating, Amr was simply told by a friend of a friend, who had 
established a tech start-up, “you are working with us.” He is now working on his own start-up, 
a mobile app mapping Cairo’s web of microbuses. Two more interlocutors also began working 
in entrepreneurship upon graduation, but most obtained jobs in multinational companies, as 
financial analysists, software engineers, computer programmers, and civil engineers in PwC, 
Dell, ECS, Nestle, GSK, Euromoney. One person went to take a Master’s in Germany, with 
two others planning to do the same.40 
 
The government is now a place to avoid for the upper-middle classes. First, it is low-paid 
compared to jobs in the international economy. But more important, the culture (thakāfa) does 
not fit them. Language is an important part of this, as the government overwhelmingly operates 
in Arabic, whereas many of the upper-middle classes are more comfortable in English. 
However, reflecting narratives about government education, people also described how, in the 
government, “nobody does any work,” everything is very slow, robotic, inefficient, and 
repetitive, and ‘corruption’ is rife. It thus does not fit their critical or ethical subjectivities. 
Conversely, multinational companies are constantly innovating, fast-paced, require critical 
thinking, and offer advancement opportunities. Technology is also important here. Technology 
in Egypt, as around the world, has come to signify modernisation. Amr, for example, is working 
                                                          
40 All of the women I interviewed were working, and planned to continue after marriage. This represents a 
significant shift from the previous generation.  
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on a technological fix to a transport infrastructure that many in the upper-middle classes, even 
though they rarely use it, perceive as ‘chaotic.’ The entrepreneurship scene in general, as one 
employee of a start-up platform told me, favours “innovative, scalable start-ups. Things which 
are new, adding value to society and things that can be scaled up outside Egypt…a ‘fuwwl’ 
(fava beans) car is not a start-up, as it is not new.” This distinguishes upper-middle class 
entrepreneurs from be‘aiyyn (sellers) who work in the street as stallholders, or shop owners. 
 
People working in international companies are also assumed to be different to those working 
in the government and local private sector, both in regards to the distinctions described above, 
but also in their culture. Kareem described a difference between “someone who is happy with 
shisha and local food, and someone who wants to go to France and fine dine.” This reflects 
what previous scholars have identified, that a certain type of “familiarity and comfortableness 
with ‘barra,’ an imagined First World abroad” is now an essential marker of upper-middle class 
belonging (de Koning, 2009: 65). There are many bodily markers of this international 
orientation: the clothes one wears – for women the type of hijab they wear (if one is worn at 
all) – the food one eats, the way one speaks Arabic or English, hand gestures one uses, and, 
indeed, the way in which men introduce themselves to each other.  
 
However, these surface-level markers only serve to represent a deeper character. Arafa 
described this when we were discussing how he recruits employees in interviews for his 
company. He had previously described how companies find people through asking employees 
if they know any friends looking for jobs, and sorting CVs by people who went to private 
schools or universities, thus uncovering the institutionalised cultural capital, and social capital 
required to secure entry. But these were done to ensure they interviewed people with the right 
‘mentality’: 
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“I don’t know how to describe it, but you know when you sit with a person 
and he’s an open-minded person and you talk about different topics and knows about 
lots of things, and you listen to someone else who doesn’t know anything. It’s not 
technicalities, not what he studied, just narrow-mindedness. This is a very common 
interview question; what was the last film you saw, or what’s your favorite band, 
what music do you listen to, did you travel, things that have nothing to do with your 
education but make a huge difference, and the problem is it limits certain classes of 
society, it’s very socially based, it automatically gets some social classes out of the 
equation, because their interests are different. If you have any client-facing job, you 
need to impress people, by the way you talk, dress, how witty you are. You don’t 
have to be smart actually, you have to know how to look smart, talking about foreign 
politics, about current events.” 
 
Being open-minded, and not judgmental of other ways of living a life, is presented as ethical. 
This perhaps reflects the boundary work of educated ‘liberals’ in many contexts. According to 
Arafa, an “open-minded” habitus, or an “international mentality,” is created, not through 
education, but through one’s family, social circle, and neighbourhood. Crucially, this can only 
come from historical privilege, not from getting rich quick. If a family becomes rich, and sends 
their child to a “fancy private school,” but they are uneducated and still live in slums 
(‘ashwa’yāt) surrounded by shaʿby people, they would not develop this mentality. You have to 
be ‘ibn al-nass’ (a son of the people). This is originally an Ottoman term describing military 
officers and notables, but now connotes someone who is well-raised, who has a good 
background. Sons of the people are, as a result, respectful (muḥtaram) and polite (mw‘addab), 
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but they are also educated, and able to follow international consumption trends – thus it is tied 
to wealth.  
 
Its opposite is someone who is shaʿby. Shaʿby people are considered to be closed-minded and 
ignorant with regards to other cultures. Again, this is reproduced by the UNDP report on 
government education, which states that it produces “thousands who have a fossilised 
relationship with their own culture, and are suspicious of, if not antagonistic to, other cultures 
in the world” (2008: 101). Shaʿby people are also vilified as rude, and vulgar (mu‘affin), 
because they use swear words and speak in a derogatory way about, or harass, women. It is 
thus highly gendered. It also brings into question one’s religiosity. Shaʿby people are often 
considered hypocritical by the upper-classes, in that they judge others for their lack of Islamic 
piety, yet at the same time harass women or smoke hashish.  
 
Arafa stressed that it is easy to see through someone who is faking an upper-middle class 
mentality, but who is “really ‘shaʿby’ in background.” He said he felt bad for people who take 
English or computer courses to improve themselves, because “they do not make much 
difference.” The new lines of distinction expressed by these upper-middle classes were 
produced out of generations of historical privilege and many years of upbringing in specific 
social circles. In the next section, I describe how, by contrast to the fortunes of the upper-
middle classes, many middle-class Egyptians have experienced increasing difficulty with 
living a symbolically respectable middle-class life. 
 
Growing up shaʿby 
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Schielke (2012) explains that the old image of a modernist and committed civil servant has not 
been abandoned in Egypt. It has rather been complimented by an increased focus on 
consumption on the back of the socio-economic changes of the late-20th century. A middle-
class life requires having “a house or apartment of one’s own, classy interior, marriage to 
respectable family, command of English, possession of a range of goods, such as a computer, 
automatic washing machine, or a private car, and a ‘refined’ (rāqy) habitus expressed in one’s 
styles of dress, socialization, language, and religiosity” (ibid. 34). But for my lower-middle 
class interlocutors, this has become difficult to maintain. They all grew up in informal areas in 
Cairo’s suburbs that have rapidly expanded due to continued migration, or in towns and villages 
beyond. These areas are occupied by a mixture of the lower-middle classes, and ‘al fuqara’ (the 
poor). Many complained that their neighbourhoods had become overcrowded and dirty over 
the years. They were now surrounded by shaʿby, uneducated people who worked in informal 
forms of work, and who hang around on the streets swearing, smoking hashish, and talking 
about women.41   
 
They described how their parents also struggled to afford daily expenses as a result of inflation 
and stagnating wages: 
 
“When my parents first entered work the salary was 12LE, and that was a lot, 
a sheep was 4LE. By the 1990s the salary was 40LE, a television was 20LE, now it 
is 2000LE, the fridge was 2500LE in 2005, it is more expensive by a lot now (around 
5000LE). Their salary now is 1200LE. If I stay in my salary now (1400LE) it would 
be nothing, I would not be able to do anything with it.” (Adel) 
                                                          
41 In terms of neighbourhoods, informal defines areas that are not planned by the government, and which have 
become heavily populated since the 1960s (Sims, 2010). It is a wider category than “‘ashwa’yāt” (slum), which 
are occupied by those living in poverty, rather than the lower-middle classes. In terms of work, informal defines 
people working in the streets, as traders or manual workers, rather than in an office.  
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Reflecting new consumptive standards of middle class-ness, Adel describes his family’s 
struggle to afford modern household items. He also described how his parents struggle to afford 
healthcare. This reflects how state services, such as healthcare, education, transport, electricity, 
and water have deteriorated dramatically. This means that people either have to rely on them, 
or struggle to pay for low-quality private alternatives.  
 
All of my interlocutors, except Gamal who attended a government-run experimental language 
school, attended free public schools. Here I wish to outline another example of how the 
trajectories of these young men were shaped by events outside the boundaries of class. 
Mahmoud’s father entered the military academy faculty of engineering, thereafter travelling to 
the Gulf for many years, earning a very high salary. However, when Mahmoud was young his 
parents divorced. His mother – the daughter of a chef in the Japanese embassy – worked in the 
Ministry of Education. She remarried another man who worked in the Gulf, however Mahmoud 
was abandoned by both parents. He was passed into the care of his mother’s sister, who had 
remained unmarried and worked in a low-paid government job in Giza (she now earns 1200LE 
per month). Having begun at a private language school, Mahmoud suddenly switched to a 
government school because his aunt could not afford it. While Mahmoud remained in 
government education, he saw half-siblings enjoy a private language education. 
 
Mahmoud was emphatic in his description of the difference between private and public 
education. In government schools, you learn nothing, most people do not attend lessons, 
teachers are sometimes violent, and kids fight all the time. As a result of this situation – along 
with the declining salaries of teachers – a parallel system of private tutoring has developed. 
Particularly as one reaches the end of high-school, the majority of children pay for private 
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lessons in preparation for the notorious high-school exam. However, there is huge variation in 
quality amongst private teachers. Richer parents can pay for less crowded lessons with better 
teachers. Poor public schooling left these young men having to attend low-quality university 
faculties, namely the ‘faculties of the people.’ Ibrahim, like many middle-class Egyptian men, 
wanted to enter the faculty of engineering, but a bad grade in chemistry meant he missed out. 
Thereafter he could only enter the faculty of commerce at the nearby government university. 
Ibrahim’s father had offered to pay for the more prestigious English section, but Ibrahim 
refused because he thought money should not be wasted on an education he did not want. 
Others had a similar story; they had wanted to enter what they knew to be more prestigious 
faculties, but because of bad grades, ended up in faculties of commerce, law, and humanities.  
 
When discussing their university experience, these young men relayed stories of lecture halls 
they could not enter due to overcrowding, having to buy the books written by professors to be 
able to pass, corruption in grading whereby one might pass even if nothing is written on the 
exam paper, and fail even if you work hard, and an educational system where memorisation is 
rewarded and independent thought disabled. There is no way of knowing the validity of these 
accusations. They were sometimes experienced and sometimes heard from others. But for these 
young men, they told me how the educational system induces a perception of purposelessness, 
and thus many stopped going to lectures and working hard to get a good grade. They therefore 
understood that they had graduated from universities with ‘no qualifications’ or ‘skills’ that 
were suitable for the labour market. They did not possess the embodied cultural capital to 
ensure success.  
 
In Egypt, access to good quality, free education which might provide the means for social 
mobility, has been stripped away. Indeed, to illustrate this, these educational trajectories led to 
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quite different employment than the upper-middle class. The parents of the lower-middle class 
had all obtained low-level government jobs. However, government employment is no longer 
an option for most graduates, as recruitment has been drastically cut. Those entering the public 
sector upon leaving university declined from 70% to 20% between 1970 and 1996 (Assaad & 
Kraft, 2014). Many male graduates have instead, according to Bayat (2011), pushed into the 
informal economy, working as street vendors, sales persons, supermarket box boys, or taxi 
drivers. In the absence of government employment, and in the context of capital-intensive 
formal private sector growth, millions have been pushed into informal employment, or 
extended unemployment – this has been particularly the case for women (Assad & Kraft, 2014). 
For my interlocutors, the picture was slightly more mixed than this. Ibrahim’s father tried to 
secure him a job as an accountant earning a few hundred pounds per month in a factory in 10th 
of Ramadan, an industrial town close to his village which has provided employment for the 
region since the 1990s. Others were expected to obtain jobs as family lawyers in their local 
neighbourhoods, accountants for local companies, or freelance salesmen – earning no more 
than a few hundred pounds per month. Another form of employment that has become a 
common pathway for university graduates, particularly in Cairo, is the call centre. This has 
developed out of a government strategy to provide jobs for university graduates. The 
information and communication technology industry now employs around 200,000 people.42 
 
Thus, for these lower-middle class men, these are the employment trajectories which have 
become ‘theirs’ in contemporary Egypt. As a result of socio-economic changes that have taken 
place over the previous 40 years, this middle-class has been stripped of its ability to acquire a 
good education. I will show in the final section how the jobs that were supposed to follow did 
not fit their middle-class dispositions. This is both because these jobs could not provide middle-
                                                          
42 http://www.egyptindependent.com/call-center-industry-obstacles-and-potential/ 
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class respectability and comfort, but also because these young men had been exposed to the 
globalised lives of Egypt’s upper-middle classes. This created a rupture within these young 
middle-class men between their ‘objective chances’ and ‘subjective expectations’ (Bourdieu, 
2000).  
 
Making a difference to the world 
 
Ibrahim refused the job his father was lining up for him. 10th of Ramadan, he said, is a “qabr 
l’al shaʿb” (tomb for youth). His brother-in-law worked as an accountant in the town, and had 
become ‘depressed’ (mukta’ib). His salary of 1500LE meant he struggled to afford family 
expenses, and therefore remained dependent on parental help. He also faced the constant risk 
of being fired at any moment, and travelled four hours per day to and from work. His life is 
“all work and sleep.”  
 
Ibrahim therefore looked up to the struggles of those around him. He saw an inability to obtain 
a respectable, stable job, or afford to look after one’s family. Others saw an inability to afford 
marriage, to buy a house in the context of skyrocketing property prices, to access good 
education for one’s children, or healthcare, and amenities, and to afford basic household 
appliances. Exposure to this struggle to live up to norms of respectable middle-class 
masculinity, through their families, friends, and themselves, left them wanting to escape 
(Ghannam, 2013). They knew that finding good education or healthcare for their children 
required going private, and finding reliable access to electricity and water meant moving out 
of their areas. Furthermore, they wanted to afford a car to avoid public transport, and modern 
appliances in the home. These reflect the shifting markers of a respectable lifestyle in middle-
class Egypt, in part as a result of the declining quality of government services.  
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When I met my interlocutors, many of them had had experience of the labour market, working 
in call centres, as low-paid accountants, and informal salesmen. At some point they decided 
these jobs would not provide a basis from which to lead a good life. Mohamed for example, 
even before graduating from the faculty of commerce, began working as a tyre salesman. He 
made good money, around 3000LE per month, however decided to look for a formal job in a 
company because this job would not provide a ‘career.’ Furthermore, the people he worked 
with smoked cigarettes and hashish. He feared he would do the same. The job would drag him 
into impious shaʿby culture, and out of a respectable middle-class culture. Those who 
experienced the call centre also found it to be not respectable. There was the constant threat of 
being laid off – thus making it impossible to be accepted for marriage – it was not in their 
fields, the rotating shifts did not allow a social life, and the work itself was chastening, as 
frustrated customers would abuse you every day.  
 
Thus, the shift in macro-economic circumstances had created for this middle-class group a 
mismatch between their ‘subjective expectations’ and ‘objective chances.’ The jobs described 
above, and the lifestyle they enabled, did not fit their middle-class dispositions for comfort, 
security, or even morality (Jeffrey, 2010). Thus, Mohamed needed a ‘career,’ in his field, or 
stable job, from which he could marry within his social circle, and he also needed to be 
surrounded by pious Muslims, not shaʿby people. His job was therefore pushing him beneath 
the middle-classes. For others, the jobs did not match their educational fields, and did not 
enable them to look after a family (in terms of marriage, or affording expenses).  
 
This decline in objective chances, an inability to find work that matches their education or 
provides security and comfort, produced a disjuncture with the dispositions of these young 
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men. However, I described in the introduction that this phenomenon can also stem from an 
expansion of ordinary aspirations (Bourdieu, 2000; Bauman, 2011). These young men, as they 
grew up in lower-middle class areas of Cairo, and in surrounding villages and towns, became 
exposed to the urban places, commodities, and lifestyles of the upper-middle classes – both in 
Egypt and abroad – and Cairo’s ‘global city.’  
 
In Zagazig University, Ibrahim hated his accountancy studies. From early on he engaged in 
various extra-curricular activities, joining Students in Free Enterprise, a global organisation 
designed to enhance youth entrepreneurship around the world which conducted 
entrepreneurship courses. Through this, he entered two student start-up competitions at AUC, 
along with a group of male friends.43 Even though Ibrahim felt different – a group of AUC 
students had pushed a girl into him and his friends, thereby making fun of his ‘traditional’ 
views on male/female interaction – Ibrahim described to me the excitement he felt there. He 
had never seen such advanced knowledge about entrepreneurship and the business world. 
Reflecting archetypal urban-rural distinctions, he described people in the village as “closed-
minded” in comparison. Ibrahim also set up a student initiative called Make Your Goal, which 
was designed to help students improve their competitiveness in Egypt’s international private 
sector by teaching CV writing, business structure, interview techniques, and English. The idea 
came from another international organisation which offered a skills course to secure success in 
the private sector.  
 
Ibrahim described these activities as “a trip, which through you now about the passion inside 
and follow” (sic). They helped him “discover himself (yilāqy nafsuh).” Ibrahim had decided 
                                                          
43 This reflects the gendered nature of these aspirations. Ghannam (2013) points out that men possess a greater 
ability to be mobile. 
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he possessed an “entrepreneurial mind,” which meant he could not work under someone else’s 
control. He was passionate about the “world of business,” about business administration, HR, 
marketing, and public relations. Ibrahim had developed a desire to become an entrepreneur, 
and Steve Jobs – about whom he read extensively online – became his idol. Specifically, he 
wanted to make a mobile app. Technology, he said, is “very important for progress, twenty 
years ago we did not have all the stuff there is available now, like smart phones.” Ibrahim 
wanted to contribute to that progress, to “make a difference to the world, to have [his] message 
heard in the world and contribute to the development of mankind, not just work to get money, 
marry and have babies only.” He distinguished this form of entrepreneurship from “be‘aiyyn” 
(sellers) in his village, who sold mobile accessories. They are not entrepreneurs, because they 
are not creating anything new. The idea of working as an accountant filled him with dread: you 
work like a “calculator and a robot,” Ibrahim would say, only gaining money to feed your 
family. Ibrahim stressed his goals were not about improving his lifestyle: “I am not obsessed 
to raise my level to get things, like a car, or really nice flat, that stuff is important to get respect 
from others and be able to do things, but I just want to be comfortable, and not stressed about 
money. What drives me is to make a difference to the world, Steve Jobs wanted to make a 
difference to the world.” This in itself though may have been an ethical performance in a 
context where craving wealth alone is judged.  
 
Despite their very different upbringings, Ibrahim developed aspirations for the same future as 
Amr. International NGOs staffed by the upper-middle classes, as a result of their outreach 
efforts, had entered his provincial university and exposed him to the modern, internationalised 
entrepreneurship scene and private sector. This reflects an active strategy by NGOs and the 
government to create the means for this aspirational shift. They are part of efforts to tackle the 
problem of educated unemployment amongst public university graduates, which are discussed 
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in detail in Chapter 4. Through these activities Ibrahim came into contact with the country’s 
most exclusive private university, and read about successful entrepreneurs on the internet. 
Thus, the connection between desirable middle-class living and the modern, internationalised 
economy filtered down Egypt’s social structure. As a result he came to think of ‘informal 
employment’ as useless and lacking respectability, and a job in the local private sector as 
robotic and limiting. 
 
Ibrahim was not alone in developing such aspirations. One day we were looking at responses 
to a question a friend had posted on Facebook asking people for their ‘dream jobs.’ As we 
scrolled through them, we saw ‘CEO, banker, HR representative, trainer, finance manager, 
entrepreneur.’ My interlocutors had aspirations to work in law, commerce, HR, public 
relations, and banking in multinational or large Egyptian companies, or to travel abroad. These 
lower-middle class Egyptian men, despite what is still repeated in development writing 
(Brookings, 2016), no longer look to the state for employment. For example, Mostafa’s parents 
expected him to get a low-level government job in Mahalla as they had. But he refused. He 
told me that government work was low-paid and boring: “you just work from 9am to 2pm and 
go home.” Mostafa, like Ibrahim, wished to make a difference to the world.  
 
Both Ibrahim and Mostafa had defied their parents. This was common among many of my 
interlocutors, which I described in the previous chapter might be specifically gendered. Their 
parents were considered to be ‘boxed in,’ unexposed to other possibilities. These young men 
were being exposed to a wider world. For Ibrahim, this came in university. For others, it came 
as they travelled around the city seeing billboards advertising gated community living, as they 
spent time on Facebook reading about successful global entrepreneurs, and as they heard 
success stories of friends or relatives who, for example, had migrated to the Gulf. One young 
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man described how he had realised he wanted more from his life when he was working in a 
restaurant in the upmarket neighbourhood of Zamalek. Two Egyptian customers began 
speaking English, he thought, so that he could not understand what they were saying. This 
made him feel that he had to learn English to get a better job for himself. 
 
For Gamal, this exposure came through a family connection. Upon graduating from the faculty 
of law, he described how he was “just looking for money.” He was ready to become a family 
lawyer in his neighborhood, like others he knew. However, the sudden social mobility of his 
cousin stimulated higher ambitions. Shady was five years older than Gamal. His father was an 
army officer, the husband of Gamal’s aunt. They lived in the upmarket neighborhood of 
Heliopolis, with Shady working as an IT technician. Through his work Shady met a British 
woman living in the same area, and they later married. According to Gamal, Shady’s wife 
helped get him a job in an international refugee organization – and two years afterwards they 
moved to London.  
 
Shady’s encounter, and sudden mobility, stemmed in part from his upbringing in an upmarket 
neighbourhood inhabited by Europeans, and his field of work in IT, which brought him into 
contact with upmarket employment places. Shady’s sudden mobility stimulated ambition in 
Gamal. Gamal started studying international law on the internet. He had been told by Shady 
that if he became fluent in English he could help him get a job at the UN, so Gamal set about 
doing that. This period provided the stimulus for Gamal’s continuing aspiration: “before I 
educated myself I could have lived there (in his lower-middle class area), but if I had to now I 
would be very sad.” Gamal not only wanted a prestigious job, but the lifestyle that came with 
it. Ultimately, he wanted the international mobility Shady enjoyed – his ultimate dream was to 
also live in London. 
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Gamal described how he now looks at people in his area and feels different. They lived limited 
lives, not caring about events beyond the neighbourhood’s boundaries:  
 
“most of these people just think of tomorrow only, they don’t think of a long-
term plan. They only plan for the next day, their dreams become very limited, they 
become stuck to the area, maybe they want to open up a shop. They just care for 
money and marriage; they do simple jobs for 2000LE and don’t aim for more. People 
accept work which is not in their fields; they give up and don’t use their degree. I 
don’t want to live life planning for the next day only.”  
 
Gamal felt different. He felt rāqy, as opposed to “shaʿby.” Reflecting the discourses I 
introduced above, he described people in his area as rude, ignorant, violent, trivial, and 
judgmental. They spend their time playing PlayStation or sitting in the ahwa (café). They talk 
about trivial topics, such as who is best on the PlayStation, about football more generally, 
gossip about people in the area, how best you can prepare for a fight and what weapons to 
bring, about girls in a derogatory way, and about drugs. Gamal perceives he is judged for 
wanting to study rather than spend time on the PlayStation or in the ahwa. He prefers to “talk 
about more serious topics…about work, about the news, or politics.” All this other stuff is 
“bullshit.” Thus, even though Gamal could earn good money in the area, he cared about the 
“environment (be’a)” now.  
 
Gamal, like all of my interlocutors who grew up in the lower-middle class, had developed a 
modern, globalised disposition to work in Cairo’s internationalized economy and travel abroad. 
They aspired after the lives of the upper-middle classes in Egypt. This situation has developed 
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partly out of the socio-economic decline experienced in this section of Egypt’s middle-classes, 
which has increased their precarity (Standing, 2011), and brought them closer to the shaʿby 
lower-classes. But these young men also craved participation in a global circulation of 
knowledge, people, and capital (Ferguson, 2006). They are being exposed to this circulation 
within their universities, as they move around the city, in their workplaces, on the internet, and 
through their families.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has made clear that realizing their global dreams will be extremely difficult for 
these young men. Jobs in Cairo’s international economy are secured through generations of 
privilege, which have enabled people like Amr to develop exclusive forms of cultural capital 
(private education, English, and a ‘rāqy’ mentality) and social capital (friends who worked in 
the international economy). The chapter showed how the chasm opened up over the last 70 
years between those who live this life, and those who want it. Nasser’s dramatic socialist 
reforms had led to the convergence of these two groups. One was lifted up, culturally, by access 
to public education and employment, and another was restricted in their accumulation of wealth 
and symbolic capital. Even though divisions remained, they converged around a more coherent 
modernist, nationalist middle-class identity. However, the Egyptian infitaah, or economic 
opening, suddenly opened up new avenues for economic accumulation in the private sector, 
property market, and the Gulf from the 1970s onwards. Those in the upper-echelons of the 
Nasserist middle-class were able to take advantage due to their pre-existing economic, cultural, 
and social capitals. In working through this history, I contributed to existing literature on the 
global middle-classes, by uncovering the importance of inherited wealth (in the form of land), 
the legal and political remnants of state-socialism, and international migration in their rise. This 
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economic accumulation, alongside their historical privilege and changes in labour and 
education markets, enabled this group to acquire new forms of symbolic capital, including an 
‘open-minded’ mentality, which defined membership in the modern, global upper-middle 
class. Again, this shifted debate away from consumptive distinction, towards educational and 
‘personality’ distinction among the new middle-classes.  
 
Yet, I also highlighted the emergence of an alternative middle-class in contemporary Egypt, 
one that experienced increased hardship. This was in many ways a direct consequence of the 
speculative accumulation of the upper-middle classes. Those growing up in this ‘lower-middle 
class’ are now struggling to hang on to the cultural markers of respectable middle-class living. 
They find it difficult to locate a stable white-collar job, a good education, and a comfortable 
financial, and even moral, life. This reflects the status of middle-class populations around the 
world (Hochschild, 2016; Hage, 2003), but it is not being recognized enough in the Global 
South.  
 
The chapter finally showed how this is creating a rupture within the lives of lower-middle class 
young men between their aspirations and social trajectories, in Bourdieu’s terms between their 
subjective expectations and objective chances. Importantly, this has also emerged out of 
exposure to ‘other possible lives’ (Appadurai, 1996), to the globalized lifestyles enjoyed by 
Egypt’s upper-middle classes. Egypt’s socio-economic landscape is producing a destabilization 
of ordinary aspirations. This simultaneous expansion of aspiration, even as the opportunities to 
realise them diminish, is perhaps becoming a defining condition of the 21st century in different 
contexts (Heiman, 2015). It represents a breaking down of the forward-looking class project, 
where people desire more than what they are ‘fated to be’ (Jackson, 2011). The remainder of 
this thesis is concerned with the consequences of this breakdown. As I described in the 
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introduction, I turn to affect and emotion, to examine how a vital sense of hope is kept alive in 
the present among young immobile lower-middle class men. Moving beyond a focus on 
resistance, and everyday hope-making, I demonstrated in the following chapter how a material 
and discursive terrain of meritocracy, as it is extended within the ‘global city’ of Cairo, is 
productive of an affective atmosphere of hope for the realisation of dreams, whatever they are. 
In turn, the historical privilege, and supposed ‘luck’ described in this chapter, that enabled 
upper-middle class distinction, is re-narrated into ‘hard work.’  
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Chapter 4 Hopeful city  
 
Eslam, now 24, travelled to Egypt’s enormous capital in September 2014 in search of a better 
life. He came from Sohag, a city of 200,000 people in Upper Egypt some 500km south of Cairo. 
Having graduated from the Faculty of English Literature in 2012, Eslam spent two years trying 
to fulfil a dream to become a professional footballer. However, he finally decided he would not 
be able to support a family if he continued playing for the city’s team. After searching for 
alternative employment, he found only outdoor sales positions available. This was a job many 
of his friends were doing, but unhappily. They continually struggled to afford everyday 
expenses and save for marriage due to low wages and job insecurity, and did not see any 
possibility of progression. Eslam decided he wanted more for his life, he wanted a career. After 
coming across an NGO training course located in Cairo offering to teach young people the 
professional skills they needed to succeed in the private sector, he decided to come and try it 
out, initially relying on parental funds and the spare bed of his cousin, who was studying in 
Cairo, to survive. After the course, Eslam took a job in an Arabic language call centre and 
began renting a cheap apartment in a lower/middle-class area of Giza with colleagues.  
 
Eslam found Cairo life difficult. His job was tiring and frustrating, it was hard to save money 
from his 1400LE (US$175) per month salary, and he missed his family – according to him the 
reason why most people decide to stay in Sohag. Relocating was therefore a difficult decision. 
It is uncommon for Egyptian men across all classes – and even more so for women – to leave 
home before marriage. Moving meant being far from familial support, being unable to take an 
active role in family life, and living in tough conditions. Furthermore, Cairo itself is an 
intensely stressful, alienating place for people attuned to a slower, more convivial rhythm of 
life in the provinces. However, despite the difficulties, Eslam did not regret his decision to 
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come. He was in Cairo “because of the future, not because of the present, today it is hard, but 
tomorrow an opportunity could come. In Sohag the opportunities are set, you know that your 
level will not change, but in Cairo opportunities could open up tomorrow.” In difficult moments 
Eslam focused his mind on the better future to come rather than the frustrating present. This 
relied on an image of Cairo as unpredictable, a place where immanent transformation could 
occur. The city holds within it prestigious educational opportunities, employment, and 
lifestyles that Eslam hoped to one day obtain. His move, though difficult and involving 
sacrifice, was inducing a resolute sense of social mobility, a sense of hope for a good future.  
 
This chapter examines how the city of Cairo came to affect in a group of young lower-middle 
class Egyptian men a feeling of hope that their ambitious dreams could one day be realised. It 
builds on recent work exploring how cities are in many ways built, governed, and lived through 
particular affects and emotions (Gandy, 2002; Thrift, 2004; Davidson et al. 2005; Zeiderman, 
2016). It turns attention to how the city, as a set of objects, places, and discourses (Novaro, 
2009; Wachsmuth, 2014), generates an affective ‘atmosphere’ that is generative of feelings of 
hope for inhabitants (Anderson, 2009). The chapter therefore uses affect theory, which draw 
attention to the capacities of the “materialities of space-time” (Anderson, 2006: 736), in other 
words certain objects, discourses, and places, to develop and hold within them particular 
transpersonal affective intensities. These affective intensities, as they move through bodies 
during encounters between people and objects, discourses, and places, are productive of 
personal feelings and emotions.  
 
Cities have long stimulated inward migration through the promise of employment and lifestyles 
not available in rural areas. Within Egypt, its vast capital is the predominant destination for 
internal movers (Zohry, 2002). Greater Cairo now contains over 20 million inhabitants, one 
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quarter of the nation’s population. It is constantly juxtaposed to other cities. They are places in 
which the future is predictably difficult, some even describe them as places ‘without a future.’ 
Mostafa, for example, came to Cairo in 2013 from Mahalla, an industrial city in the Nile delta 
with 500,000 inhabitants, after graduating with a Business Administration degree. Mahalla, for 
him, had no future: 
 
“Mahalla used to be full of clothing factories, clothing of every kind, but it 
was ruined after the infitaah (economic opening), the economy is now very weak, 
everything is made abroad. I could have found work there, but the jobs are very 
basic. I could have worked in a government job, but I don’t want to work 9am to 
2pm and go home, I want more from my career. I came to Cairo because it is the 
capital, I am trying to develop myself here, to find courses, and then a good job.” 
 
Mostafa alludes to the changing political economies of Egyptian cities since the mid-20th 
century. Mahalla used to be an important hub of the global textile industry, but following 
liberalisation policies of the 1970s many of the factories closed down and moved abroad in 
search of lower costs. Places like Mahalla and Sohag were therefore perceived to have entered 
states of decay. If they had once been thriving, they had long since become places of stagnation 
and disconnection from the global economy. The available employment – low-level 
government jobs, but more commonly low-paid, low-skilled, small-scale private sector work – 
did not fulfil the dreams of these young men, as Mostafa once described, to “influence the 
world” (see Chapter 3). 
 
Cairo on the other hand is a place of possibility. ‘Everything is in Cairo’ was the ubiquitous 
response from those who were puzzled to be asked why they had moved. Samuli Schielke 
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(2015: 10) describes Cairo, for inhabitants of the provinces, as “a place to make money, to 
make a career, to make things happen – it is a centre of wealth, power, culture, and glamour. 
Cairo is the place to be, so to speak, in Egypt.” It is often even referred to as ‘Masr’ (Egypt) by 
those outside the capital, signifying its unrivalled dominance in terms of jobs, services, and 
administration. It houses the largest national and multinational companies, as well as the best 
educational opportunities. The city as a whole, therefore, produced an affect, or affectual plane 
(Seigworth, 2000), that was distinct from the provinces. This affect was experienced as a 
feeling of hope as these young men came towards it, imagining the prospect of taking courses, 
and working in those companies. The presence of those jobs and courses makes Cairo a place 
of indeterminacy, within which new opportunities can arise at any moment (Simone, 2004; di 
Nunzio, 2014; Zeiderman et al. 2015).  
 
The decision to migrate is often stimulated by peers. Adel, a colleague of Eslam, had come 
from Zagazig, a city in the east delta, because two friends had relocated and secured good jobs, 
one as an accountant in a Saudi company, and another in a bank. Adel now hoped to do the 
same. When the stories of their mobility were told, it was understood to stem from their 
decisions to move, rather than their privileged forms of social, cultural, or economic capital – 
one friend took expensive accountancy and English courses, and another entered a bank, 
notorious for the prevalent use of wasta (nepotism) in recruitment. This narration of Cairo as a 
place which facilitates social mobility affected these men with hope for the future. Their 
imagined ability to take advantage of the unique companies and courses it contained facilitated 
a sense that moving spatially also meant moving temporally towards a good life (Hage, 2003). 
The frustrated sense of immobility that had engulfed them in their hometowns disappeared, 
alongside an understanding of their structurally marginal position when they arrived in the 
capital.  
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Schielke (2015) notes that, despite want, many people are put off or prevented from coming to 
Cairo by the cost of living or their lack of connections. Though these young men did not possess 
useful work connections, they could sometimes rely on limited, temporary financial support 
from parents, and a place to live with relatives. Yet most relied on their meagre salaries and 
cheap, overcrowded apartments to survive. They also enjoyed the gendered privilege of 
movement. As Ghannam (2013) states, the early twenties is a life-stage for men in which a 
certain level of roaming is allowed and even expected. Although women also migrated, it was 
rarer, and they would often be constrained by the necessity of having to know family with 
whom to stay. Men, on the other hand, could live with colleagues or friends.  
 
But moving alone was not enough for these men. What will become clear in the following 
chapters is the undulating, ephemeral nature of feelings of hope in their lives. The city, as much 
as it produces an affective atmosphere of hope, also affects in these young men feelings of 
frustration over time, as they are rejected from jobs, or spend a prolonged period in difficult 
conditions. However, in this chapter I focus on how the city affected a powerful feeling of hope 
for these men at this stage of their employment transition. Both those who migrated, and those 
who grew up in Cairo were constantly on the move in order to take advantage of the 
opportunities the city promised. They were attempting to educate themselves, find a desirable 
job, and establish their dream start-up. This took them into contact with various places: training 
centres offering to teach the skills to ensure success in Egypt’s internationalised private sector, 
employment and scholarship fairs presenting private sector jobs and elite education, and 
entrepreneurship lectures and events providing inspiration for budding entrepreneurs. These 
places, which span public, private, and developmental spheres, form part of an institutional and 
industrial infrastructure designed to close the gap between Cairo’s private, formal, globalised 
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employment, and its university graduates. They also form part of Cairo’s ‘global city,’ 
advertising its jobs and wealth opportunities, and offering the skills required to obtain them.  
 
The chapter works through the encounters between these young men and these places, 
demonstrating how each generated an affective ‘atmosphere’ that induced, and sometimes sold, 
intense feelings of hope that global dreams were reachable. The objects within these places – 
upper-middle class trainers or entrepreneurs, business cards, or suits – aesthetically symbolised 
Cairo’s ‘global city,’ thus offering up a sense of inclusion. Furthermore, these objects generated 
and extended meritocratic discourses that project Egypt’s labour market as open, a field in 
which success is dependent upon ‘salūq al-shakhṣ’ (a person’s attitude), rather than the 
exclusionary forms of social, cultural, and economic capital described in the previous chapter. 
These discourses fill people with the hope that inclusion will come for real.  
 
By intricately demonstrating how this affective process unfolds, the chapter departs from 
previous literature on hope-making. The hope of these young men is not a ‘radical’ hope. It is 
also not a hope that stems from individual resilience. It is a hope that places faith in, and 
emerges from, the dominant economic system. In Cairo, a focus on places of revolutionary 
hope has dominated literature in recent years. I render visible an alternative, more mundane 
cartography of hope in the city, that stems from a rather different ‘revolution’ which has been 
taking place in recent years among development workers, entrepreneurs, and government 
officials who claim to be trying to establish a transparent, fair, and modern labour market. 
Through doing this, they are able to operationalise a form of compliance that works through 
affect, through making people who are denied access to a dignified life hope for a better future 
(Bourdieu, 2000; Auyero, 2012), rather than through making people content with what they 
already have. In making this claim, the chapter also departs from the literature on global or 
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world-class cities that analyses them as sites of exclusion and mounting inequalities (Davis, 
2006; Sassen, 2014; Schindler, 2014). Instead, I argue that they offer up a semblance of 
inclusion to those beyond their gates and walls (de Boeck, 2011; Ghertner, 2015), as certain 
industries and institutions continue to churn out, and profit from, a meritocratic promise that 
the good life comes through hard work.  
 
Graduate Training Organisation 
 
Ibrahim also looked to Cairo in his quest for a fulfilling job. As outlined in the previous chapter, 
he defied his father’s expectation that he take an accountancy job in 10th of Ramadan in order 
to pursue his entrepreneurial dream. He graduated from the Faculty of Commerce (Arabic 
section) in 2012, and spent one year in the army before returning home to his village. He 
worked briefly in a call centre, but quickly began to hate it. After a year-long struggle to locate 
a more fulfilling job, like Eslam, he decided to apply for what was labelled a ‘scholarship’ 
offered by an NGO in Cairo, about which he had heard from friends who had previously 
attended. This course offered to provide the skills he was lacking to ‘succeed’ in Egypt’s private 
sector. Ibrahim hoped it might help him to reach an HR job and also to achieve his longer-term 
goal of opening a start-up.  
 
This course was one of many undertaken by these young men in the quest to make up for a 
poor public education. Its decline in quality has opened the space for a thriving private training 
economy, within which there is much money to be made. Cairo offers a vast array of training 
options, unrivalled in other parts of Egypt, in the form of universities, local and international 
NGOs, foreign cultural centres, and private entities ranging from large international 
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corporations to self-employed ‘career coaches’ and teachers.44 Each promises to be the gateway 
to success. Educational opportunities are highly stratified. The most prestigious courses – for 
example English courses at the British Council or American University, or the Certified 
Management Accountant (CMA) certificate – can cost thousands of Egyptian pounds, and thus 
lay out of reach for most. This leaves people, including my lower-middle class interlocutors, 
investing in low-cost options, which often means lower-quality and larger crowds. During my 
fieldwork period, they would take courses in English, accountancy, HR, banking, business 
administration, and architectural engineering. 
 
The NGO scholarship offered to Ibrahim forms part of a recent effort by the government and 
development industry to tackle the entrenched problem of unemployment amongst Egypt’s 
educated youth.45 It is provided by multiple local and global non-profit organisations that 
obtain funding from development donors and the private sector, and also by international 
training companies who run Corporate Social Responsibility programmes with government 
funding.46 The scholarship offers – for a small ‘commitment fee’ of 150/200 Egyptian pounds 
(US$18.75/25) – to provide unemployed university graduates the professional ‘soft skills’ they 
are apparently lacking to succeed in the labour market: business English, ‘essential labour 
market skills’ like interview techniques, CV writing, and career planning, and work 
values/character development such as self-presentation, communication, teamwork, 
commitment, problem solving, and time management. It also aims to help graduates find 
‘decent work,’ an aim on which success is measured and funding rests. This sometimes 
                                                          
44 Young et al. (2016) reveal how a similar private training economy has developed in India.  
45 Youth unemployment has long been a priority for developmental and state intervention (Urdal, 2006; Kelly, 
2006), particularly in the Arab World in the aftermath of Uprisings seen to be instigated by large populations of 
frustrated youth. In Egypt, 34% of its 2.3 million university graduates are unemployed, compared to just 2.4% 
of those without education (Brookings, 2016). It is a particular problem among women. 
46 A 2015 International Labour Organisation survey found at least 30 out of 230 youth unemployment initiatives 
offering soft skills training to educated youth, which translates into 160,000 graduates. But this training extends 
much deeper, through self-employed “career coaches.” and online material. It is also on the rise, with one 
organisation introducing their programme into all public universities. 
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prefaces the establishment of partnerships with companies who offer to employ participants, 
and which requires the teaching of specific skills attached to those jobs.  
 
The course attended by Ibrahim was provided by an organisation I shall call Graduate Training 
Organisation (GTO), a US-based non-profit founded in 2006 with the mission to create 
‘economic opportunity’ by ‘providing world-class professional and technical training that leads 
directly to career-building jobs’ for youth in the MENA region. It operates as a series of locally-
run franchises across seven countries. By 2013, 25,000 youth had been trained by its 
programmes in the region. Between August and October 2014, I attended three courses. I also 
conducted interviews with staff members of four other organisations offering the same course. 
The scholarship is advertised through employment fairs, within universities, and online through 
organisation websites, YouTube, and Facebook. As Ibrahim demonstrated, organisations also 
rely on recommendations from former participants. Each course contains 30-40 young men and 
women, who had graduated between one to four years earlier and had struggled to locate 
desirable employment. This course, they hoped, would change that.  
 
The soft-skills focus of these courses has international origins. GTO’s course stems from the 
International Youth Foundation’s (IYF) global soft skills training initiative, and it uses 
American textbooks. The IYF considers these “non-technical, professional” abilities to include 
“communication, interpersonal and customer service skills, as well as personal traits such as 
integrity and responsibility” (2013: 1). Vocational employment training has historically been 
associated with preparing people for technical and manual labour, yet there has been a recent 
rise in attention to ‘non-technical’ skills (Schulz, 2008; Hurrell et al. 2013).47 This rise is in 
                                                          
47 Much employment-related development assistance is focused on demand-side factors, but attention also goes 
towards enhancing the skills of populations (Wallace, 1990; Walker et al. 2008). The origins of this focus lie in 
Becker’s (1975) concept of human capital, but it has intensified with increased emphasis on more vocational 
forms of education (Watson, 1994; Ansell, 2015). 
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part associated with global shifts towards immaterial and affective labour, and is derived from 
surveys conducted with private-sector organisations. 
 
In Egypt, in the case of university students there has been a growth in the view that ‘soft life 
skills’ rather than technical skills are holding them back: their “personal responsibility, 
adherence to common work ethic, leadership, and ability to manage conflict and criticism” in 
addition to “basic IT and English language skills” (IYF, 2013: 1; Osman, 2011). This comes 
from a view that, first, public education does not provide the English, presentation, or problem-
solving skills required by an international service economy. However, this focus also stems 
from the jobs deemed accessible to, and suitable for, university graduates. GTO attempts to 
form partnerships with, or otherwise suggest entry-level service or sales work in call centres, 
hotels, or malls. These are growing fields in Cairo, on the lookout for graduates with basic 
computer and English skills, as well as people who can deal ‘politely’ with upscale customers. 
Cairo’s call centre industry remains small but is growing fast, going from just 600 jobs to 
50,000 between 2000 and 2010. It receives substantial government support in the form of 
subsidies and employee training because it is seen as a graduate unemployment fix.48  
 
For these jobs, as Mona, a manager of another organisation told me, no specific skills are 
required: 
 
“You will be surprised but all they need is good communication skills, 
negotiation, they can present themselves, have confidence, be respectable. In Cairo 
they need basic computer skills and English, and that’s it they don’t need any other 
                                                          
48 http://egyptoutsourcing.blogspot.com/ 
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specific skill. Employers tell you bluntly, bring him to me and I’ll teach him 
everything, but at least they can be teachable, that’s all I need.” 
 
Despite not requiring any skills, these jobs are considered suitable for university graduates. 
Those targeted mostly come from the kullyāt al shaʿb described in the previous chapter. These 
graduates also self-select, as they are the most prone to unemployment. They were considered 
to be ‘without skills’ by programme organisers, disadvantaged youth to be helped. As a result 
these jobs are considered suitable for them. When pressed, staff would tell me they had to 
“respond to the market,” that “these are the available jobs at the moment.” Yet they were also 
presented as ‘good jobs’ – for these unskilled graduates anyway. ‘Good’ was defined by ILO 
standards of ‘decent work’ – they have a contract, social insurance, they are white-collar, and 
have a minimum salary of 1000LE (US$125) per month.  
 
However, they are not considered ‘good’ by the graduates themselves (see Chapter 3). After 
spending four years in university education, they expect more. Call centre work is infamous 
amongst Egyptian youth, a sign that one is not able to get a job in one’s field. There are no 
opportunities for advancement, it is insecure with rolling one-year contracts, and the work is 
highly stressful. It does not provide the basis for a respectable middle-class life. Like Ibrahim, 
most participants had actually worked in call centres before enrolling on the course and left in 
search of something better. One participant told me on the course’s first day he would “rather 
die than go back.”  
 
 162 
 
Amongst staff and within Egypt’s development apparatus more broadly, awareness of this 
misalignment is ubiquitous. Salma Wahba, youth and adolescent development officer for 
UNICEF Egypt, made this clear in a 2014 interview with the Guardian:49 
 
“In Egypt, youth still prefer to work for the government, rather than the 
private sector, perceiving it to be a secure job. Many people are waiting for the job 
that best fits their qualifications rather than actively seeking employment and 
accepting jobs that they think are below their level. This is a major cultural barrier 
among youth in Egypt.” 
 
Egypt’s educated youth are understood to be in ‘luxury unemployment’ (Brookings, 2016), 
where they ‘choose’ to wait for suitable jobs while being supported by parents.50 This middle-
class waithood is presented as illegitimate, a product of a classist society.51 GTO staff 
considered youth too ‘image-conscious’ and ‘closed-minded.’ Their aspirations are also seen 
to be illegitimate, based on what they thought was ‘prestigious’ rather than on real knowledge. 
This echoes Arafa’s comment in the previous chapter, that it is easy to tell when people are 
‘faking’ and upper-middle class mentality.  
 
Graduates are also described as lazy, and lacking knowledge of how labour markets work: 
 
                                                          
49 https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2014/aug/20/youth-unemployment-
interactive-salma-wahba 
50 This claim is proved by figures such as “30% of unemployed youth refused a job because they felt it “did not 
match their level of qualification”” (Brookings, 2016). 
51 This is perceived to be a “problem” among young people in many contexts 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/alasdair-palmer/8276212/Youth-unemployment-cant-work-
or-wont-work.html). 
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“Youth need to be realistic. The mind-set of graduates now is to finish and 
get the certificate, and with that it is assumed you get a job, they don’t have guidance 
to know it doesn’t work like that. I try to think where this taking culture comes from, 
the lazy culture of expecting things to be done for you. Maybe it was from Nasser 
and the big government giving jobs, but I wasn’t given anything” (Wafaa, GTO 
Programme Manager). 
 
Refusal of work becomes another personal deficiency to be solved. Egyptian graduates are 
projected as ‘lazy,’ lacking understanding of how contemporary labour markets work. One 
starts low, builds a career slowly, and switches frequently, rather than being given a ‘job for 
life’ straight away. According to the IYF, many Egyptian workers are ‘short-sighted,’ only 
considering “short-term financial gains” rather than “longer-term benefits” such as “career 
development, pensions, and insurance” (2013: 8). Breaking down this ‘mind-set’ emerges as a 
key and even progressive endeavour. Staff expressed great confidence about their abilities to 
do this, although they said men are more difficult to convince than women, because they 
possess more ‘stubborn’ aspirations. It is achieved through teaching participants work 
commitment, and the western concept of ‘career planning’ (Darmon & Perez, 2011). People 
are supposed to view themselves as a bundle of skills, to match those skills to the market, and 
continually engage in self-learning to ‘climb the ladder’ in an open labour market that recruits 
based on acquirable skills (Bergmo-Prvulovic, 2012). Finally, staff expressed how Egyptian 
graduates do not know they are unskilled. They have to work hard to gain more skills, both 
those required in modern jobs, and those required to apply for jobs in a modern, meritocratic 
labour market (CV writing, interview techniques, and presentation skills). 
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The course thus represents an extension of western, neoliberal labour market logics to an 
Egyptian context, thus reflecting the shift towards individual autonomy noted by Talal Asad 
(2015). These logics are applied by international development and training organisations, and 
the government as a fix to a local problem of educated unemployment. These logics have been 
much critiqued, as a ‘technique of power’ for the ‘making-up’ of the ideal worker-citizen 
required by contemporary capitalism (Dardot & Laval, 2014). First, it valorises work as a 
means for self-realisation and moral value (Korteweg, 2003). Second, enhancing so called 
‘skills’ such as communication and time management is a veil for producing the disciplined 
worker required by employers, particularly in low-skilled jobs (Lafer, 2004). Finally, career 
planning encourages workers to see themselves as an autonomous ‘bundle of skills,’ to assess 
their ‘competence’ and ‘adapt’ to the market. Risks and rewards become the responsibility of 
the individual rather than society (Lemke, 2001; Kohl-Arenas, 2015). However, although these 
analyses expose important discursive aspects of training, its actual effects upon recipients are 
too often assumed. Recipients are given no room to interpret, take on, or reject the messages 
being given to them (Willis, 1981).52 
 
I will argue in the next section that these Egyptian soft-skills programmes do produce important 
effects, as they attempt to cultivate the disciplined workers required by a growing low-skilled 
service economy. This disciplining was stubbornly resisted by participants, yet, in the context 
of misalignment between the participants’ employment aspirations, and the jobs suggested by 
the organisation, the most powerful ‘affect’ becomes the extension of meritocracy. This place 
produced an affective atmosphere that ignited a feeling of hope amongst participants, that 
                                                          
52 Laurence Ralph (2015) demonstrates how “career days” are met with the “scornful distain” of poor black 
youth in Chicago (79), as they penetrate the fantastical notion that they might one day follow in the footsteps of 
the black lawyer, academic, or President who are pinned up as role models.  
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through hard work, positivity, and taking employment, future mobility towards their global 
fantasies was possible. 
 
Learning to hope 
 
Ibrahim travelled two hours every day from his village to central Cairo where the training 
centre was located. Other participants made similar journeys, either from Cairo’s informal 
neighbourhoods, or from towns in the delta. These journeys represented a traversal of social 
worlds. These lower-middle class youth would ordinarily be denied access to places in this part 
of Cairo, through high prices or the presence of doormen. GTO itself signifies Cairo’s upscale 
globalised economy. Signs are written in English and staff members include a mixture of 
foreigners and upper-middle class Egyptians – ensuring English is a dominant means of 
communication. The act of coming to the centre every day and into contact with this space, and 
these people, was extremely exciting for people like Ibrahim.  
 
When Ibrahim first arrived, his English was tested and he was interviewed. During these 
interviews, Salma, the Programme Coordinator, asked applicants if they were “ready to work 
in any job.” If they replied no, or not in a call centre, a negotiation ensued. Salma wanted youth 
who were ready to work, not youth who wanted to “endlessly take training.” If she figured they 
would not work, they would be rejected. During negotiations, she would say GTO considers 
the call centre a good job. She also argued that they provide useful skills, saying to one aspiring 
lawyer “all lawyers need to be good sales people!” in order to convince him of the utility of 
sales work.  
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Ibrahim proudly told me he had lied about being ready to work in customer services, because 
he knew it would secure access to the course. He made it to ‘Orientation Day.’ When he arrived 
he was told to sit and wait in a room with other participants. They were asked to introduce 
themselves in English by outlining their dreams, identifying a role model, and describing where 
they see themselves in five years – Ibrahim’s dream was to be an entrepreneur, others wanted 
to travel abroad, or work in a multinational company. Thereafter they were shown an 
introductory video of GTO, which according to the American CEO on screen, “helps youth get 
that first job, and gives them an economic advantage, a path to social mobility, and an 
opportunity of choice.” Former ‘alumni’ are also shown on screen, working in jobs such as a 
‘content associate’ or ‘accountant.’ The present job is subsequently crossed out and replaced 
with ‘future commerce expert?’, ‘future CEO?’ Participants were asked what they understood 
from the video. One woman responded anxiously that “GTO helps people who have no hope.” 
Ibrahim followed: “it does not just focus on customer services.” The organiser agreed, but also 
said: “we think it is important to get that first job.” Thus, from the moment Ibrahim stepped 
into GTO, he was exposed to narratives that offered up a positive vision of the future. He was 
encouraged to dream and follow his passion rather than letting it go, yet importantly, this would 
be achieved through taking employment in a lesser role.  
 
In the first session, Ibrahim was introduced to Wafaa, who in 2014 was a teacher. She also 
asked participants to outline their dreams, before relaying her story of career advancement in 
flawless English. Wafaa had wanted to go to AUC upon leaving her private school. She dreamt 
of becoming an economist or entrepreneur, but had to give up those dreams and attend public 
university as her father could not afford AUC (which is beyond the reach of most upper-middle 
class Egyptians). She hated the system of public education and quickly decided to leave. Her 
father instead paid for her to study English for two years at the British Council – a seven week 
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course (one of four per level) costs 2000LE (US$250), more than the monthly salary of all my 
interlocutors. Over time Wafaa developed fluency in English. The reason for that fluency was 
her “hard work”: “I would go to the library to read books, and even listen to songs on public 
transport.” Wafaa described how English gave her “freedom,” as it had been a “hot 
commodity” at the time. It was vital for her ability to obtain a job as a receptionist in a 
multinational company, which gave her a salary five times that of an engineer. Once a 
receptionist, Wafaa kept working to improve herself, teaching herself Excel and even learning 
German on the job. This “attitude” secured her eventual progression to project management in 
Vodafone. After she began training new staff in Vodafone, she became interested in the training 
field. This took her to GTO. Wafaa stressed the key reason for her advancement was that she 
was: “always working on [her] development.” She then told the students directly: “you have to 
be passionate and believe. I have seen so many young people who are not sure what they have 
to gain, or not sure how to develop themselves, the ones who want to achieve will, the only one 
who stops you is yourself.”  
 
Wafaa’s personal story, and her narration of it, is integral to understanding how GTO became 
affective. The transnational content of the course becomes intertwined with this development 
practitioner’s understanding of her own story of social mobility. This upper-middle class 
woman believed it was her “attitude, dedication, and need to learn” that secured her 
progression, rather than inherited privilege (Khan, 2012). She also showed it is possible to 
switch jobs frequently. Her narrative, and therefore her body, come to enact affective intensities 
that can be productive of hope for young aspirational men and women who encounter them.  
Wafaa acquired this language through exposure to soft skills discourses, but also through 
working in international companies that operate ‘meritocratic’ recruitment practices. Like all 
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GTO staff, she yearned to ‘give back,’ to help youth like Ibrahim do the same. When I 
suggested that GTO gives youth a sense of hope, she disagreed:  
 
“It doesn’t just give hope, it gives ideas, we are saying you have capabilities, 
you have to look for your talents and discover them, it is conviction. Hope is a weak 
word, it sounds laid back, like youth just sit at home and hope. We are talking about 
courage and conviction that something will come, even if the picture is mixed, that 
conviction that you will work on excel, English, instead of sitting on Facebook like 
they all do, not learning…in your brain you are capable of looking to a great future, 
or to be like the guys in the coffee shop.” 
 
Hope, according to Wafaa, is not confident of success. It is also passive, a sign of laziness. 
GTO was providing “hope with conviction”, a form of hope which requires action. The GTO 
course is designed to affect in its participants that sense, that through working hard to develop 
oneself, remaining positive, and taking a job, dreams are realisable. 
 
Ibrahim, like all participants, admired Wafaa. She embodied and spoke their hope, proving that 
hard work can lead to a successful career in Cairo’s global economy. Ibrahim also loved the 
classes. Over the following weeks students would excitedly watch videos of Australian 
executives introducing themselves over work drinks, listen to Steve Jobs’ lecturing advice, 
practice how to speak English in a ‘non-Egyptianised’ accent with a teacher who had studied 
in England, learn how to put together professional attire (even which kind of perfume to use), 
and learn how sales, customer services, and marketing form different aspects of business. It 
was easy to observe the pleasure induced through these activities, it was written on their 
excitable faces, demonstrated as they put their hands up before the teacher had even finished 
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answering her question, and conveyed aurally as they asked for breaks to be delayed so they 
could carry on learning. Thus, certain objects – the videos, the international marketing 
textbook, the professional clothing, the privileged teacher – and the discourses they extended, 
produced affects that were productive of hope for the future.  
 
Sessions were highly interactive. Participants would be asked to perform role plays, or draw 
out what they were learning (see Figure 4.1). On every occasion there would be a rush of 
volunteers who wished to take the pen or perform the ‘interviewee’ in order show off their 
knowledge of English, marketing, or formal business settings. Ibrahim on many occasions 
talked to me about how exciting the material was. He was excited about learning the skills he 
needed for business, and how to behave in business settings, particularly in English. During 
these conversations, I felt that my positive reactions were important in the maintenance of an 
atmosphere of hope. Frequent struggles to speak English would serve to highlight the gulf 
between the teachers and students. I often noticed the disappointment and embarrassment that 
followed struggles to formulate a sentence, however, teachers would always make sure to 
extend praise, thus (re)securing the affective atmosphere of hope. This reflected the broader 
banishment of negativity within the classroom. Participants were told to be encouraging to 
others, and to “walk into class with a smile” whatever happens outside. According to Wafaa, 
negativity had led to career stagnation for many of her colleagues, whereas her positive outlook 
had secured mobility. These young graduates needed to do the same. One teacher showed the 
way by posting inspirational quotes to Facebook every day: “Smile for life, believe in your 
dream, believe you can and you will.” This is a practice Ibrahim would quickly pick up and 
mimic on his own Facebook page.  
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Figure 4.1 - An object of hope: drawing of ‘professional introductions’ by GTO participants (Source: author) 
 
Hurrell et al. (2012) argues that ‘soft skills’ represent the dominant cultural capital held by the 
‘middle-classes’ in a society. In Egypt these ‘skills’ are intensely classed. Speaking English in 
a ‘non-Egyptianised’ accent, presenting oneself in a formal way, and knowledge of formal 
business structures are recognisable markers of Cairo’s global economy and its privately-
educated upper-middle classes. They are juxtaposed with the ‘humorous’ Egytianised accents, 
‘impolite’ manners, and ‘informal’ ways of doing business of shaʿby culture. These markers 
are therefore exclusive to a small percentage of the population; they were not on display in 
Ibrahim’s village. In the classroom, these markers of distinction are presented as acquirable 
‘soft skills’ by members of the upper-middle class. Not only exposure, but vitally the sense of 
acquiring them filled Ibrahim with excitement and self-confidence. He felt socially mobile. As 
Gamal, who was also a student at GTO, once put it: “I am rāqy in character now, just shaʿby 
in background.” 
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Students were supposed to continue self-development beyond GTO. For this, they would need 
to manage their time effectively. Time management, the teacher said, is “vital to achieving 
your professional goals.” It includes stopping activities that are “wasting your life” – such as 
chatting on Facebook, sleeping long hours, or socialising, and using your time effectively on 
productive activities such as studying. One should always be active, even during the hours 
spent on public transport. Ibrahim immediately recognised “time-wasting” as a problem 
amongst Egyptian youth. Many in his village would just sit in cafés, watching football and 
smoking rather than working on themselves. Ibrahim on the other hand was here, travelling 
two hours every day to Cairo to develop himself.53 
 
In one class, participants would conduct a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, 
Threats) analysis, which Wafaa explained would be useful for career changes. It enables you 
to assess your weaknesses and work on them to create opportunities within your desired field. 
The opportunities and threats, Wafaa said, “mostly follow from your strengths and weaknesses, 
but also sometimes from outside, for example if the economy is in bad shape, which it is at the 
moment, you need to have a plan B in case you cannot access your desired field.” This is one 
of a few instances where teachers stressed a factor beyond individual control, but the 
predominant narrative remained an optimistic focus on the self. In the event of failure, youth 
should not quit, they should learn from their mistakes and keep going. 
 
After he had listened intently to Wafaa, taking notes as she spoke, Ibrahim was instructed to 
conduct a SWOT analysis for himself on a piece of paper. He did one for the HR field. His 
                                                          
53 This provides an interesting juxtaposition to literature on ‘waiting’ (Jeffrey, 2010; Ralph, 2008), showing how 
it can be an active endeavour.  
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strengths were his ‘communication skills,’ his ‘passion,’ and ability to match people with 
suitable jobs. His weaknesses were his lack of connections in HR, and English. Upon 
completion, Wafaa asked for feedback. One student excitedly said: “it gives a snapshot on me, 
an organised way of thinking about myself, which can help me to start to plan,” another 
welcomed learning “how not to get angry with my weaknesses, but to focus on dealing with 
them.” Ibrahim told me later how the exercise helped him to visualise what he needed to do to 
reach his dream. The mind-set instilled by this exercise was therefore empowering. Seemingly 
impenetrable barriers which might produce anger were converted into surmountable 
weaknesses. This includes what remains a preeminent way through which jobs are obtained in 
Egypt, even in the globalised economy: “wasta” – the act of getting a job through relatives or 
friends. In GTO it is refashioned as a legitimate, acquirable resource. When one young man 
jokingly mentioned it during an exercise discussing tactics for job searches, the teacher was 
quick to interject, insisting that “nobody pays money, or is just placed in jobs anymore.” Instead 
recruitment processes are projected as open, and dependent on one’s skills. Ibrahim fully 
agreed with this. He insisted that private companies do not condone wasta like the government: 
“they want profit so they want the best people. They will only employ someone if they are 
skilled and efficient, rather than if they know someone. So if someone knows what he wants 
and takes the relevant qualifications he can reach it.” 
 
Making use of one’s connections is presented as a job strategy, which could be used to secure 
an interview in which one shows they ‘deserve’ the job. Wafaa, hinting at her social capital, 
emphasised that she used her network of friends to find out about the training field. Afterwards, 
one participant asked how she might combat a bad network. Wafaa asked others to respond. 
They suggested finding friends, attending conferences, taking courses, and using sites such as 
LinkedIn, all suggestions with which Wafaa approved. This reformulation converts a widely 
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acknowledged, exclusionary, class-dependent mechanism, and a source of much anger, into a 
legitimate and obtainable commodity, a source of hope. Ibrahim could now envisage how he 
might make inroads into the field of HR. He once described this as the “modern” way of getting 
a job: building connections, acquiring information and skills, and “marketing yourself” instead 
of being “placed” into a government job. It is also intensely hopeful. 
 
The course therefore constantly extended discourses that described how Cairo’s labour market 
is open and meritocratic. This is a narrative of inclusion rather than exclusion in this ‘global 
city.’ These young men were not being left behind (Hage, 2003), they were actively being 
subjected by a transnational rule of experts – made up of the state, international donor sector, 
and the upper-middle classes – that was attempting to establish the notion of a progressive, 
meritocratic labour market, and create the hardworking, hopeful labourers who comply with 
its rules and accept its inequalities. My daily presence in this place enabled me to observe how 
the course operated affectively. ‘Objects’ such as an upper-middle class trainer, a video of 
Steve Jobs, an international textbook, a piece of paper outlining SWOT analysis, a poster 
illustrating professional introductions, and the meritocratic discourses they extended – such as 
time-management, SWOT, the link between hard work and success – all generated an 
atmosphere of intense positivity, which rendered the future a euphoric realm. This atmosphere, 
and specifically the encounter between participants and objects and discourses within it, 
induced bodily reactions that were felt as feelings of hope. Enacting hope (with conviction) 
was indeed described as the course’s explicit aim. It was especially the exercises that required 
the active bodily participation of participants that induced what Kathleen Stewart (2007) labels 
‘a surge of vitality’ through them. As they pretended to introduce themselves to company 
managers, carry out a successful interview, or reply to a question in good English, one could 
 174 
 
observe, and hear, the excitement rush across their faces. Any surfacing of sadness or cynicism 
was immediately shutdown by trainers.  
 
However, one aspect of the course produced a quite different affective reaction: the focus on 
customer service work. Participants would become frustrated, and noticeably disinterested as 
they were taught customer service skills, and had to tailor their CVs to customer service jobs 
in CV-writing exercises. Ibrahim said to me one afternoon after the course that skilled 
graduates like him do not belong in call centres. He thought GTO should expand its focus to 
other sectors, and even criticised them for just wanting to secure labour for corporate sponsors. 
A few participants told me they would ‘take what they want’ from GTO and not accept the call 
centre.  
 
This was a refusal to accept the employment match GTO had made with these university 
graduates. This refusal though was openly allowed and negotiated by staff.54 Near the end of 
the course, Ibrahim had a conversation with two teachers about his desire to follow his passion 
for HR and entrepreneurship. Both advised him to follow his passion, rather than give it up. 
But, following the approved narrative, they said he should take temporary work now in order 
to save money for his project, and use it as a base from which to apply for HR work. Holding 
a job, they claimed, would look good to future employers. This was one of many similar 
conversations teachers would have with anxious, confused students. They would emphasise, 
using personal stories of people they knew, how taking a job in customer services could provide 
a stepping stone on to their dreams: it would teach valuable skills and ‘experience’ (khibra) for 
the career they were passionate about, one could secure promotion to other departments once 
                                                          
54 Paul Willis (1981) notes how compliance is sometimes achieved through active resistance. This allowance of 
agency makes it all the more powerful.  
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inside through building connections and ‘showing yourself really well,’ or save money to take 
further courses in one’s chosen field. Hearing such advice – or discourses – from successful 
people secured a feeling of hope for the future.  
 
Ibrahim’s GTO graduation was therefore a euphoric experience. This was sealed by the final 
assignment. Participants were instructed to come up with an imaginary business start-up and 
present it, in English, at a ceremony, which would be held in an events hall in Cairo’s most 
exclusive neighbourhood, Zamalek. They were told to invite family and friends, and to 
“imagine this to be the real thing, that you are pitching to potential investors.” They had to 
come up with a vision, organisational structure, target market, and projected costs and revenue. 
Wafaa said the project’s idea was to introduce participants to company logistics. When I 
mentioned during an interview in 2016 the juxtaposition between the project and the low-level 
employment that comes after, she said: “it is about planting a seed, so if you know you are in 
a call centre for two years, but you are also working on a project, I’m sure someone can find 
financing these days.”  
 
Ibrahim was especially enthusiastic about the project, and quickly became his group’s CEO. 
They spent days planning and researching in order to present a start-up of hydro-powered cars. 
Wafaa told the group she would definitely buy it if it were real. On graduation day only two 
participants brought family. However, the atmosphere was one of huge excitement, and 
nervousness. Students sat together on the right, teachers on the left. This, I thought, was a 
symbol of the social gulf that existed between them. The General Manager said congratulations, 
then reminded participants that their employment rate is the most important thing. Next, each 
group went, one after the other, presenting their GPS watch, sand-manufactured micro-chip, 
and mobile app that helps navigate government bureaucracy. These items represented 
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imaginative objects that reflected their hope. Some forgot their lines or messed up their 
grammar. This represented a brief rupture of the euphoria as their faces became red with 
embarrassment, but each time it surfaced, it was quickly dispelled by shouts of encouragement 
or applause. They had done it, they had overcome their fears and proved they could partake in 
the globalised economy. Each person received hugs from smiling teachers, who told them how 
proud they should be.  
 
After the presentations, Ibrahim wished to thank GTO. He said on stage: “GTO is not a training 
centre; it’s a trip in which you can find your passion.” Ibrahim left feeling more emboldened 
than ever about his trajectory. He made a plan to take a ‘temporary’ customer service job in 
Cairo, and use it as a base from which to save money, expand his connections in business and 
HR by applying for jobs and attending events, and also to learn about how companies are run 
from the inside. This, he said, would help him “develop himself” (yiṭawwar nafsuh) and gain 
experience that would lead him towards his dream. Others made similar plans to use customer 
service work as a springboard to their dreams. Many expressed the self-confidence they now 
felt about themselves, and the belief they had in the future.  
 
GTO could therefore claim success. These young men and women were obtaining jobs, but in 
the hope they would lead to something else.55 Ibrahim had also brought a friend, Hassan, to the 
graduation ceremony. Hassan’s voice was hoarse and quiet, his face drained of energy. He had 
graduated from GTO two years ago, and joined a call centre as a precursor to obtaining his 
dream job in a bank. Two years later though he had not moved. He described how tiring the 
job was; he had to speak for 3 hours at a time non-stop, and both his voice and hearing were 
                                                          
55 GTO would phone participants three months after the course to find out if they were still in employment. This 
was used to measure success.  
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suffering. He had also forgotten his English, lacking the time, money, or energy to maintain it. 
He would tell me later he had become depressed. One of the teachers came over to say hello, 
enthusiastically asking “how are you?!” He replied, in Arabic, “good, but the job is hard, there 
are no opportunities for promotion.” After a brief pause, the teacher replied: “ok well keep 
trying and working, something will come.” Hassan nodded and smiled, and the teacher moved 
on.  
 
Hassan represented a lurking presence of the potential future to come for these youth. But, for 
now, he remained an unacknowledged presence amongst an atmosphere of euphoric hope. 
Ibrahim felt sorry for Hassan, but he also blamed him for “letting depression overcome him.” 
He had “surrendered” (istaslim), and stopped working to improve his skills. He had not 
“managed his time properly.” The discourses Ibrahim had received in GTO, that hard work 
would succeed, and the feeling of hope they had affected in him, led him to criticise the 
depression he saw in Hassan. The graduation ceremony secured the affective atmosphere of 
hope, inducing the feeling that these young men and women had succeeded, that they were now 
part of the ‘global city.’ They would reach their dreams if they continued working hard and 
retaining positivity. This training centre had therefore secured their compliance in the labour 
market through an optimistic incitement of individual autonomy (Asad, 2015). In the following 
section, I show how a similar process occurred in the places connected to Cairo’s upscale 
entrepreneurship scene.  
 
Planning in Hope 
 
In October 2014, two months after the GTO course, I attended a UN Day Fair with Ibrahim 
and two other former students, Mahmoud and Mostafa. They had come across the Fair on 
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Facebook. It was located in the Fish Garden in Zamalek, an exclusive upper-class 
neighbourhood in the centre of Cairo that these young men seldom frequented. The park 
ordinarily required a 15LE (US$1.90) entry fee, and would be visited by upper-middle/upper-
class Cairenes and tourists, but today it was free and open to all. The Fair was designed to 
commemorate the stories and successes of beneficiaries of the UN in Egypt. It formed a small 
part of Cairo’s entrepreneurship scene that has sprung up in the aftermath of President Obama’s 
2009 Middle East entrepreneurship initiative. Entrepreneurship is presented as a powerful tool 
for enhancing inclusive economic growth and decreasing unemployment, particularly for 
Egypt’s ‘tech-savvy,’ ‘bulging’ youth population, in a context where the government and 
private sector are failing to generate jobs.56 It incorporates different kinds of donors/investors, 
incubators and platforms designed to provide supportive ‘ecosystems,’ educational facilities 
teaching entrepreneurship skills, and start-ups themselves. There are various links between the 
training economy and this scene. Centres like GTO often conduct entrepreneurship training, 
and one ‘social entrepreneurship project’ also conducts soft-skills training. 
 
                                                          
56 The use of entrepreneurship as a development strategy has been much critiqued (Elyachar, 2005; Dolan & 
Rajak, 2016). 
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Figure 4.2 – UN Day Fair (Source: author) 
 
I arrived shortly after the 2pm opening, entering after having my bag checked by security. From 
11.30am to 1pm there had been a closed event that government ministers had attended, the only 
remnants being a marquee filled with empty cocktail tables and a podium. The Fair had an 
extremely upscale feel, owing to its location and appearance (see Figure 4.2). Ibrahim himself 
commented on its “professional look.” There were though visible separations. The people 
running the event and the UN stalls – outside some of the UN-supported microenterprises – 
were all either from Cairo’s upper-middle/upper-classes or foreigners. One stall attendant was 
a German flatmate of mine doing a UN internship. These people, and their friends, would move 
freely both in front of, and behind, the stalls enjoying convivial conversations together. Another 
group, of which Ibrahim, Mahmoud, and Mostafa were part, was more restricted in movement 
and exchange. They moved between stalls picking up leaflets and sometimes talking with stall 
attendants, usually in Arabic after initial attempts in English. These lower-middle class youth 
had come – as GTO had taught them – to seek employment opportunities, build connections, 
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and learn useful information. Their communication with the upper-middle classes was always 
mediated by a desk, and restricted to questions about opportunities of working or project 
information, and robotic responses in return. Stalls included successful start-ups, it was 
claimed, who had benefited from UN funding – ranging from date farmers in Upper Egypt to 
mobile app developers in Cairo – information stands on UN projects, NGOs offering services 
such as ‘educational networking,’ and UN initiatives seeking volunteers. Many crowded 
around the UN Volunteering Scheme desk seeking to apply both for jobs and the Scheme itself, 
only to be disappointed by the response that it was not possible at the fair.  
 
Mostafa excitedly collected any leaflet he could as we walked around. He said he would benefit 
from reading the information they contained. By the end he had collected too many to carry, 
and so put a couple down, only to pick them back up after deciding he could not let them go. I 
offered to put some in my bag, and wondered what would become of these materials. I was 
reminded of Wafaa’s accusation that youth do not know what they want. Amongst the leaflets 
was a monthly schedule of the Information Resource Center (IRC) at the US Embassy, on 
which Mahmoud had marked events he would like to attend: Business Planning for 
Entrepreneurs, English Conversation Club, and Introduction to Project Management (see 
Figure 4.3).   
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Figure 4.3 – Timetable for US Embassy (Source: author) 
 
I left the young men briefly so that I could to speak with my flatmate. She told me she had had 
a conversation with her manager about how many attendees do not know how to have a 
memorable conversation, or which questions to ask. They just come and listen to the 
information, ask if there are opportunities, and if so how to apply. They do not show ‘genuine’ 
interest. I thought about Mostafa during this conversation. He did not show the necessary 
conduct to stand out or display a deep interest; performed qualities that are considered 
important. I then reminded myself however, that even with the ‘correct behaviour,’ there were 
many other barriers preventing him from standing out against the upper-middle class UN 
employees.  
 
Our conversation was interrupted by Ibrahim, who excitedly called me over to listen to an 
“amazing story.” A young man from one of Cairo’s ‘ashwa’yāt was selling ice cream. He was 
prompted by an organiser to tell his story, and began, shyly, to say how he had been in prison 
 182 
 
for fighting with someone who had a relative in the police. Since leaving he had established an 
ice-cream business with UN funding. After expressing our congratulations and buying an ice-
cream, we left. Ibrahim immediately said: “isn’t that amazing, he has not done anything bad 
since and turned his life around…he shows if you do the right thing you can overcome 
anything.” This story vindicated Ibrahim’s belief in individual power. It embodied hope for his 
own journey.  
 
We continued on so Ibrahim could exercise his plan. He was here to build connections and find 
funding for his start-up idea, currently a mobile app to help deaf people communicate. Ibrahim 
had learned he needed to do these things in lectures by well-known entrepreneurs, 
entrepreneurship coaching sessions, competitions, and through online reading. He would 
always excitedly tell me about these events. After one lecture on how to initiate a start-up by 
an entrepreneur in Ibrahim’s university, he said over Facebook: “it made me so happy (my 
emphasis), it was so helpful and motivating, I learned how to follow and develop the passion 
inside me; that makes me feel like I am flying, it was even on TV, it was so cool!” Ibrahim had 
been told to utilise and expand his network, as well as search hard for the plentiful funding 
opportunities on offer. He also learned that entrepreneurs need to have passion (shaghaf), to be 
risk-takers, hard workers (mugtahidiyyn), and to have unwavering belief. 
 
At the fair, Ibrahim found it difficult to bring up his project directly, so the majority of his 
effort went towards obtaining business cards of stall attendants. By the end he managed to get 
two – which he was happy with. Following this, we joined the huge crowds at the stage to listen 
to the free evening concert, which would be performed by Wust al-balad, a post-revolution 
band popular amongst youth. As we listened to the music, thoughts of entrepreneurial dreams 
lingered on.  
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Later, I spoke to Ibrahim, Mostafa, and Mahmoud about the day. When I asked Mostafa why 
youth went, he responded: 
 
“Most are looking for a chance or to see how they can improve themselves, 
how it can help them. They have a talent and dream. Today I told myself I can do 
everything I want to. Others go there for the free concert, you can see that, but there 
are others who have a goal and a dream. They take inspiration for their own projects.” 
 
In contrast to Mostafa’s optimism, Mahmoud was more sceptical of the Fair. Throughout the 
day he had been noticeably disinterested, not approaching any stalls. He also said to me that 
most people come because “they are searching for hope, motivation, and maybe new ideas,” 
but he had not felt motivated: “I am fed up with speaking with people, I need actions, I am not 
pessimistic but I am realistic.” For Mahmoud, this particular place had not induced feelings of 
hope. But for Ibrahim, like Mostafa, this event was extremely exciting. Hearing stories of 
entrepreneurial transformation, and obtaining business cards ensured the fair enacted a sense 
that his own dreams were realisable too.  
 
How can the inhabitation of this quintessential place of Cairo’s ‘global city’ by these lower-
middle class men be understood? I would argue that it cannot be interpreted using existing 
analytical framings in urban geography. Ibrahim is not simply exercising class belonging in 
this global urban place as a member of the upper-middle class. The difference between him 
and the UN employees was starkly represented in the ways in which they used the space. It 
could therefore be interpreted as an act of transgression, a lower-middle class man from the 
provinces traversing spatialized class boundaries. Schindler (2007) has argued that poor 
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people’s inhabitation of shopping malls in India represents a subversive, mimetic act. But, this 
is an interpretation that privileges a desire to seek out resistance. Yet, it is also insufficient, 
reflecting the ethnographic studies of hope described in Chapter 1, to see it as a subjective form 
of hope-making by these marginal people. This neglects the spatial terrain through which hope 
is affected in the body (Navaro, 2009).  
 
For two of these young men, the spatial terrain of Cairo’s global city incited a feeling of hope. 
This is because the fair, and the objects and discourses within it, enacted an affective 
atmosphere of hope. Its location, aesthetics, and its upper-middle class inhabitants all signified 
the global city. But this securitised space opened itself up to others, in this case to lower-middle 
class men. Objects such as a UN leaflet, a US Embassy timetable, a business card, and an ice-
cream seller symbolised successful entrepreneurship, and a global economy of knowledge 
(Ferguson, 2006). They generated an atmosphere of positivity. For Ibrahim and Mostafa, 
encountering these objects, and this atmosphere, induced feelings of hope. The act of coming 
to this place provided a sense of inclusion, of participation in the life of the global city. But it 
was the active practices of viewing or hearing about inspirational projects, picking up leaflets 
(and being unable to let them go) and marking future events, and collecting business cards that 
enacted a sense of ‘prospective momentum’ towards a desirable future (Miyazaki, 2004).  
 
This enabled these men to distinguish themselves as people focused on the future, as opposed 
to those who were going nowhere, even those who had come for entertainment. Thus, hope 
rested on discourses which offered up the ‘global city’ as reachable for all, by extending a 
meritocratic fantasy. The discursive reproduction of this fantasy was shown to me as I 
interviewed employees of the entrepreneurship scene. In September 2016, I met Noura, an 
employee of a famous platform. She was a graduate of AUC, more fluent in English than 
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Arabic. Her father owned multiple companies. After discussing Cairo’s entrepreneurship scene 
for an hour, I admitted my scepticism that young men like Ibrahim would open a start-up. She 
immediately rebuked me, saying: “no, there is hope, you need to be more positive Harry! They 
are just doing things in the wrong order. You know they need a career coach. They need a plan, 
a career plan and they will do it, everyone can do it if they do the right things, they are just 
doing the wrong things.” Incidentally, I had not told her what Ibrahim was doing. Noura then 
told me about Malcolm Gladwell, an author who had proven scientifically that hard work and 
taking the right actions can secure success.57 His writing had inspired her when she was a 
student. Noura then described how working at the platform had made her more positive: “I was 
told by my dad I would take over the company only, but here I saw more ambition, and it made 
me ambitious too. I saw perseverance and ambition here that made me believe anything is 
possible.” She then repeated that I was too negative, and she wanted to make me more positive. 
She would send me a positive thought to me every day via Facebook; today’s was “to be 
grateful.”  
 
Looking around, it was easy to see why Noura was so positive. In the Greek Campus, formerly 
part of the AUC but now an entrepreneurial ‘hub’ in Downtown Cairo – which required a 
membership card for entry – she was surrounded by Egypt’s most successful start-ups. The 
employees of these start-ups had certainly worked hard to succeed, to obtain funding, to build 
networks, and know-how. However, even through brief conversations with people working in 
the field – all graduates of international private universities – there were hints of the class 
position required: outside the fact “nine out of ten start-ups fail,” according to Noura. Most 
start-ups rely on family funding in the pre-prototype phase, Noura told me, as investors do not 
invest in “just an idea.” Furthermore, both she and others emphasised the importance of ‘social 
                                                          
57 Noura was referencing the book Outliers: The Story of Success (2009). 
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capital,’ knowing investors for example. Salma, a researcher in AUC’s Centre for 
Entrepreneurship said: “social capital is important in the early stages, it is facilitated through 
connections, of clients, the promotion of family and friends, and their resources. If you know 
investors it is easier too.” Salma quickly qualified her statement by saying: “alone it is possible 
but more difficult.” Ghada, Salma’s boss then interjected: “you can’t generalise though, if it is 
a good idea people are going to reach out.” 
 
These conversations reveal the existence and reproduction of meritocratic discourses within 
Cairo’s global city that posit success as dependent upon the autonomous individual, upon 
‘attitude’ rather than inherited privilege. Whenever a potential barrier arose during 
conversations – which threatened to penetrate the meritocratic myth – a solution was quickly 
offered and positivity restored. Funding can be found because “there are so many options!” and 
networks can be built. The entrepreneurship ‘ecosystem’ is designed to combat such barriers. 
Success becomes about personal characteristics: perseverance, passion, risk-taking, and hard 
work. It is difficult to plot the origins of this terrain. Noura’s perspective was shaped by North 
American self-help, and entrepreneurship discourses are products of transnational ideologies. 
But, as other scholars have showed, there are many specifically Egyptian ideologies and 
discourses through which individual autonomy is generated (Mahmood, 2004; Asad, 2015; 
Schielke, 2015). These ideologies are thus reproduced everyday within global places 
themselves, in particular locally inflected ways, by the people performing, and seeing, hard 
work that leads to success.58  
 
                                                          
58 https://www.madamasr.com/en/2017/02/11/opinion/society/the-precarity-of-youth-entrepreneurship-is-not-
the-solution/ 
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This legitimises the class position of inhabitants of Cairo’s global city, by placing emphasis on 
attitudes and behaviour (Khan, 2012). It also holds power because it is presented as liberal, and 
progressive, challenging the exclusionary ‘family business model’ dominating Egypt’s private 
sector (Elyachar, 2005). But, I have shown in the account above how it also has an important 
‘affect’ on those in pursuit of class privilege, because of its hopeful quality. Within the place 
of the UN Fair, and within entrepreneurship lectures, Ibrahim was told repeatedly, by members 
of the upper-middle classes, if he worked hard, took risks, remained passionate, and acquired 
connections he would reach his entrepreneurial dream. In turn, the class hierarchies governing 
these places were concealed. Hearing these meritocratic discourses, seeing ‘proof’ of their 
success in certain ‘successful’ bodies, and more importantly acting them out produced an 
intense feeling of hope, making it seem like what Ibrahim desired was within reach.59  
 
However, Mahmoud’s response to the UN Fair demonstrates that this affective process is far 
from automatic. As Ben Anderson (2006: 736) states, the shape of the feelings and emotions 
induced by encounters between objects and bodies is dependent upon the “affected body’s 
existing condition to be affected.” Mahmoud was slightly older than Ibrahim. He had had two 
more years of struggle to locate a stable, fulfilling job. This struggle had brought forth many 
rounds of frustration, as a result of a closing of the future. At this stage he needed something 
more tangible: as he said, he needed actions, not words. The UN Fair as a place thus produced 
a different affective reaction in Mahmoud, one of cynicism.60 However, there were other places 
that could still induce hope for him, like the employment fair, to which I now turn.  
                                                          
59 When I asked Ghada and Salma at AUC’s Centre for Entrepreneurship if they measure the success rate of 
Egyptian start-ups, they said no. Rather, they focus on the barriers they face, such as risk-averse investors, or a 
lack of “social capital.” 
60 Mahmoud’s friends often complained that he was a negative person in general. One possible explanation for 
this, that is difficult to pin down empirically, is his difficult upbringing – which I outlined in Chapter 3. 
Mahmoud was abandoned by both parents, and passed into the care of his aunt. He said to me on multiple 
occasions how this made it difficult for him to trust people, and contributed to his general cynicism of the world.  
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Applying in hope 
 
In November 2015 I attended two employment fairs with Mahmoud. These represented two 
contrasting types of fair. On each occasion we woke up at 6am to travel by microbus two hours 
across the city from his home in a lower/lower-middle class informal area in Giza to the 
glamorous InterContinental, one of the city’s newly-built upmarket hotels in an upper-middle 
class neighbourhood in east Cairo. Mahmoud had come across the fairs during his daily search 
for new job opportunities on the internet. They had flashed across his Facebook newsfeed. The 
search for jobs took these young men to various places of the global city: job fairs held in 
international hotels, private universities, and shopping malls, as well as company offices and 
upscale business parks. Fairs have been part of Egypt’s recruitment circuit since the 1990s, and 
are enjoying a boom. They are organised by government agencies, private universities, and 
recruitment firms in conjunction with sponsorship from government ministries, foreign 
embassies, and private sector stakeholders, and represent an effort to enhance ‘communication’ 
between graduates and the labour market, providing a transparent, meritocratic place for 
companies to locate talent, and for graduates to encounter employers.  
 
By November 2015, a year after the GTO course, and five years after graduating, Mahmoud 
remained desperate for a fulfilling job. He had just been fired from a data entry job after three 
months without explanation, having been repeatedly praised for the quality of his work. This 
had induced intense feelings of frustration and depression. Whenever this story was relayed to 
others they would rail against this “balad bint al-wisskhr” (daughter of a whore country), where 
people want you to be a “donkey and just do your job.” This event proved the injustice built 
into Egypt’s labour market that prevented them from achieving respectable employment. Thus, 
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Mahmoud by this stage did not feel hopeful about the future. This section therefore 
demonstrates how the hopeful city can still affect a feeling of hope, despite a lack of complete 
investment in its narratives of success.  
 
A call centre fair 
 
In the microbus on November 7th Mahmoud was telling me about his past employment; an 
accountancy office delivery boy, fanning kebabs in a street restaurant, selling a fake “sexual 
drug” over the phone, and a teller in a bank. He described how a guy he had outperformed in 
the bank interviews entered the prestigious customer service department because he was rich. 
Mahmoud had left after realising he would be counting money as a teller all his life. This was 
a decision he now regretted, realising it to be a good job in Egypt’s current climate. Mahmoud 
also talked about a trainer in another soft-skills scholarship he had done before GTO, who had 
been an inspiration, getting him to feel confident speaking in public. He compared him to Dale 
Carnegie, an American self-help guru who teaches you how to be “creative, effective, and 
positive,” and that nothing is impossible. Mahmoud was shocked when I told him that I had 
not heard of Carnegie, because these skills were so important.  
 
Our conversation was cut short by our impending arrival. Mahmoud was sceptical about this 
fair. He had seen online it would predominantly advertise call centre jobs, but he thought there 
might be other opportunities: the advertisement said banking would be represented, or at least 
English language call centres. This fair was organised by the Information Technology Industry 
Development Agency (ITIDA), designed to develop Egypt’s technology industry, in 
conjunction with the Ministry of Communication. It was the 7th annual fair. Upon arrival we 
were shown through the hotel’s side entrance away from the guests, along with hundreds of 
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others. Our bags and bodies were scanned and thereafter we entered a shiny, bustling function 
room where we were to register. In this Fair it was possible just to show up.  
 
Before we began approaching stalls we came across an organiser conducting an interview with 
state television channel NileTV. We listened in as he explained the fair’s aims, in Arabic but 
with use of English words which suggested his membership of the upper-middle class: 
 
“The aim of the fair is to present a variety of companies for young people and 
to improve the communication between companies and job seekers…It is not just a 
case of youth coming here and choosing a random job, it is about tailoring yourself 
to the labour market, and picking the career that best suits you.” 
 
The organiser evokes a language of consumption to describe the fair. Like commodities in a 
mall, companies are ‘presented’ for youth, who can ‘pick’ their chosen career depending on 
what best suits them. He thus extends a discourse of hope. Intrinsically, employment fairs are 
a material representation of an open labour market. One can apply to desirable employers, in 
the expectation they will judge you on the ‘skills’ presented on your CV, and how you come 
across in person. Fairs incubate the perception that recruitment is based on meritocratic 
principles, that those most qualified succeed. This image is particularly important in Egypt, in 
the context of the practice of recruiting through wasta. But Reem, an employee of a recruitment 
company that organises fairs, was adamant that wasta is not a big problem in the private sector. 
Companies now recruit “the best candidates.”  
 
The organiser’s speech, and the space of the fair, thus creates an air of expectation. However, 
Mahmoud and I laughed about the supposed choice as we looked around at what were mostly 
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call centre companies. We also noticed various companies offering ‘soft-skills’ training. I 
asked a representative of one about their course. After introducing myself, he enthusiastically 
informed me he had studied at the University of Essex. He went on to tell us that the company 
offered a scholarship, funded by the Ministry of Communications, to help youth get jobs. The 
soft-skills focus was because they are needed in a call centre industry that does not require 
“specific skills.” I asked how they handle graduates who do not want this work. He said this is 
one of their biggest problems: “we tell them there are opportunities to be promoted, I started in 
the call centre and I am in HR now.” It is common for upper-middle class Egyptians to take 
English-language call centre jobs in university holidays. But this represents a very different 
venture into the field than the lower-middle classes, who could not access foreign language 
accounts due to their Egyptianized accents.61  
 
We left the stall. Mahmoud expressed his disappointment at the admission that soft skills were 
targeted for call centres. He also questioned the hopeful message of transfer to HR: “there are 
rotation shifts and it is hard to do courses outside, it’s so hard to afford HR diplomas.” His 
experience within a call centre enabled him to critique this particular mythical discourse. 
Mahmoud went back to ask how he travelled to England, “was it a scholarship?” The man 
immediately replied that he paid for it, followed by an awkward laugh. What might have been 
received by some as a hopeful message was therefore punctured by Mahmoud’s scepticism, 
which had developed out of a prolonged period of stagnation. It led him to investigate the 
hopeful claims of this upper-middle class man.  
 
                                                          
61 The upper-middle classes are taking this work for extra income, or work experience during holidays. They are 
therefore taking jobs, temporarily, which others need.  
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Mahmoud then turned his attention to applying for jobs. We went to different outsourcing 
companies looking for opportunities and asking questions. He was looking for English 
accounts, but mentioned every time he applied he had been told his accent was not good 
enough. I felt obliged to tell him he is good enough, to reintroduce hope. One woman stressed 
that they have “special training” for language, so you do not need fluency. If Mahmoud did not 
make it he could go into an Egyptian account. She outlined the ‘steps’ programme in the 
company, which helps employees “build their dreams”: “people think the call centre is just a 
temp job, not a career, they don’t know you can rise up.” One slogan reflecting this hope was 
found at another stall: ‘our today’s beginners are tomorrow’s leaders.’  
 
I described above how the origins of these meritocratic discourses lie in the educational 
experiences of the upper-middle classes, and the narration of success they have seen and lived 
through those lenses. Yet, there is also a financial incentive to reproduce them. At another 
company, young HR reps described how they had a recruitment target which affects their 
bonuses. They said to me that they therefore “try to convince people to take jobs,” by telling 
them they can apply for other positions within one or two years, or that it is only a temporary 
job. They had also worked as agents during university, but studied management systems in 
private colleges. An expensive private education, very different to Mahmoud’s, became a 
consistent theme among the representatives behind the stalls. It suggested people like 
Mahmoud do not make it into the HR department.  
 
These discourses of hope, which were attempting to create an atmosphere of hope, though 
affective to many, were by this stage not affective on Mahmoud. He had come to know them 
as a lie. As we walked around, we spoke to two young men who were also disappointed by the 
focus on call centres. After jokingly asking me if I could get them a job in England, they said 
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they wanted bank work, but “you need wasta.” One of them said his dad works in a bank, but 
he was unable to use this ‘wasta’ because he only obtained an ‘acceptable’ grade in university, 
not ‘good.’ In this case, wasta could only be used in conjunction with a minimum university 
grade, otherwise the bank would be unable to justify the recruitment.62 This story punctures the 
hopeful myth presented in these fairs, and reveals the marginal position of these men, to the 
extent that they cannot even use the social capital they hold.  
 
Some stalls did offer hope to Mahmoud. He approached one company recruiting engineers and 
software developers. The HR representative said they have admin jobs, but asked Mahmoud 
for his experience. He began to respond, nervously in English, that he had worked as a sales 
rep, an import specialist, but she disengaged quickly and cut him off, asking what his major 
was. He said commerce, and she put his CV on a huge ‘commerce’ pile. He would never hear. 
After this, Mahmoud had submitted his CV to every stall he could, so we went to another room 
in which there were various talks and workshops. One talk was by the CEO of Jobzella, an 
online employment and course aggregator describing itself as “The World’s First Online Career 
Mega Mall…providing a one-stop-shop to all career services for job-seekers and professionals 
to aspire to a better life,” a description which does not hold back in discursively transforming 
jobs into easily-acquired commodities. The CEO asked the young people sitting before him 
about the biggest problems they faced in their job searches. They responded with: the 
prevalence of wasta, lack of experience, the difference between knowledge learned in 
university and that required by companies, companies advertising a job falsely, and the 
ubiquitous prevalence of call centre jobs. The CEO, rather than responding to those comments, 
                                                          
62 I mentioned in Chapter 3 how the educational system in the faculties of the people often lead to students 
“giving up.”  
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went on to confidently describe the problem of joblessness as being down to a ‘communication 
problem’ between employers and prospective employees:  
 
“There are 4 million jobs available; you can’t say there are no jobs. How you 
write your CV is crucial. Youth always put “I want a challenging opportunity in an 
international company,” they won’t listen to that. You need to tell them what you 
are, who you are, and what you have done, you need to market yourself. Make your 
CV stand out from everyone else’s.” 
According to this logic, the problem lies within CV writing, an easily fixable fault. It is a 
hopeful logic, enabling people to believe in the possibility of obtaining employment they are 
currently unable to obtain. This move therefore shutdown the negativity introduced by the 
audience, and reinstated an affective atmosphere which might be productive of feelings of 
hope. I asked Mahmoud what he thought. He responded: “I want to believe him, but the 
situation I have seen is different. I have applied to so many jobs and not been able to get a good 
one. I spent a lot of time improving my CV, I don’t know if I could have done more.” Mahmoud 
by now was sceptical, but even though he had invested in this hopeful belief to little material 
effect, he felt compelled to believe in it.  
 
In September 2016 I met with the CEO and another partner of Jobzella. It is a start-up based in 
the Greek Campus. The CEO was motivated by “helping people and effecting lives.” I 
described to them how graduates feel they cannot reach their dreams because of wasta or the 
favouring of private education. The partner immediately responded: “no no I feel like these are 
excuses for losers. You need to invest in yourself.” The CEO jumped in:  
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“lots don’t take it seriously, they don’t show up to jobs when they are offered. 
If you don’t have wasta you can build a professional network, through a website it 
is easy, you can connect with people and then after show your knowledge. Wasta is 
not needed nowadays. Look you built your network through Noura, and met me 
through that, they need to do the same.”  
 
The CEO was referencing the fact that Noura had introduced me to him. He skated over my 
English language, class compatibility, ethnicity, and my particular ability as a foreign man to 
reach out to a woman. He then said he meets lots of young people in events who say they want 
to work in anything, “that is not an answer” he said, “you need to know what you want.” 
Apparently youth send blanket emails to many companies, but “they have to put in much more 
effort. You can find information online, how to apply for stuff, or online courses. It goes back 
to the motivation of the person.” Jobzella is one such website through which youth can find 
courses, and contact people. The internet, he said, is “opening up the world,” because you can 
find courses, contacts, job information, and not be excluded from networks or knowledge.  
 
Again, this highlights the similarity of attitudes within these professional labour market 
institutions. Success is pinned down on the individual. Crucially, the CEO asserted that the 
internet is playing a key role in enabling a level playing field, neglecting the continued 
hierarchies that shape who one is able to access, and which courses people are able to afford. I 
finally mentioned I was doing research with graduates of the ‘faculties of the people.’ The CEO 
responded saying, “oh yea they all work in call centres right?” This displayed tacit knowingness 
of where people like Mahmoud really belong according to ‘successful’ people like him, and 
provides an insight into how they would be judged in application processes. However, in the 
employment fair, an atmosphere of hope is sustained, by HR representatives who promise, and 
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seemingly embody, career progression, and by soft-skills trainers and recruitment agents who 
claim to hold the solution to employment struggles. Furthermore, the materiality of the place 
itself again symbolised the global city; it was located in an upmarket hotel, it was filled with 
members of the upper-middle classes, and its signs were in English. For many, interacting with 
this place and the upscale objects and meritocratic discourses within it, applying to its jobs, 
making connections, and learning how to write a CV, would induce feelings of hope. However, 
for Mahmoud, the ‘affect’ of this place was complicated by the prolonged period he had spent 
in a call centre, and the effort he had extended on improving his CV. The fair thus conjured up 
frustration, and confusion, as he partially laid bare the fair’s real goal: a governmental effort to 
train young graduates and place them in call centres.  
 
However, Mahmoud was still at the fair, and yearned to believe in, and feel, its hopeful promise 
again. When we left, Mahmoud said he was sad about the young men who had asked me to 
find them a job in the UK: “I like to think I can make it here, but it is just too hard it seems.” 
This emotional pull represents a subjective aspect of hope-making that will be discussed in 
Chapter 6. But now I go on to describe Mahmoud’s experience at another kind of fair.  
 
A ‘classy’ fair 
 
On November 21st I was in the microbus with Mahmoud on the way to the InterContinental 
again. This time he was more excited, but still not optimistic. This Fair would be very different. 
It was called ‘Our future in our Country’, co-organised by recruitment firm JobMaster and 
Egypt’s branch of the Rotary Club in order to “contribute towards social progress and the 
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development of youth in Egypt.”63 On the way we discussed Mahmoud’s planned 
entrepreneurial project, a burger restaurant. He was going through the list of items he would 
sell, before describing how entrepreneurship was becoming so popular because Egypt’s private 
sector is so difficult.  
 
We soon switched our minds to the fair. As we approached, Mahmoud excitedly discussed the 
abundance of international companies, banks, and large Egyptian companies, along with the 
desirable jobs in HR, PR, and administration that would be present. We went through the same 
arrival, only this time Mahmoud had already filled out an application form – a means of 
attendee pre-screening – on which he had to declare his qualifications and career goals. Some 
fairs were inaccessible to these relatively poor, public university graduates. Private universities 
held fairs exclusively for their own graduates. Other fairs charged a fee for entry (often around 
50LE (US$6.25)), which put off my interlocutors who struggled to afford it and criticised the 
idea of unemployed youth having to pay for job fair entry. Another format was the one that had 
been applied in this fair. Prospective attendees had to send their CVs and fill out application 
forms, and await acceptance. One fair asked which private school applicants had attended and 
of which ‘nady’ (club) they were a member. Many fairs however remained accessible for these 
young men. During the interview with Reem, the JobMaster employee, she explained this 
screening process. It was designed to target a particular calibre of graduates for particular jobs. 
This one, she said, targeted private foreign-language university graduates, but also most 
university graduates. One fair they had held focused on call centres. This was an ‘open day,’ 
so anyone could show up. She stressed that they target graduates of law and commerce for call 
centre jobs.  
                                                          
63 https://jobmastergroup.wordpress.com/2015/05/17/the-vocational-service-leadership-award-from-rotary-
international-and-rotary-kasr-el-nile-club/ 
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As we entered the hall Mahmoud commented on the ‘professional’ appearance of the fair 
compared with the previous one (see Figure 4.4). The attendees, he said, were noticeably 
higher-class, privately educated. He could tell by their clothes. We immediately saw the 
multitude of prestigious companies, Pirelli, QNB, Vodafone, ElAraby, the list went on. Each 
stand was surrounded by groups of young men and women waiting impatiently to hand over 
their CV and talk to HR representatives. A visibly more excited Mahmoud soon joined the 
crowds. Like GTO and the UN Fair, this exclusive international hotel symbolised the global 
city desired by these young men – Mahmoud had even applied to work here seven times in the 
past, never receiving a response. The act of accessing these upmarket places was exciting. 
Aesthetically they were worlds away from Mahmoud’s home. And, just as some fairs took 
place in shopping malls, instead of being filled with desirable commodities, they were filled 
with desirable jobs. 
 
Figure 4.4 – Employment fair at the InterContinental Hotel (Source: author) 
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Mahmoud began rushing around handing out his CV, the only consultation being to ask which 
vacancies were available, and whether he could leave his CV. This consultation, unlike at the 
other fair, took place in English. Once the CV had been delivered, Mahmoud moved to the next 
opportunity. “The more the better!” he said as I questioned the speed, while thereafter feeling 
guilty about ‘blaming’ Mahmoud for not cultivating relations with HR representatives. Some 
firms would tell him to apply online, some said they needed more experience. At one stand 
Mahmoud had inquired about HR vacancies, but after the representative looked at his CV she 
wrote down ‘customer services.’  Rather than taking issue, Mahmoud moved on to the next 
one. Once he applied to all the companies he could, we left. On the way out, Mahmoud tried 
to submit his CV to the hotel again, but they told him to return the next day, an answer he knew 
was a way to get rid of him. As we departed, Mahmoud said: “let’s see if they call, I think these 
fairs are all for marketing, but let’s see.” 
 
Although inside the fair, during the rush to around handing out CVs, Mahmoud had felt flashes 
of hope, but as we exited the space, its affect upon him waned as he brought back memories of 
previous employment fairs. A few months earlier Mahmoud had attended a fair at October 
University for Modern Science & Arts, an international private university. When he told me 
about this fair, his sense of excitement was clear:  
 
“It was amazing, there were a lot of banks, like CIB bank, Arabic African 
bank and good insource companies, even Ferrari was there, there were amazing 
vacancies actually in supply chain, HR, and sales. I really hope I get accepted in any 
of them. I applied to a supply chain job in MAC, it’s an amazing job, I would be the 
guy responsible for purchasing, if I get it that would be amazing. Wish me luck!”  
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Mahmoud’s interaction with the affective atmosphere of this fair, its location in an elite private 
university, objects such as stalls presenting prestigious jobs and upper-middle class attendees, 
induced lingering feelings of intense hope. The act of attending the fair, coming into contact 
with many prestigious companies, having his CV accepted and conceivably considered enabled 
Mahmoud to imagine the job he would be ‘responsible for,’ and thereby experience an instant 
of fulfilment dimly anticipatory of a good future. The material representation of meritocracy 
that is intrinsic to employment fairs had been crucial to that hope. These feelings reflected those 
that followed the practice of submitting applications to desirable jobs (or scholarships) in 
general. Every time, I saw how submission generated an imaginary shift into a desirable future 
that produced a flash of hope.  
 
However, by late 2015 the feeling produced by remembering this same fair was very different. 
His body was no longer able to receive the affect in the same way (Anderson, 2006). Looking 
back, he described it as a place of frustration: 
 
“Nobody ever rings back. We applied to every single great company at the 
MSA fair, and got no reply. They asked us if we were MSA students, they had to put 
it on the CV, but for everyone else they didn’t ask, I think this is corruption. Also at 
the AUC Greek Campus fair, we went and applied, and not one of us got any 
response!” 
 
Mahmoud had now concluded that fairs were marketing tools for companies and the 
government. This once hopeful space, over time, now provided a memory that conjured up 
frustration, by reminding him of his exclusion. But, despite his scepticism, Mahmoud had gone 
to another ‘high-class’ fair. The continued construction of transparent employment fairs left 
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the door open for hope to return. Mahmoud indeed did return. He had come, he told me, 
“because I have no other choice but to try, I might get lucky.” Thus, the reproduction of an 
affective atmosphere of hope continued to catch the body of this young man, but not through a 
clean linear influence of the subject by certain places, objects, and discourses, but through the 
body’s compulsion for a feeling of hope.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I have used the theoretical insights of affect theory (Anderson, 2009; Seigworth, 
2000), to describe how certain places of Cairo’s ‘global city’ generate affective atmospheres 
of hope. Within training courses, entrepreneurship events, and employment fairs, certain 
objects – such as a video of Steve Jobs, a business card, and an upper-middle class trainer – 
represent aesthetically a global circulation of knowledge. They also embody and extend 
discourses of meritocracy and individual autonomy, which offer up the ‘global city’ as 
reachable to all. These discourses stem from the transnational educational trainings of the 
upper-middle classes, through which they learn that their class privilege has been earned (Khan, 
2012). But they are also found within specifically Egyptian ideologies (Elyachar, 2005; 
Kenney, 2015). I have thus examined how a new ‘rule of experts’ (Mitchell, 2002), organised 
by the government, international development organisations, and members of the upper-middle 
classes who work in recruitment, entrepreneurship, and training, is attempting to construct a 
‘modern,’ seemingly transparent labour market, and destroy ‘backwards’ recruitment practices 
and prejudicial notions of where people belong. These prejudicial notions though linger on 
beneath the surface, enabling the upper-middle classes to maintain their class position.  
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The Chapter demonstrated how this meritocratic promise is extended to lower-middle class 
young men who are chasing employment in the global city, and thereby social mobility. As 
these young men come to interact with the places of the hopeful city, and the objects and 
discourses held within them, they are affected with a bodily feeling of euphoric hope that 
global, upper-middle class belonging is available, and will come to them. Inhabitants of these 
places are informed over and over again that their own behaviour can secure social mobility in 
a labour market that responds to acquired skills. In turn, social relations that determine people’s 
abilities to acquire those ‘skills’ are veiled over.  
 
In following this analysis, and utilising affect theory, I have suggested an alternative 
theorisation of the exercise of power to that which rests on securing a congruence between 
subjective expectations and objective chances (Bourdieu, 2000). This form of compliance, 
operationalised by certain labour market industries and institutions within Cairo’s global city, 
works through affect, through making people work hard and wait in hope. In the process I have 
shown how global cities, and certain labour market institutions and industries, also extend 
discourses and produce landscapes of inclusion, not just exclusion (Hage, 2003; Ghertner, 
2015). The personal reception of these transpersonal affective atmospheres is heavily 
dependent upon the body’s condition to be affected. The following chapters discuss how the 
‘affect’ of the city upon these men changed over time. Their experience in Cairo began to 
unravel their feeling of hope. The next chapter therefore examines how they stitched this 
feeling back together over time by returning to the same objects and discourses of hope. 
However, in this chapter, I have concentrated on the generation of affective atmospheres of 
hope within the city.   
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Finally, throughout the chapter I have hinted at the financial incentives propelling the 
reproduction of hope. There is indeed much money to be made from selling hope (Schüll, 
2012), and there are many people discussed in this chapter who are doing just that. Recruitment 
firms make money by setting up fairs, from companies who set up stalls in the expectation of 
heavy traffic, and sometimes from applicants themselves. GTO sustains itself through getting 
trainees into the centre and into jobs, and private training centres obtain money out of promising 
access to jobs. Entrepreneurship organisations make money through hosting events that people 
attend in anticipation of finding inspiration. And finally, outsourcing companies – even HR 
reps – benefit from convincing people to take low-end jobs. Thus, many people profit from 
these narratives of hope, apart from the young men to whom they are sold. In the next two 
chapters, I show how these young men struggled with the consequences of trying to sustain 
that promised mobility in a social terrain ridden with hierarchies that prevent it.  
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Chapter 5 Being hopeful 
 
Eslam, like Ibrahim, after graduating from the GTO programme, heeded its message and took 
a job in one of Cairo’s call centres, an outsourced local Arabic language account for a large 
mobile phone company. Eslam did not have a defined dream like some of other graduates of 
GTO, but he would take the job – which he needed to sustain a life in Cairo – in order to gain 
some experience in customer services and develop his language skills on the side, before 
looking for a higher-level job after six months. He quickly moved into a flat in an informal 
neighbourhood of Giza with two of his new colleagues, Adel and Mohammed, who were also 
in their early 20s. They each paid 400LE (US$50) a month for a bed in a shared room, and 
would be joined at different times by friends who had also come to Cairo to work or study. 
Adel and Mohammed had also come to Cairo after university in order to locate a better job 
than what was available in their hometowns, Zagazig and Zifta in the Nile Delta. Adel dreamed 
of a job as an accountant, and Mohammed of working in a ‘big company’ in which he could 
grow and have a ‘career.’ But both had to settle for temporary jobs in the call centre. They 
hoped to acquire some skills, save some money, and take courses on the side. Coming to Cairo, 
as explained in the previous chapter, made these young men feel good. Simply being in the city 
gave them a sense that they were moving towards a desirable future, as opposed to those who 
had stayed behind and accepted the difficult trajectories in their hometowns. 
 
The previous chapter uncovered how a feeling of hope that rested on a discursive and material 
terrain of meritocracy was affected by certain labour market institutions and industries in 
Cairo’s ‘global city,’ in training courses, employment fairs, and entrepreneurial events. This 
chapter begins to examine the tormented journey to the realisation of that hope. I moved in 
with Eslam, Adel, and Mohammed in May 2015, five months after they had entered the call 
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centre. I would live with them for an initial three month period, before returning once more in 
November 2015 for one month. This chapter tells the story of this living arrangement in this 
gendered male space, revealing the attempts of these three young migrant men to keep moving 
towards their dreams, in a context where they have limited means to do so. They set about 
being the hardworking subjects they had been told to be, gaining experience in the call centre. 
Yet, over time, negative emotions overwhelmed them. They became frustrated, fearful, 
confused, and angry as a result of an existential sense of ‘stuckedness’ (Hage, 2003). This took 
them to discourses which embodied those emotions. They railed against a corrupt government, 
stagnant economy, and an unjust labour market. But Eslam, Adel, and Mohammed would 
constantly try to foreclose these emotions; through making jokes, talking about girls, buying 
something for themselves, or watching television. However, these ‘drugs of life’ often led to 
more anxiety. All three engaged in practices and thoughts that re-enacted a sense of 
‘prospective momentum’ towards future mobility, by returning to meritocratic objects and 
discourses of hope found in self-help and religion (Miyazaki, 2004). This allowed them to 
blame themselves for their own predicament, and talk about what they would now do to correct 
their behaviour. They also accrued respect for themselves, over those who had surrendered. 
However, over the chapter, their fragile positions will be laid bare. All they could do was talk 
over and over about how they will work hard in the future.  
 
The Chapter thus complicates the argument outlined in Chapter 4, by introducing time as a 
significant aspect of affective power. The production of hopeful, hardworking workers is full 
of confusions, penetrations, fatigue, and periods of disbelief, as the reward for working hard is 
never grasped. Meritocratic hope maintains its hold because it is emotionally attractive. The 
Chapter therefore also builds on existing work that reveals how people who are thrust into 
prolonged class immobility, or periods of waithood, attempt to relocate a sense of movement 
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in their lives (Mains, 2012; Pedersen, 2012; Jansen, 2015; Ralph, 2015; O’Neil, 2017). First, 
while the boundaries are sometimes blurred, I make a distinction between practices (and 
objects) which distract, and practices which re-enact a sense of hope. Although both are 
embedded in neoliberal capitalism as the objects used are part of chains of consumption, they 
instil different emotions. Second, I add a notion of temporality, revealing the dramatic 
oscillation in the lives of the structurally disenfranchised between hope and despair. Third, I 
move away from this literature’s celebratory tones, which hail people’s ability to find hope in 
difficult conditions, by taking forward the previous chapter’s focus on the objects and 
discourses which affect feelings of hope. These young men find hope through meritocratic 
discourses, and certain objects which embody them, that serve to legitimise their marginal 
positions. In this way, I examine the moral dimensions of hope (Lamont, 2002; Crapanzano, 
2016).  
 
I also wish that the chapter speaks to many who read it, to people who is chasing something – 
a better job, marriage or love, or a house – that is difficult to locate. As I outlined in the 
introduction, normative systems of value connected to age, class, and gender rely on forward 
momentum. But, for many, pursuing adulthood, a satisfying job, or romantic love is extremely 
challenging. This chapter reveals how young Egyptian men who are extremely limited in their 
ability to move sometimes need distraction, become angry or disenfranchised that the race is 
not fair, or that the goal is not worth it, but continue chasing because there is little alternative, 
and because they crave or need the feeling it keeps alive.  
 
Factory Life 
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Eslam, Adel, and Mohammed’s flat was situated in an informal neighbourhood of Giza, which 
has developed through a process of landowner property development and inward migration 
since the 1960s (Sims, 2010). The vast informal areas of Cairo hold a diverse range of people. 
But this particular neighbourhood, although not considered part of the ‘‘ashwa’yāt’ (slums), 
was on the lower end in terms of socio-economic status. Whenever I mentioned living there to 
both upper- and lower-middle class research participants, people responded with confusion and 
fear, before commenting on the shaʿby inhabitants they considered to be ignorant, rude, 
immoral (mish akhlāqy), and violent. Adel, Eslam, and Mohammed certainly wished to live in 
a more upscale neighbourhood. They were annoyed by the smells and noise coming from the 
market directly below the third floor flat (see Figure 5.1). The flat itself was also a source of 
annoyance. It contained five beds in two bedrooms, a simple kitchen that was seldom used and 
quickly became dirty, a small bathroom where the water often cut out, and a living room 
consisting of a sofa, television, fridge, and ironing board. It stood in contrast to the relative 
comfort afforded to them in their family homes.  
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Figure 5.1 – The street of the apartment (Source: author) 
 
Eslam, Adel, and Mohammed would arrive home every day from work between 2am and 3am. 
We would sit up for an hour or two while they ate the koshary (a low-cost, but filling dish 
consisting of pasta, rice, lentils, fried onions and tomato sauce), or pasta with liver that they 
had bought from the street below. They would watch television, relay stories, laugh and 
complain about the annoying or rude customers they had encountered during the shift. They 
would then head to bed, before waking up around 12pm. They would slowly shower and pray, 
and go out to get breakfast, which consisted of bean and falafel sandwiches. Thereafter, apart 
from the odd occasion when they needed to run errands, we would sit again in front of the 
television. During this time we would do the most talking, about the state of Egypt, their current 
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situations and future dreams, as well as more light-hearted topics of world politics, films, and 
football. By 3pm they would leave again for work, walking five minutes to the shuttle bus 
organised by the company before being taken back to what Adel called the ‘factory.’ The only 
break to this routine came during their days off. Adel and Mohammed returned home every 
week, where they would sleep, and see friends and family. Eslam usually stayed in the flat, not 
doing very much, because his home in Sohag was nine hours away.  
 
This daily rhythm quickly began to induce frustration. The call centre, and the phone itself, 
generated an affective atmosphere of frustration. Though I never worked with them in the call 
centre – the language requirements presented a barrier – it was clear that this was a taxing 
place.64 They would spend nine hours per shift on the headset, moving from one customer to 
the next without respite, with a 45-minute break for lunch. This was not only extremely tiring, 
but also immensely stressful. Every day they would return home drained, complaining about 
abusive customers who had reacted angrily when a problem was not solved immediately. In 
the face of such abuse, agents are forced to remain polite, rather than retaliating as they would 
if they experienced the same treatment outside work. This is a chastening experience, 
particularly for men. The dignity and respect that comes with normative sociability is stripped 
away from them on the phone. This over time led to an accumulation of anger for Adel, 
Mohammed, and Eslam, which often spilled over into their lives outside: 
 
Adel:  “you know the problem with this job is it makes you rude when you communicate 
with people, it makes you not care about other people’s feelings. You learn to do 
what the customers do, they come and shout and abuse you, and you can’t do 
                                                          
64 Jamie Woodcock (2016) examines the stress induced by spending time on the headset among UK call centre 
workers. 
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anything, so you take it out in other situations. Like, in the microbus I used to let 
the driver keep 25 pence if he kept it, but not now, I always get it back now”. 
 
Mohammed: “yea I think when you have a job you enjoy and feel satisfied with you can have 
a good life outside, to keep up with friends and family. I used to be very involved 
with my siblings, if they did something wrong I would tell them off. But now 
when I go home and they do something I don’t care, I don’t have the energy to 
tell them to stop.”  
 
Most literature on low-skilled service work focuses on the indignity of the work itself 
(Braverman, 1975; Woodcock, 2016), but Adel and Mohammed are describing here how a 
difficult job leads to an inability to lead a satisfying life outside. They are unable to live up to 
the behavioural norms expected of respectable citizens on the streets, or responsible older 
brothers. The two qualities those roles required, generosity and attentiveness, were being 
eroded on the headset.  
 
Adel described the call centre as a new kind of ‘factory’ for youth. Having worked on textile 
machines when he was a student, he said that kind of factory was hard on your body, but the 
call centre is hard on your mind. Yet this factory also took its toll on the bodies of its workers. 
Many over time developed health problems, such as hearing or speech impairments, and also 
become sapped of energy after spending nine hours a day dealing with customers. On one 
occasion a young man was laid off due to a speech impediment he had developed in work. But 
primarily, these three young men thought the call centre, as Adel once said to me, was just not 
the place for people who had spent years in education, and developed dreams for high-skilled 
jobs in their fields (May et al. 2007). They were unable to ‘find themselves’ (yilāqu nafsuhum) 
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there – something which involves loving what you do – neither as respectable employees, nor 
even as respectable men (Skeggs, 1997; Braverman, 1975; Sennett, 1998). Call centre work, 
they feared, would not even provide a basis to secure marriage.  
 
Fucking with your head 
 
These young men would engage in various strategies to forget the daily stresses conjured up 
by work, and to alter the affective atmosphere that was inducing feelings of frustration. Upon 
returning home each night Adel, Mohammed, and Eslam would ritualistically spend time 
relaying stories about the annoying or rude customers they had encountered during the shift. 
They would laugh at their stupidity and plot fantastical ways they could seek revenge, for 
example by setting up another line and charging the customer without them knowing. Though 
they would say things like, “I swear I’m going to do this tomorrow,” they would never actually 
carry out these revengeful acts. But the activity of talking about them felt therapeutic. 
Converting these deeply frustrating, chastening events into objects of laughter, and discursively 
being able to retaliate and correct the wrong, enabled them to dispel the anger that these 
encounters had built up on the headset.65  It reasserted a form of imaginary power and respect 
over customers who had wronged them. The use of speech and conversation to dispel negativity 
will be a recurring theme of the chapter. It represents a strategy of people who have extremely 
limited means to escape their structural precarity.  
 
Yet on some days reliving these work frustrations was unwelcome. On one occasion after a 
particularly strenuous ‘rush’ period – a period with a higher number of calls than usual – 
                                                          
65 See Parkhill et al. (2011) and Billig (2001) for sociological studies on the relationship between humour and 
affect.  
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Mohammed and Eslam returned home in a sombre mood. Mohammed started recalling with 
agitation a woman who had kept screaming at him and swearing at the company. He had 
repeatedly asked her to calm down, but she refused. He was about to move on to a story of 
another customer, but Eslam abruptly told him “fuqak” (leave it). He wanted to forget about 
the day as quickly as possible. So instead he sat down and began scrolling through Facebook 
on his phone, chuckling to himself intermittently as he read. Mohammed then switched on the 
television and began watching an episode of Ramez, a Ramadan comedy show that puts 
celebrities in uncomfortable situations (see Figure 5.2). They both put the frustrations of the 
day out of their minds as they focused on the devices in front of them (Gorton, 2009; Garde-
Hansen & Gorton, 2013).  
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Figure 5.2 – Inside the flat (Source: author) 
 
Every evening, after they had relayed the day’s stories, we would spend time watching 
television, either a Western film, or an Egyptian show. This would always be something ‘light’ 
(khafīf), which would be easy to watch in a tired state. They wanted an object which would 
‘affect’ them in a way that removed their anger. As we watched we would talk and joke about 
football, films, world politics, and girls. Before going to sleep, no matter how late it was, Eslam 
would then watch a film or television show, or scroll through Facebook on his phone in bed. 
This activity formed one of his attempts to ensure his life was more than just work. It meant he 
could sit and enjoy some free time before sleep in which he was not imminently heading back 
 214 
 
to work. The timings of shifts meant it was very difficult to do much outside work for these 
men. As male employees, they always got evening shifts due to the need for women to be home 
before nightfall. This meant they often missed out on watching football matches, hanging out 
in the ahwa, and meeting the few friends they knew in Cairo. Eslam also complained about not 
getting time to do sport. Back in Sohag he had played football, but the schedule in Cairo 
prevented that. Sport made him feel happy: “it makes you feel like you are doing something 
else with your life, that you are accomplishing something.” It was one of the pillars of his life 
philosophy. If you sort out your work, religion, sports, and humour you will be happy, he would 
say. In Cairo he had no “balance,” all he did was work and sleep. Eslam would try to organise 
to see a friend or go on an outing on his days off. At one stage we talked about planning a day 
trip away to the beach, but it never happened because we could not coordinate days in which 
the whole group was free. More infrequently, I would go with Eslam when he went to buy new 
clothes for himself, either from the shops in the neighbourhood, or sometimes from a mall. 
Buying something new, he said, was like a “reward.” It too provided a brief break in what was 
otherwise a monotonous routine. Another of my interlocutors, outside the house, who had a 
stressful job as a salesman for a cheese company in which he constantly struggled to hit targets, 
described his activities of smoking, going to the gym, or watching films as “doing anything 
that fucks with [his] head a bit.” His time in the gym, he said, was the only time he is able to 
relax and forget about his daily problems of earning money. 
 
The everyday attempts of these men to alleviate the monotony and frustrations of work reflect 
those of workers around the world. Watching light television, flicking through social media, 
doing exercise, socialising, and buying new things represent efforts to put the stresses of work 
out of mind. These are activities, and objects (such as a television, the phone, new clothing, 
gym equipment, other people), which produce alterations in the atmosphere, which in turn 
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induces different feelings. They also represent an effort to reclaim control over one’s time, and 
be one’s self. They are activities which people want to do in order to adhere to normative 
classed and gendered modes of value after which they aspire (Skeggs, 1997). In work, people 
spend time doing something they have to do, their time is not theirs, and they often do not feel 
‘themselves.’ As mentioned above, some took to smoking, drinking alcohol, or smoking 
hashish to ‘fuck with their head’ (Schielke, 2015). But, for my three flatmates, this did not 
conform to their middle-class Islamic subjectivities. Hashish, alcohol, and smoking is often 
associated with shaʿby culture. I will describe below how they were considered objects which 
might result in permanent distraction from one’s goal of middle-class respectability.66 
 
Feeling bored 
 
Over time another more existential set of feelings began to arise for these young men. The 
everyday frustrations they experienced in the call centre served as a constant reminder of the 
need for prospective movement, to a job in which they felt themselves. These frustrations 
would have been more bearable a pathway towards better remained open in their minds. Their 
time in the call centre was supposed to be temporary, but as six months passed they began to 
feel like they were becoming stuck. Early on, Adel would frequently repeat something he 
remembered from the one day he had attended the GTO course a couple of years previously. 
A trainer had said that one year in the call centre was good experience, because you learn useful 
skills such as communication, and patience in handling customers. However, over time Adel 
stopped recalling that lesson. Upon arriving home in early July he told us he had been called 
by an English-speaking customer. Rather than handling her, he froze when she started 
                                                          
66 The practices discussed here, along with the monotonous sense from which these men need to escape, are 
highly gendered. Many Egyptian women rather experience the frustrations and monotony of home life. They 
thus develop different, and more spatially limited ways to “escape” (see Ring, 2006).  
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speaking, before frantically passing her on to a colleague who could speak English. Eslam and 
Mohammed, trying to turn it into another joke, made fun of Adel for not even trying to ‘handle’ 
her, but Adel did not find it funny. He claimed, with a palpable sense of nostalgia, that a couple 
of years ago when he was still in university he would not have had a problem dealing with the 
customer. This event served to remind him that he was not moving forwards towards his dream 
accountancy job. In fact, he was moving backwards in the call centre, losing skills he once 
held. In the days after, he lamented how he felt he was becoming stuck. The job and schedule 
were preventing him from even thinking about the future, let alone taking courses like he had 
hoped. 
 
Similar moments would come for Eslam and Mohammed over the summer, through 
‘encounters’ that rendered conscious the stubborn and even increasing distance between 
themselves and what they considered a good life. For Eslam, this led to a period of three days 
where he did not speak. He would not join in watching television, and instead headed straight 
to bed. Only afterwards would we have a conversation about this. He said he had been confused 
by all the stuff I am interested in for the research. He knew I wanted to understand the attempts 
of youth to get married, obtain good jobs, and afford a desirable lifestyle. He said – while 
pointing to an advert on television offering new one million pound villas in a new gated 
community – that he gets annoyed when he thinks about the future, about marriage, a car, his 
career. As a result of this annoyance, he often chooses not to think about these things, “I have 
come to think that it is not useful.” But in those few days he could not help it. He was scared 
of becoming stuck in the call centre. He looked up to people who had been there for three years. 
They got used to it, they see leaving as a risk. He did not want that to happen to him, he wanted 
to move on.  
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These feelings of frustration and confusion overwhelmed all of my interlocutors at different 
points. Ibrahim, as I described in the previous chapter, had moved to Cairo full of promise. In 
February 2015, barely two months after arriving, this promise had disappeared. Upon my return 
to Egypt a few months later, he described to me his change of feeling:  
 
“I could not stay in the job, I was becoming depressed and angry all the time. I 
was not able to think about anything outside work, only how to reach the targets, the 
customers. When I went home I would keep thinking about it, and just be so tired 
from the long shifts that I had to sleep. I was not able to work towards my goals, I 
was working for the company, not for myself and my dreams. It was a very hard 
time, I felt stuck, like I was not learning anything, I was not moving towards my 
dream, I was not going anywhere, it was very depressing.” 
 
Ibrahim’s sense of hopeful mobility had been replaced by a sense of fearful regression. He was 
living ‘day-to-day,’ not in preparation for a long-term goal. His job consumed his time and 
energy, meaning he was unable to attend events and courses, make useful connections, conduct 
research for his start-up, or apply to jobs like he had planned. He was also unable to save money 
from his salary (1400LE/US$175 per month) that could go towards a future project, spending 
it all on rent and daily expenses. Ibrahim looked to his flatmate, Hassan (the same Hassan who 
had attended GTO’s graduation), who had come to Cairo two years before him. Hassan once 
dreamed of working in a bank, but had become depressed and stopped trying to reach this job. 
This was a state Ibrahim feared would befall him. As he described to me during one meeting, 
he feared “what was once temporary would become permanent.” 
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The emergence of these feelings of confusion, anxiety, fear, and even depression is reflective 
of what Ghassan Hage (2003) has previously labelled a sense of ‘stuckedness.’ For these young 
Egyptian men, the spatial terrain of the city was now inducing frustration rather than hope. This 
feeling was brought forth through a job rejection, a parent becoming angry about requests for 
money, a chastening experience at work, a frustrating, alienating interaction in one’s 
neighbourhood, and even seeing an advert for a gated community villa on TV. These 
encounters rendered conscious the fact they were not moving towards aspirational markers of 
adulthood, manhood, or respectable middle-class living.67 My racialized, classed body also 
played a role in reminding these men of this stagnation (see Chapter 2). When I spoke English, 
told them I was going to the AUC to meet someone, talked about my life in the UK, or even 
asked them about their struggles, I brought to life both the social distance between us and thus 
the anxiety arising from their precarious positions. 
 
Adel, during one of our afternoon sessions in front of the television, described this sense as a 
general affliction of Egypt’s youth. He used an analogy of the Hollywood film Fight Club to 
explain what he meant: 
 
“Fight Club is about someone who is bored from daily routine, who can 
consume anything he wants, he can buy a fridge, a television, anything, but he gets 
bored of that life, he wants something different and stimulating. It is like in Sweden, 
where they kill themselves because they have so much money that life gets boring, 
so they get depressed. But here in Egypt we have a different type of boredom, it 
comes from not being able to do anything, you cannot solve any problems here so 
                                                          
67 I described in Chapter 2 how these frustrations differentially afflict women.  
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you get bored. You can’t marry, or get a flat. Lots think that after marriage, and a 
flat, and family it will all be ok, but there will still be problems you have to solve, 
and you can still get bored.”  
 
Adel was reflecting here an understanding of boredom that has been described before in the 
context of un/underemployed people (Ralph, 2008; Schielke, 2015; O’Neil, 2017). It arises not 
from doing nothing, or from doing the same thing over and over, but from one’s time not 
seeming to move towards attaining normative aspirational markers. It is therefore connected to 
the presence of unfulfilled expectations for a better life. Adel compares what he feels as 
boredom to an alternative sense he attaches to the West, a sense that arises from having too 
much, perhaps from realising that attaining markers of ‘success’ do not produce fulfilment. But 
perhaps these senses are connected. They both arise from a sense of lack, from wanting 
something different to what one already has, which may be an intrinsic human feeling (Jackson, 
2012). One may therefore have a lot, but still not find fulfilment. One needs to keep chasing 
the scene of our desires (Berlant, 2011; see Bettelheim, 1991).   
 
Outbursts of anger 
 
These young men did not shy away from connecting their predicaments to structural problems 
in Egypt. From early on during my time with Adel, Mohammed, and Eslam we would have 
many conversations about recent socio-economic transformations that have made life for many 
Egyptians harder. As I sat with Adel one afternoon in early July, he flicked the television on to 
a soap describing how Egypt has changed in the fifty years since Nasser. I asked him what had 
changed exactly: 
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“The middle-class has finished now. There is no middle class, just rich and the 
rest are poor. Nasser created the middle-class out of education, and providing jobs, 
but it is over now, you can’t get educated and you can’t get work. My parents were 
in the middle-class, because they had education and jobs. But we can’t now. Nasser 
did some bad things, but the good outweighs the bad. He gave land to poor farmers, 
and provided education and jobs. The infitaah ruined it all. This was the beginning, 
where everything started to be bought from outside, and so we didn’t make anything 
ourselves, the industry was destroyed. There is no industry now, and no jobs. There 
was oil, and steel. It is finished now. There were factories in Zagazig but not now. 
Corruption has ruined things too. The government made deals with businessmen and 
looked after their own interests only. Land was sold for very cheap and factories 
were closed. We were in the middle, due to education and work, but now in the 
lower-middle. I think I am poor now. I can’t find decent work, can’t save money. 
You can’t get educated now too. You have to work in order to pay for more 
education.” 
 
Adel is calling on various structural explanations for his own difficulties. He blames the lack 
of jobs and poor state of education on corruption between the government and elites, and the 
infitaah. In other discussions he would complain about Egypt’s elite making money through 
corrupt and illegal means, and government disinvestment. Others would also rail against the 
prevalence of ‘wasta’ in recruitment processes, as well as ingrained class prejudice. Egypt’s 
2011 Uprising provided multiple frames through which people can criticise structural 
problems. These young men latched on to those frames as they experienced and reflected upon 
the frustration of their own stagnation. These discourses affectively embodied, and provided 
an outlet for frustration (Hage, 2003; Hochschild, 2016). They complained that a lack of jobs, 
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nepotism, or corruption prevented them from reaching a good life. The direction of this anger 
might indeed lead to more active resistance, and perhaps it did in 2011. In these moments, these 
young men were not being the hopeful subjects they were told to be by the upper-middle classes 
in the hopeful city, only looking to themselves to explain their plight. They were briefly 
penetrating the myths on which meritocratic hope relies, and demonstrating that the 
meritocratic terrain of this neoliberal capitalist regime did not enjoy complete ‘hegemony’ (see 
Chapter 6 for more discussion).  
 
However, political science literature has long understood the emergence of protest or resistance 
to be a complex, contingent process (Chalcraft, 2012; Ismail, 2012; Beinin, 2015; Ketchley, 
2017). Thus, in 2017 Egypt, although there are still protests – a protest by master’s and doctoral 
students was held in 2014 demanding state employment – there exists protest fatigue amongst 
many people, and also constant fear of state violence.68 Furthermore, although these young 
men attended some protests in the 2011 revolution, they have never been actively involved in 
protest ‘movements.’ In this context, in everyday life, these narratives could not reintroduce 
hope. These young men call on other frames and practices to override this anger and hang on 
to the notion that a good life is reachable. Despite acute knowledge of structural constraints, 
they did not give up, become permanently hopeless, or begin engaging in more active 
resistance. What follows is concerned with the question of why.  
 
The drugs of life 
 
                                                          
68 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/12/egypt-protests-masters-phd-degree-holders-appointment-
state.html 
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The same activities which enabled people to forget daily work stresses were also utilised to 
escape the anxieties that came with stuckedness. They were described by one young man as 
the ‘drugs of life,’ allowing you to momentarily forget your dissatisfactions. Samuli Schielke 
(2015) showed how young men in a rural village in Egypt’s delta attempt to escape their 
boredom through a number of daily activities; watching football and other kinds of television, 
hanging out in cafes, going to weddings, joking, walks, flirting, internet chat, pornography, and 
smoking hashish. In Cairo the practices were no different. As Eslam mentioned, these young 
men would spend much time trying to not think about the future. 
 
 “I don’t think of tomorrow, I just live my life, because I don’t want to think 
about something that will annoy me. If I think about it I will just think I need lots of 
money to buy lots of things and I don’t have it right now.”  
 
This quotation comes from Hashem, a young graduate working in a mobile phone shop, but 
dreaming of work in a bank. As we sat in the café, I asked him for his thoughts about Egypt’s 
difficult environment, about which one of his friends was always complaining. After giving 
this answer, he said he dislikes his friend’s negativity. He then switched back to talking about 
his favourite Egyptian music, and setting out a list of places he wished to travel in the future, 
Dubai, Turkey, and France. Typical of other young men, he did not want to talk about futures 
or anxieties, instead he wanted to fill his time and mind with less distressing, more enjoyable 
activities and thoughts (Ralph, 2008; Jones, 2012).  
 
I would spend many hours with research participants talking about girls they liked – including 
with a few about their views and experiences of sex – their opinions about, and yearning for, 
particular commodities, their favourite TV programmes and films, their views on world 
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politics, Egyptian or European football, and funny situations they had encountered or heard 
about during the day. It was often the case that, in the middle of a conversation about 
frustrations in the labour market, we would suddenly switch to talking about a commodity they 
wished to buy, a girl they liked, or a football match that had just taken place. At first, the 
researcher in me who was interested in their labour market struggles became agitated by this, 
but I quickly understood it to be a necessary deflection away from distress. 
 
Whenever groups of young men hung out together, usually in the café but also in the flat, very 
seldom were job struggles discussed. I was, again, surprised at how little serious conversation 
was had between friends, sometimes to the extent that they knew nothing of each other’s 
present difficulties. Talking about one’s difficulties or dissatisfactions can instil a sense of 
social shame in men. My interlocutors told me they might be judged and told to stop 
complaining (Ghannam, 2013). Thus, instead, they would talk about girls, religion, friends, 
football, or various commodities. This would always involve much joke-making, either at each 
other or about particular situations. Even when someone’s work or the country’s problems were 
discussed, things that might conjure up frustration would be recast in a humorous way 
(Wedeen, 1999).69 I would hear jokes about the state of public services in Egypt, the craziness 
of Egypt’s education system, and the prevalence of bribery or wasta. A particularly memorable 
joke came when hanging out with Hashem’s friends. We were discussing the prevalence of 
wasta (nepotism), and one friend quipped: “law kān al-nil salsa, makuntsh koft al-kusa illy f’ 
Masr” (if the Nile was salsa, you could not cook all the “kusa” in Egypt), followed by much 
laughter. Kusa means zucchini, a vegetable eaten frequently in Egypt with salsa. But it is also 
a colloquial name for wasta, stemming from agricultural practices. When traders wanted to 
                                                          
69 Egyptian popular culture has a long history of satirical humour, with many films, soaps, and comedy shows 
targeted at problems like corruption and government incompetence (Armbrust, 1996). 
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pick up vegetables to take to trade, those picking up zucchini could jump the queue because it 
goes bad quickly. Wasta, or knowing someone inside a company, allows someone to do the 
same. Thus, the joke – originally coined by Egyptian nationalist and revolutionary, Ahmed 
Orabi – meant that there was so much zucchini (wasta) in Egypt, that if the Nile River was full 
of salsa, there would still not be enough to cook it all.  
 
Hang out sessions would therefore turn into competitions of joke-making. This was about men 
relieving frustration, but also showing off their distinctive ability to be humorous (Friedman, 
2014). The humour was extremely masculine and hetero-normative. Conversations would often 
involve language, and topics, that were deemed unsuitable for a female audience – and might 
even involve joking about women or homosexuality. However, these jokes were classed, with 
some men finding certain swear words or discussions of women vulgar. I often felt slight 
discomfort in these situations, knowing the real anguish caused by barriers that were now being 
converted into objects of humour. But Eslam once said to me: “if we did not laugh we could 
not survive in Egypt, we would get depressed from the country’s situation.” Egyptians, I was 
repeatedly told, pride themselves on their ability to laugh despite the difficult conditions they 
live in. It was understood as a sign of strength, and often compared favourably against the 
sincerity of Western culture.  
 
Brief distraction was also achieved through watching films, television, or football, playing or 
listening to music, going shopping and hanging out in the mall, or the gym, and for some 
thinking of and pursuing sex, smoking, or drinking alcohol. These places and objects enacted 
affective intensities that enabled the expulsion of feelings of frustration, and brought forth 
pleasure. These activities would not only provide a form of distraction as they were happening, 
but also something to look forward to and use to get through the working week. But they were 
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more than simple distraction of course. They were aspirational, embodying the type of young, 
modern, middle-class men they wished to be. This differed between men. Thus, Mahmoud or 
Gamal often wanted to drink alcohol with me. They found it cool, in part because rich 
Egyptians or foreigners do it. But most, like my flatmates, would not because it did not conform 
to their Islamic piety. Some would actively pursue women, or at least talk about pursuing 
women. This was an attempt to reassert masculine power that was absent from their working 
lives: although it sometimes induced more frustration. Others, again due to religiously-infused 
norms of respectability, did not try. Furthermore, these activities sometimes actively enabled 
the incitement of hope for an imagined desirable future in themselves (Mains, 2012). 
Discussing or looking at a commodity one wished to buy, or talking about the places one 
wished to travel can provide a surge of vitality stemming from an opening of the future 
(Stewart, 2007). At other times, the realisation that those dreams will not be realised could also 
induce frustration. Mahmoud, when we were walking along the Nile one afternoon, was 
imagining, with a smile on his face, buying a 5 million pound villa. Ibrahim swiftly told him 
that will never happen. Mahmoud became annoyed, saying “why can’t you let me just pretend 
for a minute!” 
 
Interacting with, inhabiting, and talking about these objects and places were actively used to 
improve one’s mood. Eslam, as I mentioned, would spend time every night lying in bed either 
watching a film on his laptop, reading about football or flicking through Facebook on his 
phone, or reading a book. He would always try to watch or read something light, funny, or 
optimistic, and avoid material that was overly negative or focused on the country’s problems. 
He picked out one film in particular, called sa’a w’ nuss (An hour and a half), which was too 
negative in its portrayal of the difficulties faced by young people. One book Eslam read during 
my time in the flat, and that I began reading as well, was called ‘sukhriyya’ (sarcasm). The 
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book described funny situations that happen every day in Egypt’s streets, in transport, or when 
dealing with government bureaucracy. When I asked Eslam about the preference for ‘light’ 
entertainment, he said: “there is enough negativity in life, like all the stuff you talk about with 
people for your research, and you need to cut that out of your activities. I don’t want to read or 
watch something negative because “al dunya sa’b” (the environment is difficult) for everyone 
here already.” Therefore these activities can be an important way of sustaining positive 
emotions. Interacting with objects such as a laptop, a phone, or a book, which produce distinct 
affective intensities, enables these young men to alter their feelings.  
 
Perhaps we can all recognise this desire to ‘switch off’ from the daily stresses of securing a 
job, keeping a job, and earning enough money. People have different ways of doing this, and 
these are extremely classed and gendered.70 However, doing this too much can sometimes lead 
to anxiety. One evening in early summer, Eslam said he felt he wastes too much time on 
Facebook. He wanted to try closing it for a week. When he woke up he was supposed to get 
up, have a shower, eat, and do ‘useful’ things, but instead he looked at Facebook. He thought 
if he shut it off he could play sports and study. Mahmoud described his activities, of window 
shopping, thinking about sex, and drinking alcohol, as the ‘drugs of life.’ They allow you to 
forget your labour market struggles for a moment, but they do not solve them, or rid you of the 
feelings that they produce. They can even make those struggles and feelings worse by securing 
your permanent distraction. Thus, the remaining half of the chapter describes how my flatmates 
attempted to keep alive the feeling of mobility for a good job and future. This will focus 
primarily on Adel, in part to examine a complex emotional and psychological journey, but also 
because it was Adel with whom I would spend the most time in the flat. Eslam, as I mentioned, 
was more inclined to avoid these topics. 
                                                          
70 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health-fitness/mind/how-to-find-your-brains-off-switch/ 
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You can make it on your own 
 
Sitting with Adel one afternoon in July while he waited for another shift to begin, he began 
telling me about a colleague at work. Henri had been in the call centre for three years, and knew 
everything about the company. He had applied for a team leader job in order to leave the 
outsourced company, but was rejected. They first told him he was overqualified, which 
everyone found ridiculous. But they also apparently said they could not take him because he 
was from a shaʿby area (one’s neighbourhood of residence is written on their ID), suggesting 
he was too local and low-class. I questioned whether they would really say that directly, but 
Adel insisted. Eslam, who was ironing his shirt, backed up Adel’s story. He said he knew two 
people from another branch who both had the same qualifications, but one got rejected because 
he was from a shaʿby area, while another was accepted because he was from Mohandiseen, an 
upmarket area. “It is not so easy to change where you live!” Eslam proclaimed. Adel then 
jumped in again, relaying with exasperation how the current team leaders know nothing, they 
always ask people like Henri to do things for them. They must have got the job through wasta 
because they do not have the qualifications.  
 
Adel said such judgement only happened in this company, but Eslam insisted it happened 
everywhere. They then discussed if they would use wasta if they had the chance. Adel said he 
would not, he would also not lie about where he was from. He wanted to feel that he succeeded 
by his own effort. Eslam did not agree. He had spoken to a graduate of Al Azhar, Cairo’s 
prestigious religious university, which meant this person would know right from wrong. He 
had told him you have to use what is given to you, because the environment is so tough. But 
Adel again said no, if a job came through wasta that was better, and another like his current 
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job, he would take the current one because he would want to feel like he earned it. This is an 
interesting debate regarding the morality of using wasta in contemporary Egypt. Samuli 
Schielke (2015) shows how, even though many do not agree with it, they utilise it because 
conditions are difficult. But Adel’s discursive stance demonstrates the moral power of 
meritocracy. Making it on your own secures self-respect, and using wasta secures the opposite. 
One consequence of this might be the hiding of its use, and thus the maintenance of a discursive 
terrain of meritocracy, even though it is not reflected in reality.   
 
Eslam then turned to me and said: “this type of rejection gives you such depression Harry, what 
will I do! I am from Sohag, they won’t even call me for an interview!” Eslam had said this 
jokingly, but it could not hide his anguish. This story induces an affect of “depression” because 
it closes the possibility of progression, placing it outside their control. No matter how hard they 
work, they cannot change their place of birth – which they both knew to be shaʿby in the eyes 
of the upper-middle class HR employees making the decision. But Adel reiterated again his 
belief that class prejudice did not happen everywhere in Egypt’s private sector. To back this 
up, he introduced to the conversation a story of a friend from Zagazig. This friend had studied 
in the same Arabic section of Commerce as Adel, and according to him did not take any extra 
courses. He had done an interview five or six times for an accountant position with a Saudi 
firm in Cairo, each time being rejected. But, he had noted down and studied the questions he 
had been asked after every interview. By the end he knew exactly what they would ask and had 
prepared answers. Because of this, he got the job in the end. Adel insisted this was proof that 
you can make it fairly, on your own, without the help of wasta or hiding your residence.  
 
This story, whether reflective of the truth or not, superseded the other less hopeful story. It 
proved to Adel that at least some of the labour market remains open and meritocratic, firstly to 
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youth from a similar background to him, and also to perseverance. Not all good jobs were 
decided by exclusionary class signifiers. This friend had exercised perseverance – something 
Adel could do himself – rather than paying money for courses or using connections. This story 
– as a discourse – therefore held an affective quality of hope, sustaining for Adel the idea he 
might succeed by doing the same. In this moment, to use Hirokazu Miyazaki’s (2004) term, it 
‘reoriented’ Adel’s knowledge, from what had been a depressing discussion where classed 
exclusion had momentarily been highlighted, towards positivity that rested on merit and 
individual power.  
 
These young men often stated that the barriers they faced; a bad education, the prevalence of 
wasta or class prejudice, and a lack of jobs or government help, would not entirely prevent 
them from obtaining a good job. A bad education could be overcome through ‘self-
development,’ wasta or class prejudice were not everywhere, and there were still jobs available 
– in Cairo at least. Wasta, as mentioned in Chapter 4, is viewed as a major problem in the 
government, and in banks, but not in a private sector that wants profit, and therefore qualified 
people. These three young men had come to Cairo believing that if they develop themselves by 
taking courses the labour market will be open to them. In the previous chapter, I demonstrated 
how this hopeful discursive terrain is extended by training courses, entrepreneurship events, 
and employment fairs. But here it was proved through a more mundane story and rumour 
passed between lower-middle class youth (Quayson, 2014).  
 
A little later in our conversation, when Eslam had gone to watch a film, Adel returned to discuss 
his situation. He said his current job is not a permanent job, it had made him suffer a lot. He 
then said he thinks he is “lazy” (kaslaan), because he has not been proactive since starting this 
job to look for another one, or work on his skills. Instead he spends a lot of time doing ‘nothing.’ 
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He then quickly insisted that he would look for courses in English and accountancy after 
Ramadan, the Holy month in which they were fasting every day. He really wanted to find an 
accountancy job, he said, followed by a long sigh.  
 
Adel had labelled himself as lazy in direct comparison with his committed friend. This was one 
of many times he would call himself lazy. He would perceive that his actions, both in the past 
and present, had not been enough to secure a good job. For example, he had not studied hard 
at university: “I would sleep for two days in a row.” He had worked hard at the beginning but 
received bad grades, and when he did not work hard he received good grades. He therefore did 
not bother. As context, university grading is notoriously chaotic, and I would hear many stories 
of people not working as a result. But Adel now regretted this, he blamed himself. After 
graduating, he stayed home for a year not doing much. During this time he forgot accountancy 
and English. He even attended the GTO course for a day, but did not continue. He also regretted 
this. If he had taken it, he said, he would be in a great position now – although I thought of 
Eslam when he said this. Adel’s decision to come to Cairo formed part of his efforts to begin 
working hard. It was indeed stimulated by his successful friend. But Adel was now being lazy 
again in Cairo. He was not doing anything outside work, spending too much time doing useless 
things like watching television, or sleeping.  
 
What can be seen here is how the discursive introduction of meritocracy fosters a moral 
economy between individuals, those who work hard, and those who do not (Lamont, 2002). It 
is what Asad (2015) labelled a ‘subjectivisation of morality.’ In this case, Adel passed a moral 
judgement on his present and former self. He is ‘injuring’ himself, but this injury stems from 
the presence of a discursive terrain of meritocracy (Sennett & Cobb, 1972). However, through 
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this identification with self-injury Adel was able to reintroduce a feeling of hope, as it provided 
a possible blueprint to move towards a different path.  
 
For Eslam, this reorientation was achieved through calling on the power of God. During his 
period of confusion, Eslam posted the following quotation on Facebook: “la illaha illa anta 
sabhanak iny kunt min elzalemiyyn” (none has the right to be worshipped by You (Allah), 
Glorified are You. Truly, I have been of the wrong-doers). This famous Quranic verse 
represents a symbolic act of repentance for sins committed which have caused present 
difficulties. It also symbolises a promise to be better, which could thereby secure reward in the 
future. This act of public prayer helped Eslam to feel better. It reminded him that God is looking 
after him, and that his present difficulties were part of a broader plan or test. Explaining this to 
me afterwards, he said: 
 
“You need to have patience, and faith you will be rewarded by God. You have 
faith you will get a good job, marriage, have kids. I have confidence those things 
will happen. Something will happen to make it ok. These conditions are a test. You 
need to live in a good way to keep a good relationship with God, not because of 
getting rewards though. But he will look after you.” 
 
Eslam’s faith kept him “calm.” The act of prayer, as it had done over the summer, would help 
dispel feelings of doubt. This represents what Miyazaki (2004) termed an ‘abeyance of agency,’ 
whereby future events are placed in the hands of God, who will ensure eventual reward (di 
Nunzio, 2014). However, modern Islamic belief also returns agency to the individual 
(Mahmood, 2004). It was Eslam’s duty to ‘live in a good way.’ Only this way would he secure 
reward. This involves not just acts of religiosity, such as prayer, or being helpful (gada’) to 
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others, but also working hard, as Adel explained through a story “from the time after the 
Prophet”:  
 
“there were two brothers, one who prayed all the time and did nothing else, and 
one who worked all the time to look after his family. God told them that the one who 
worked was more devoted to God. So it is not just about praying all the time, you 
have to look after your life, family, and yourself, and do things for your life and 
work.”  
  
Religious discourses therefore hold within them an affective quality that is productive of hope. 
The concept of religious divination and reward captured within these quotes and stories 
generates a transpersonal affective terrain that is brought into contact with the body during acts 
of speech or prayer. It produces bodily shifts that induce feelings of hope, and calmness. Prayer 
involves calling on a transpersonal power that promises reward, while returning agency to the 
individual. Modern Islam thus enacts a moral economy in which individuals must constantly 
(re)secure reward through individual action. In this way, it constantly leaves open the space for 
hope. 
 
Bill Gates once said… 
 
In response, after Ramadan all three of my flatmates went on the hunt for English courses that 
they could take while working. They knew this was a difficult task owing to their limited funds 
and changing shift times, but they were excited about the possibility. An English training centre 
would be a place which might generate hope. Eslam and Mohammed completed placement 
tests in a low-cost centre near to the house, only to be told there were only afternoon classes, 
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meaning they were unable to go. Adel was put in a 9am class. For two sessions he managed to 
get up in time. I would speak to him afterwards as he recalled with excitement the things he 
was (re)learning, although the size of the class meant he could not contribute very much. Adel 
said his mother was encouraging him to attend the class as well. However, in general his parents 
did not get involved in this aspect of his life. In fact, his father thought Adel would marry from 
within the call centre, an idea Adel found laughable. Adel’s attendance of the course did not 
last. On the third session he failed to wake up, having gone to bed at 3am the previous night 
after his shift. 
 
This set of events immediately punctured their newfound hope. It also revealed one of the 
barriers faced by these young men in their pursuit of self-development. They could not leave 
their current job due to financial constraints and could not therefore take new courses due to 
time limitations. Mahmoud at some point had tried to find a part-time call centre job while he 
took an English course, but was told repeatedly he needed to commit full-time. This induced 
an angry proclamation that companies just want to keep Egypt’s youth as ‘slaves’ rather than 
allow them to progress. However, when I had a conversation with Adel on the day he missed 
class, he said he felt bad. He reiterated that he thinks he is lazy, using his inability to wake up 
as proof. He had thought he was too tired and so would not be able to concentrate. I said it was 
very difficult owing to his schedule, but he insisted that despite this he still should have done 
it. He then said he has also been lazy in looking for an accountancy course. He insisted he 
would change though: “I am motivated to do it, I will try.” He went on:  
 
“I need to put myself in uncomfortable situations for my future, you have 
done it, you came here, away from family and friends. But you enjoy it too, you 
enjoy the new experiences even though it is hard. I need to do the same. You know 
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Bill Gates said four things you need to do to be successful, the first one is never get 
lazy, then to always keep trying…I can’t remember the others. I need to take the 
opportunity I have in Cairo. I came here to develop myself and work hard. It is a 
very important time but I am not making the most of it. I am getting stuck. I need to 
work hard now”.  
 
Rather than focusing on his job schedule, or the fact he does not have money to leave it, Adel 
continued to inflict injury, by blaming himself for ‘giving up’ the English class. To back up the 
direction of this blame he pointed to me as an example of someone working hard to achieve 
their goals, and then rather hazily recalled lessons from Bill Gates about the perseverant 
character one needs to secure ‘success.’ This hazy recollection, I thought, revealed the fragility 
of this lesson. What goes missing is the privilege enjoyed by both me, and perhaps Bill Gates, 
that enabled us to get where we are. I wanted to come back and outline my privilege, but 
realised this discourse would not be heard, that it would not want to be heard. Adel had again 
brought to life, this time using Bill Gates’ entrepreneurial wisdom, a meritocratic moral 
economy that differentiated between hard working and lazy individuals. Although this led to 
self-blame, it enabled Adel to discursively keep hope alive. Focusing on his under-privilege, 
or my privilege, was useless. It would induce depression. Asserting his own laziness enabled 
him to perceive that he might change, and begin working hard like me and Bill Gates. Adel 
was calling on a meritocratic discourse that legitimised his structural under-privilege, because 
he needed to maintain a focus on himself to keep going. By actively calling on these discourses, 
Adel was constructing an affective atmosphere that enabled him to hope. Indeed, the moral 
economy he was sustaining developed an affective quality of hope. 
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This moral economy was also reproduced by various visitors to the flat. One evening I brought 
Gamal, who knew Eslam from GTO. Gamal was at this point working as an unpaid lawyer, 
believing he was headed towards a paid law job. He therefore felt good about himself. Gamal 
immediately started asking Eslam if he was taking courses, before suggesting places he could 
look, AUC and Berlitz (both extremely expensive). Eslam said he could not take courses 
because his work schedule would not allow it. Gamal said he should leave then, but Eslam shot 
back, tentatively, saying he cannot afford to do that. When he then discovered Eslam had an 
English literature degree, he said “you should be a trainer!” He then asked if he was at least 
saving money, and Eslam said not really. Although Gamal was trying to help, his advice felt 
like a brutal dissection of Eslam’s stagnation. It placed emphasis on his decisions, and served 
to increase his perception that he was not doing anything ‘useful,’ in contrast to Gamal.  
  
I am a struggler 
 
Adel, Eslam, and Mohammed set about making new plans. Adel asked me to ask my friends if 
they knew a good accountancy course. I knew someone who worked in accountancy at PwC, 
so asked him. He said the only course that makes a difference is the Certified Management 
Accountant course, and that Adel would need to do it very soon, otherwise it would be too late. 
I asked him how much this course would cost; he said at least 10,000LE (US$1250) for the 
course and more for exams. This was a fee Adel would never be able to afford. I reluctantly 
told Adel. He had heard about it but also knew it was way beyond his means. He soon made 
another plan that did not rely on attending a course. He would buy a laptop with savings 
accumulated from work, and use it to study both English and accountancy, and also to look for 
courses and jobs. He talked about this for a while before actually doing it, as he struggled to 
find the time and money. But it was an exciting moment, not only was he buying a ‘cool’ new 
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piece of technology, but this materialised his hope for an ensuing period of hard work, and thus 
prospective mobility. Eslam too bought a laptop from his home in Sohag in order to learn 
English and search for jobs. Adel also bought an internet stick, but Eslam could not afford one.  
 
In the following days, I witnessed increased activity from these young men. Every night after 
work, Eslam would spend half an hour watching English films and reading a university 
textbook he had brought from home. He would write down on a notepad words he did not 
know, before looking up their meaning on his phone, or asking me. This simple practice helped 
relieve the stress which had built up as a result of his life being consumed by work. It gave the 
house an atmosphere of hope and forward momentum, and gave him the sense he was doing 
something ‘useful’ with his time, which was beneficial for his future. Adel tried to do the same. 
He set up a make-shift desk in his room, and would sit and write random words and phrases he 
was picking up from material he used. One day he showed me videos of English conversations 
between Saudi women that he had received from a friend who worked as an English instructor 
in Saudi Arabia. He gave them to Eslam. These objects, the book, the laptop, and notepad 
reflected the materiality of their hope. They were vital tools for the precarious construction of 
a sense of prospective mobility, though they also signified to me their inability to engage in 
more structured learning. For me, they therefore had a different affect.  
 
When Adel came home one day in August he insisted we speak English. Up to that point we 
had never spoken English, apart from translating occasional words. It was always a struggle 
for us to communicate, and their tiredness made it more difficult. But Adel had decided we 
should start so he could practice. He then went to get his laptop to show me a film he had 
downloaded at home and watched: The Pursuit of Happiness. He wanted me to translate a 
section. When I finished he said: “this film is an inspiration to Egyptians, because they are used 
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to these problems, they feel them, the problems Will Smith faces, he struggles a lot, he is close 
to homelessness, but he is successful in the end through hard work. Egyptians find a lot of hope 
in that, that they will be rewarded, despite the challenges they meet.”  
 
This film was referenced by many of the young men I met. They had heard about it through 
word of mouth, or from Facebook posts of friends who shared a link to articles describing 
‘inspirational movies.’ This film involves a protagonist, Will Smith, a victim of poverty, 
homelessness, and institutional racism, who, through continual struggle, manages to overcome 
these barriers and prove that he is qualified for a prestigious job on Wall Street. The film 
presents the quintessential American dream, teaching people that, despite tough conditions, 
through hard work they might find success. It is powerful because it shows the existence of 
systemic prejudice, but shows that the system remains open. The film again materialised Adel’s 
optimism. Watching it – in the language of affect, encountering this object – affected in him a 
sense of hope. This also shows how consumption activities did not only distract or induce 
pleasure, they could simultaneously incite hope for the future.  
 
Adel and Eslam would fluctuate in and out of ‘hard work’ during this period. Adel admitted 
that he was struggling for motivation: “it is hard studying on your own, I don’t know what to 
do, you learn Arabic here, not in England.” Adel was poignantly laying bare the structural 
constraints faced by these young men. My fluency in Arabic had only been achieved by being 
paid to travel to Egypt, take courses, and live with Egyptians. They were attempting to learn 
English by listening to videos in their homes surrounded by non-English speakers. But this did 
not stop Adel trying. On days when he did not study, he would say he felt bad, especially when 
he saw me taking field notes late at night. On other days he would study and feel good about 
it. One afternoon I came home and Adel immediately said he had woken up early because he 
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did not want to be lazy. I felt obliged to join in with the positivity, to secure the atmosphere, so 
I congratulated him. We then sat down in front of the television and began talking again about 
his situation: 
 
“I am fed up with the water, and the heat in the flat. I could live in Zagazig 
and be comfortable, but what work would I do? There are guys who work in small 
shops, one in a small accountancy job, but I want more. Everyone who has good 
work came to Cairo. Like my friend who works for the Saudi company. He struggled 
for a long time to get into his field, he applied again and again to companies, and 
memorised the questions, and in the end he was accepted. He was good in English. 
He took a course while we were in university called New Horizons, it was for 
English, presentation skills stuff like that. I was rejected from it because you needed 
to speak English. I was really bad, they asked me to describe myself in English and 
I said “what?!” This course would have been amazing, if I had taken it I would have 
been sorted. He is successful now through hard work, I could have done that.”  
 
Adel then referenced another friend who worked in a bank. He also had the same education, 
but he did courses in accountancy and English. He never took the sort of job Adel had taken. I 
suggested the friend might have had money to take courses. Adel said: “yes maybe, but he had 
the motivation, he would not accept the shitty jobs we are in.” Adel said he was lazy compared 
to him, but that he was trying to change his schedule: “that’s why I got up early!” He then 
reiterated – almost telling himself – that he had come to Cairo and put himself in a tough 
situation. He is not like people who work in small shops, or even in the call centre, they accept 
these jobs and do not look for better like he is willing to do. 
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Reflecting on this worry about the future, Adel said youth in Egypt are always focused on the 
future, always stressed about it. You can have a comfortable life abroad, not in Egypt. He then 
referenced The Pursuit of Happiness, and the lesson it teaches people again: “the conditions 
suck here, but at the start of that film there was a homeless guy who just sleeps, accepts his lot, 
and gives up, but Will Smith doesn’t, he struggles and doesn’t give up, and is eventually 
rewarded.” As we were talking, Eslam overheard our discussion of the film. He said, “I like 
watching films like that.” I asked him why, he replied: “it gives you power, it gives you a 
positive belief that things are possible.”  
 
This conversation brought forth a palpable sense of déjà vu for me. Adel had talked about his 
two successful friends, as well as The Pursuit of Happiness, many times. It reveals another 
attempt, while sitting in this dilapidated flat, to wrestle with his own predicament in comparison 
with successful others. He ‘knew’ he had been lazy in the past. He regretted this, and thought 
he could be in a good position now if he had worked harder. But he was trying to identify 
himself with his successful friends, and with Will Smith, because he was now making an effort. 
He was also trying to disassociate himself from youth who remained in his home town, who 
had given up – like the homeless man in the film – and accepted their simple jobs. 
 
In another conversation a few days later, Adel was surer of himself. He had seen my copy of 
Samuli Schielke’s Egypt in the Future Tense (2015). On the cover is a picture of a man leaning 
against a wall holding a cigarette. Adel immediately said: “who is that sarsagy? Is that how 
you are representing Egypt, who represents us? He is holding a cigarette, doing drugs, he is not 
doing anything useful.” Adel said a sarsagy is “a person who wants to hang in the street and 
pick pockets, he holds a knife, and takes money from people.” A sarsagy depends on his words, 
whereas a baltagy (thug) depends on his body. Adel said he knew people in Zagazig like this. 
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They had given up getting a good job and just hang out in cafes, smoke hashish, and drink all 
the time. These are activities which distract you from the tasks you have to do in life:  
 
“If you need to do something, pay money to get something done, and you drink 
alcohol, you could forget all about it, so it doesn’t help you solve the problems in 
your life, you just forget them. According to religion it is wrong, all were drinking 
before the Prophet decreed it wrong, if you pray you can’t focus on God and your 
words if you have drunk something.” 
 
I half-jokingly, and perhaps cruelly, said television might do the same. Adel agreed, saying it 
allows you to disconnect, but he also said “you can switch it off.”  
 
Adel thought that people in his hometown were distracting themselves. He, on the other hand, 
was in Cairo working to develop himself. He was being a ‘mukāfeḥ’ (struggler). Adel was not 
alone, many of these young men would compare themselves favourably, and unapologetically, 
with imaginary youth who had never tried, or had stopped trying to improve their situations. 
My interlocutors were moving away from home, studying, and searching for better. They were 
‘mukāfeḥiyyn’ (strugglers), active men who are always doing something to improve 
themselves. They do not complain. For this, they accrue respect, in the expectation they will 
secure social mobility. This has similarities with Sharad Chari’s (2004) notion of ‘toil,’ which 
the Indian Gounder class utilise to explain their mobility. Others had ‘surrendered’ to the 
difficult conditions. They ‘waste time’ hanging out in cafés, smoking hashish, playing 
PlayStation, talking about unimportant things like girls and gossip (namām), and complaining 
that trying for better is useless due to the prevalence of wasta. My interlocutors actively avoided 
these pursuits. Their mid-20s was a period in which men are supposed to work hard they 
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explained, not relax (Ghannam, 2013).  
 
These young men were therefore sustaining, through their conversations, a moral economy 
which differentiated between individuals. Its epistemological origins can be located in a variety 
of materials, both transnational and Egyptian, in the narratives of religious divination, the 
stories of heroic success in Hollywood films, and in the objects, discourses and places of the 
hopeful city described in the previous chapter. However, they were repeatedly called upon by 
these young lower-middle class men because of their affective qualities that induced feelings 
of hope. Over time, through repetitive discussion, this moral economy itself developed an 
affective ‘atmosphere’ of its own. Its affective pull explains why it was continually restored, 
and why it retained its power amongst these young men.  
 
I left Cairo in August 2015 with these young men still working in the call centre, studying 
English intermittently on their own. Adel said to me that when I came back in October, he 
would have left the job and taken an accountancy course. I did not have much communication 
with them in the interim, only speaking to Eslam via Facebook in September. He was angry 
with himself because he had not improved his English. He was not studying much because he 
was tired from work. He had also looked again for a suitable English course but could not find 
one.  
 
I said it would be different 
 
When I returned in late October, Adel was still in the call centre. He quickly recalled telling 
me he would be in a different position: “I said I would be in a different place, taking a course, 
in different work, but it is so hard, taking a course takes money.” He had looked but struggled 
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to find an accountancy course he could afford. He had not looked for another job either. He 
would leave the call centre first, so he could look properly, he said. Adel still planned to look 
for an accountancy course. He reiterated: “you can earn 20,000LE as an accountant!” He had 
taken an English course during my time away, in the same centre as before. However, the lack 
of improvement rather punctured the euphoria he might have felt from carrying out this difficult 
task. The classroom was overcrowded, and so he did not have the chance to practice his 
speaking much. He then showed me a Charles Dickens book he had brought from home that 
he was slowly reading. “I am still trying,” he said, before saying with a sigh: “rabina yisaḥil 
(God make it easy), lāzim na‘mil illy ‘alīna” (we need to do what we are supposed to do). Adel 
again, in this moment of anguish and regret at his immobility, called on God to smooth his 
passage. He asserted that he was trying to do his duty in return. 
 
But, despite these actions, Adel was upset with himself. Reflecting on the difficulties he has 
continued to face, he said that you need so much money for everything now, “I need to pay for 
an accountancy course,” he exclaimed. However, right after this, he stressed: “if I wasn’t lazy 
I would have left the work and looked for other work already.” He said he could have found a 
different job and saved money for a course. Adel then told me about a book he had downloaded 
on to his laptop and started reading. It was by an American self-help guru called Zig Ziglar. 
Adel was shocked when I said I did not know him, perhaps throwing into question his 
legitimacy. But Adel insisted he was very famous, “he is an inspiration to all youth, you should 
ask them, they will all know him.” Zig Ziglar, according to Adel, “helps youth to keep on 
looking positive, and not get fed up with trying.” He recalled a metaphor he had particularly 
liked in the book: 
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“Two guys are trying to get water from a well, and it is really hard to do, and 
the guy was struggling when it got near the top, and wanted to give up. But if you 
let go it will go back down and you have to start over again. So it is a metaphor 
(isti‘ara) for life that you shouldn’t let go, you should keep struggling until you reach 
your goal.” 
 
Adel quickly went on to tell me about the ‘Egyptian version’ of Zig Ziglar, Ibrahim el Fiky. 
He has also written similar books in Arabic.71 El Fiky, Adel said, had started as a waiter and 
ended up owning a chain of restaurants, taking courses to get there. Adel had watched him on 
television before and also downloaded one of his books. According to Adel, one thing it claims 
is that the worst thing to do is “talking only, talking about your goals and not doing them.” 
Adel recognised himself in this. He is lazy, talking about all the stuff he wants to do, like an 
accountancy course, changing jobs, or learning English, but he is not doing them.  
 
By this point I understood Adel’s perspective, that he talks a lot about doing stuff without ever 
getting around to doing them. But I understood this as a product of his lack of money to afford 
an accountancy course and an exhausting job that took up his time and energy. All he could do 
was talk, plan and plan again. I was reminded of the character of Davies in Harold Pinter’s The 
Caretaker, who keeps on talking about getting a new pair of shoes, an act that would symbolise 
the start of a journey to a better future. This act of planning was all Adel could do in order to 
keep the future open. But Adel put his inability to put this plan into action down to a personal 
failing. He also ignored that he had taken an English course. Because of the moral economy he 
had helped sustain, which connects mobility to hard work, his immobility must be the result of 
‘laziness.’ This was backed up by an idea he had read in a self-help book, another object which 
                                                          
71 Kenney (2015) discusses the increased popularity of self-help literature in Egypt since the infitaah.  
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was able to affect him with hope. He recognised himself as a person who spends too much time 
talking and not enough time doing. This self-help book again sustained an injurious moral 
economy between successful and failing individuals. Yet, Adel was ready to hear it. He had 
sought the book out in order to find ways to improve his life. Asserting his own failure in this 
moment enabled him to hope to change, again. 
 
A few days later, I came home and told Adel that one of my interlocutors had been asked to 
recruit youth for call centre work – thereby taking part in the economy of hope himself – but 
had not received payment in return. Adel was not shocked. He said they are thieves. He 
mentioned the terrible pay in his own company, but quickly changed tack: “but Mahmoud is 
good, he will succeed because he is looking and struggling. I am confident I will find something 
too; I will be satisfied in the end. There is a phrase in Egypt “lāzim ta‘mil illy aliyyk, we rabina 
heya‘mil al bāqy”” (you need to do what you are supposed to do, and God will do the rest). 
Adel repeated a religious phrase he had said a few times, which discursively makes a claim on 
the future. Again, he quickly reoriented this anger-inducing story towards a positive end, 
because he needed to.  
 
Déjà vu 
 
Two days before my departure at the end of November, I found Adel on the sofa early in the 
morning studying from an old, battered-looking Arabic book on accountancy. He would 
explain later that this was a book from his first year of university, the year he had worked hard 
but failed. He had brought it from home to study. But, he said, he did not remember the 
material, so was finding it difficult. He then said he needed to learn accountancy in English 
anyway, not Arabic.  
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On this day another flatmate joined these young men. Mostafa used to work in the call centre 
with them, but had been fired due to a prolonged injury lay-off. He had spent six months 
looking for a job with regular day-shifts so he could take an evening HR course, which he was 
now doing. Mostafa had the long-term goal of travelling abroad, and felt he was working hard 
to achieve this. He blamed other young people in Egypt for giving up and spending time 
distracting themselves through hanging out in the café or watching football. He on the other 
hand was working hard to improve himself. He believed that God would reward him for that. 
 
Adel looked upon Mostafa with some jealousy. He checked if there were other jobs in the same 
place Mostafa worked, but there were not. In Adel’s words Mostafa had ‘gained experience’ 
from his six months doing interviews and being rejected, and looking for courses. Adel, on the 
other hand, felt he was standing still. He then mentioned his friend again who works in the 
Saudi company: “he makes me feel lazy, he didn’t enter the call centre at all, he learned wrong 
and right answers, and finally succeeded in an interview. He took a 700LE accountancy course 
in Zagazig, I should have done that.” He then said he wishes he could take the New Horizons 
course he had been rejected from long ago in university: “I would be really good now if I had 
taken it, it would be so useful these skills like how to search for jobs, how to do interviews.” 
He became very good in English when he took a course in Zagazig. He was the best in the 
class, using complicated words even when others did not understand.  
 
Adel, stimulated by Mostafa’s arrival and seeming mobility, recollected the past here, the 
missed opportunities, and the periods in which he had gained skills, and compared it to his 
stagnant present. He again lamented his need to take an accountancy course, and an English 
one too, but this time not in a cheap centre. He regretted not using me more for my English. 
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He could do an accountancy course for 700LE (US$88) but he knew he needed to do an 
electronic course. I asked if he could do it in Zagazig, but he immediately said he could not go 
back there. Returning would represent failure. He again said he feels bad because he is not 
looking for courses. I then asked why he cannot leave work and do courses for a while. He 
said: “I wish they would make me leave, fire me, so I am pushed into doing something!” After 
I pushed him a little more, Adel admitted in hushed tones that he would have a financial 
problem if he left.  
 
This revealed the structural predicament in which Adel found himself. He cannot leave the job 
due to financial constraints. In the job he cannot take a course, or even afford one that would 
make a difference. But Adel’s reluctance to admit that highlights his desire to ignore the 
barriers he faces. He does not want to think about the reasons why he cannot do something. 
Instead, he cries out for someone to ‘make’ him do something. I then said to Adel, rather slyly: 
“I thought that you see yourself as lazy?” He responded: “yes, I am.” I said I do not agree with 
the idea that youth are lazy. He agreed, saying he knows youth work hard. He told me about a 
friend who left the call centre four months ago, and has been unemployed since. He is 
depressed; Adel said he would feel the same way if he was in the same situation. Finally, he 
said: “I am unsure if people are lazy, or if it is the conditions here.”  
 
Later that evening, Adel asked what piece of advice I would give him after my research. He 
was looking for some hope. I struggled to answer, first saying I did not really know, before 
letting out, in a slightly comical yet uncomfortable voice, “find wasta, get money, or travel.” 
The truth is I thought Adel could do very little to get the kind of job he hoped for, but this was 
not what he wanted to hear. He responded: “that’s all you have out of your research?!” I then 
quickly thought about it and said: “I think you need to look for a job with fixed shifts, so you 
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can take courses like Mostafa is doing.” This answer was better received. Adel finally reiterated 
that he needs a serious English place, not any place. The reason I found this so difficult was 
because I knew Mostafa’s seeming mobility was also fake. Even though he was taking courses, 
Mostafa was also struggling to move where he wanted to go. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has revealed the attempts of three young men who feel a sense of entrapment, to 
sustain movement in their lives. In a situation where their options were so limited, all they 
could do is talk over and over about what they want to do, what they are doing, and what they 
regret they have not done in the past to reach their dreams. The text is repetitive, going over 
the same thing again and again, because the same thing happened during my time in the flat 
again and again. Their entrapment resulted from their falling middle-class position in Egypt’s 
social structure (see Chapter 3). However, these young men had been told repeatedly that their 
dreams were reachable, despite the country’s difficult conditions. They went through round 
after round of trying to exercise hard work, and perceiving mobility as a result. But when they 
did not get anywhere, when their jobs or English level did not change, when they did not find 
that course, they blamed themselves, falling back on explanations provided by self-help and 
religious divination. These explanations were found in books, films, stories and prayer. These 
objects and discourses generated affective intensities which induced hope when these young 
men encountered them. In this way, self-blame turned into a way of coping, of keeping hope 
alive. They could not think about the structural injustice to which they were victim. In the 
context of everyday life, outside moments of revolution, these narratives induced frustration 
and depression, not hope. They had to focus on their own ability to work harder. Repeatedly 
talking about this represented an attempt to sustain movement. It was all they could do.   
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In relaying the story of these young men, I have contributed a number of points to literature on 
hope-making, and more broadly on the lives of people living in conditions of precarity and 
waithood. Waithood can be an extremely active endeavour. There must be a distinction 
between objects – and the practices that engage them – which distract from difficult emotions, 
such as social media, television, consumptive items, and the gym, and practices such as self-
study, reading self-help, or praying, which re-enact hope. Hope though is ephemeral in the lives 
of people who are structurally immobile. It has to be constantly relocated. In this case it was 
relocated through bringing to life meritocratic discourses that serve to legitimise one’s marginal 
position, and inflict self-injury. This reintroduces a notion of power and morality to analysis 
on groups experiencing waithood. Though these young men became confused, fatigued, and 
disbelieving when they stood still, they actively returned to, and sustained, a moral economy 
in which individuals (including themselves) are blamed for failure. This acted to keep 
concealed the structural inequalities which have produced their condition. They did this 
because, without this moral economy, they would lose all hope and become depressed. Its 
power is sustained through emotion. Those intent on battling structural inequality must 
recognise this emotional pull. When people are engaged in the race for a good life, they need 
to continue believing that it is possible to reach. They need hope. They cannot listen to critiques 
of structural inequality, even if they recognise them. This crucial aspect of hope is the focus of 
the next chapter. 
 
I believe the chapter sheds some light on the ways people cope in conditions of immobility. 
Perhaps the reader can recognise themselves in the text. I certainly go through similar emotions, 
feeling stressed about not working hard enough, and guilty about distracting myself too much. 
I also criticise the premise of having to be so active. However, I keep going, and reengage, 
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because I feel I have to. The difference between me and these young men is my privilege that 
enables me to keep movement towards a desired future alive. It is certainly not down to my 
hard work. We must continue to lay bare this fallacy.  
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Chapter 6 Cruel hope 
 
“Imagine you are in an isolated desert, with no food or water, you’ll die for 
sure by the end of the day. And you find a map to a well, but it’s too far and you will 
never make it. But you don’t have anything else to do but wait for death and think 
about that. Instead of waiting for death and hurting yourself with negative thoughts, 
you decide to keep yourself busy, you decide to take the trip to the well, although 
you know you will never make it, but the feeling of doing this trip and the feeling of 
drinking water from the well is much better than the feeling of waiting for death. In 
both ways you are going to die, but it’s all about feelings. The hope of the hopeless, 
it’s not about achieving anything, it’s just how it makes you feel.” 
 
As we sat in his room in his aunt’s flat, Mahmoud was explaining to me his attempts to keep 
hope alive. It was November 2015, and he had been through innumerable disappointments in 
his tormented pursuit of a respectable job. These had brought forth intense feelings of anger 
and depression, and talk of suicide. He now had no belief that his efforts would be rewarded in 
Cairo’s rigged labour market. But, Mahmoud kept being active in his day-to-day life. He kept 
applying to jobs, searching for opportunities to travel abroad, planning his imagined 
entrepreneurial project, and making wish-lists of items he wanted to buy in the future. On this 
day, Mahmoud candidly described to me why he still did these aspirational activities. It was 
not because he believed that they would come to fruition, but rather because the feeling of hope 
that these activities gave him was preferable, or at least more bearable, than the feeling of 
‘waiting for death,’ the feeling of remaining where he was. He did them to make himself feel 
good. After this comment he launched back into describing the burger restaurant he would one 
day open: ‘Big Ben Burgers.’ 
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This quotation sums up a crucial aspect of hope on which this chapter focuses, namely the 
body’s compulsion for the feeling of hope. Previous chapters have revealed how the discursive 
and material terrain of meritocracy and individualisation induced a belief that one’s dreams 
will be realised. This, in turn, affects the body with a feeling of hope. In this chapter, I reveal 
how people keep returning to this terrain, not through belief, but because of the subject’s desire, 
or need, for hope. This renders these objects and discourses powerful because of their affective 
pull, their ability to produce hope rather than their ability to produce a belief in the possibility 
of realisation. I draw on Lauren Berlant’s notion of cruel optimism (2011), which argues that 
individuals develop an attachment to the mythical promises of the good life, despite their 
perpetual break down, so that they can carry on living in the world. I similarly argue that these 
young Egyptian men hold on to meritocratic forms of hope which have caused so much 
hardship, and which are revealed as false, in order to avoid ‘death.’  
 
The chapter focuses primarily on two young men, Mahmoud and Ibrahim, both of whom the 
reader has met in previous chapters. As time passed, and their journeys towards their dreams 
were repeatedly blocked, feelings of frustration, depression, and fear became more common, 
and critique of the meritocratic myths in which they had previously invested, spread. Yet, 
despite encroaching disbelief, these men repeatedly refused to accept where they are, and 
returned to these promising forms of hope, submitting applications to jobs and scholarships, 
planning and reading about imagined entrepreneurial ventures, and engaging in self-study. 
They did this in order to foreclose the depression that stems from the realisation that their 
trajectories and aspirations have been ripped apart.  
 
Throughout the chapter, I will discuss the consequences of these activities for theorising the 
compliance of people in dominant systems of hierarchical power. Drawing on studies that 
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recognise its multifaceted, often contradictory nature (Burawoy, 1979; Willis, 1981; Wedeen, 
1999; Yurchak, 2006; Ghertner, 2015), I challenge a view that compliance arises from active, 
conscious ‘consent.’ These young men hold on to meritocratic promises which legitimise their 
own marginal positions, and the privileged positions of the upper-classes, not because they 
were duped into believing in them, but because they were attached to the feeling this belief had 
given them. Their compliance is secured affectively. I also suggest that these activities might 
constitute an act of defiance as well, against the denial of their claim to a good life. Their 
compliance is only produced, perversely, through a refusal to accept one’s ‘lot’ (naseeb) in life.  
 
The origins of hope 
 
The previous two chapters have focused on how a hopeful sensibility – what Miyazaki (2004) 
defines as a sense of ‘prospective momentum’ – comes into being and gets sustained over time 
among people experiencing class immobility. Work in both Anthropology and Geography has 
for a number of years tackled a similar question, and yet there remains an unresolved tension 
arising from the subject’s inherent need for a sense of hope. The philosopher Ernst Bloch 
(1986) viewed a hopeful sensibility as an intrinsic aspect of human consciousness. He asserted 
the presence of a ‘not-yet conscious,’ a consciousness that is formed in anticipation of the 
future. Within this consciousness, people formulate ‘presentiments’ of what they might 
become, and thereby generate a feeling of hope. Thus for Bloch, hope is an inherent component 
of the ‘not-yet conscious,’ driven by the future’s intrinsic indeterminacy.72  
 
                                                          
72 Michael Jackson (2011) suggests the existence of hope for the future is driven by an inherent sense of 
insufficiency in the present. 
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But ethnographic work has in the last decade attempted to show how a hopeful sensibility is 
far from constant in human life. Many people at certain moments do not feel hopeful about the 
future. Scholars have demonstrated how hopefulness emerges and disappears in response to 
particular socio-historical conditions, historically and contextually contingent existential 
pursuits, and forms of knowledge production (Miyazaki, 2004). Recent ethnographic studies 
have shown how groups who are dispossessed of a gendered, classed, and aged sense of 
‘prospective momentum’ – the unemployed, refugees, prisoners – attempt to reintroduce a 
sense of hope through practices that induce a “radical temporal reorientation of knowledge” 
(Miyazaki, 2004: 5; Mains, 2012; Weiss, 2009; Vigh, 2009; Pedersen, 2012; di Nunzio, 2014; 
Elliot, 2015). Stimulated by these studies, I have argued that, for educated un/underemployed 
young Egyptians, working on or submitting an application for a desirable job, engaging in self-
study, planning an entrepreneurial venture, and reciting discourses of self-help and religious 
divination similarly work to sustain a sense of hope and temporal mobility towards a good 
future. I highlighted moreover that the “hopeful city,” as a set of objects, places, and discourses, 
plays an integral role in this process, through generating and extending meritocratic discourses 
which promise mobility to all and therefore affecting these young men with this feeling.  
 
However, this literature underplays the integral role played by the subject in sustaining hope. 
It often lacks a temporal dimension, which would introduce the question of how people respond 
to hopes unrealised. Morten Pedersen (2012: 146) posits that sustaining hope involves a process 
of ‘work,’ of planning for “deliberately unrealisable endpoints whose purpose is the 
(re)production of social momentum.” I argued instead that hopes are not always ‘deliberately 
unrealisable.’ I have shown in previous chapters how these young men are told repeatedly that 
their improbable hopes are realisable. But Pedersen does recognise an important aspect of 
hope, that it is unconstrained by realism (Crapanzano, 2003). The subject’s intrinsic need for a 
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sense of purpose can drive its emergence, and override perceptions of whether it is realistic 
(see Ralph, 2015). What that sense of purpose entails, the intensity of the need, and the ways 
in which hope is created and maintained are always dependent upon socio-historical conditions. 
But, what happens when those ‘endpoints’ are repeatedly left unrealised? Does the subject 
continue recreating hope? If so, why and how? And when does the subject decide to stop? 
 
Lauren Berlant, in her 2011 book Cruel Optimism, adds this temporal dimension to this sense 
of hope, or optimism (see also Muñoz, 2009). Berlant (2011: 24) defines cruel optimism in the 
context of the liberal-capitalist United States as a: 
 
 “relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility whose 
realisation is discovered either to be impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and 
toxic. What’s cruel about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, 
is that the subjects who have x in their lives might not well endure the loss of their 
object/scene of desire, even though its presence threatens their well-being, because 
whatever the content of the attachment is, the continuity of its form provides 
something of the continuity of the subject’s sense of what it means to keep on living 
on and to look forward to being in the world.” 
 
Berlant analyses particular ‘scenes’ – from intimacy, to dieting, to voting, to the belief in 
meritocracy – which she defines as pillars of liberal-democratic notions of the good life. She 
posits that this ‘cluster of promises,’ which is supposed to connote the good life, is breaking 
down in contemporary capitalism following post-war neoliberal restructuring. This is a process 
that has been the focus for a wide range of social inquiry in recent years (see Putnam, 2015; 
Rank et al. 2016 for further studies in a US context). Berlant, though, moves beyond this to 
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explore the continued stubbornness of these wrecked promises, answering the question of how 
they retain their power despite continual collapse. In an analysis of contemporary film, she 
argues that, despite their breakdown and the pain this iteratively produces, the disadvantaged 
maintain an ‘optimistic attachment’ to these promises – which deteriorate the conditions that 
enable happiness to flourish – precisely because their very presence represents the possibility 
of happiness, and thus “losing the bad object might be deemed worse than being destroyed by 
it.”73 In this way, ‘optimism’ is sustained over time not because of the expectation of 
realisation, but because of a need for continuity, as liberal-democratic optimism in itself has 
become vital for people’s ability to keep on living in the world. Berlant therefore reveals the 
affective power of promises of the good life.  
 
As in the previous chapter, perhaps we can all see ourselves in this. We are sold the promise 
of fulfilment, in our careers, in love, in our bodies, yet we are never able to fully reach it, or to 
feel it for long at least. Instead of giving up, or succumbing to apathy or cynicism, many of us 
continue in pursuit because we retain an attachment to this feeling of expectancy. Berlant’s 
argument, however, remains restricted both due to its Western centricity and its methodological 
focus on film. It is vital to uncover how this relation manifests itself beyond a Western post-
war neoliberal context. Berlant also describes cruel optimism as a continuous relation, one that 
is not broken by temporary disbelief and cynicism. This is something I wish to complicate. 
Furthermore, unlike Berlant, I favour the word hope over optimism, in part due to its everyday 
usage among Egyptians, but also due to subtle differences in meaning. Optimism implies a 
generalised sense of confidence about the future, an expectation that outcomes will be positive. 
Hope is directed towards something desired, and defines a feeling that it could happen. It is 
thus both more specific, but entails less conviction. 
                                                          
73 http://rorotoko.com/interview/20120605_berlant_lauren_on_cruel_optimism/ 
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The brink of ‘death’ 
 
By late 2015, Mahmoud had experienced innumerable disappointments in his quest to reach a 
good life. Over the year I knew him, he worked as a sales representative in Vodafone, which 
he hated, and in data entry in a large electrical appliance company, a job from which he was 
fired. Before that, since graduating in 2009, he had spells working as an accountant in a student 
dorm, a bank teller, a call centre agent, and even spent time serving kebabs. In between these 
jobs inside Egypt, he also spent a year working in the UAE. This long list, far from signifying 
a flexibility, signified the vulnerable precarity of Egypt’s, and the Gulf’s, contemporary labour 
market to which Mahmoud was exposed (Standing, 2011). All he craved was a stable white-
collar job in a large company. Over the years, Mahmoud also made multiple efforts to develop 
himself, by taking training courses in soft skills and English, and engaging in endless self-study 
(see Chapter 4). Each time, engaging in these activities provided an intense feeling of 
expectation that he had finally found the missing link in his quest for a desirable job. Indeed, 
he has applied in vain for hundreds of jobs in Cairo, for many jobs and scholarships abroad, 
and searched for funding opportunities for a potential start-up. On one occasion in June 2015 I 
accompanied him to the Social Development Fund, because he had heard that they had a 
funding opportunity for the establishment of a small Vodafone accessories store.74 He arrived 
a little sceptical, and was swiftly told that the person he needed to speak to was not available. 
He was then told that applicants needed to provide initial funds of 50,000LE (US$6250), which 
he did not have. We left in frustration, with Mahmoud complaining about the policy of giving 
financial help to people who already had wealth. 
                                                          
74 The SDF was created by the government in partnership with the UNDP in 1991 to support Egyptians 
returning from the Gulf after the First Gulf War. It now funds sustainable development and microcredit projects. 
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Each rejection, firing, or prolonged period spent in a difficult job affected Mahmoud with 
intense feelings of frustration. Especially hurtful were the events – like the time he 
unexpectedly had to leave the UAE because Egyptian nationals could no longer be hired in his 
position – that took away his dreams just as he had felt closest to them, when he even felt a 
brief sense of confidence. As he once explained to me: “every time I get closer I get further 
away, this is meant to hurt me.” After each disappointment, Mahmoud had to pick himself up 
and try again. But six years of struggle had taken their toll when the firing happened in August 
2015. Mahmoud had been working for two months in a temporary data entry job. But he 
thought it could finally be a company in which he could find stability and grow. Mahmoud said 
to his manager one day that he was really happy because he felt: “I can finally plan for the 
future, for a car and a family.” His manager ominously responded by urging caution against 
such forward planning, but Mahmoud did not listen. He would talk to me every day about the 
exciting things happening in the job. He had been sent on a tour of the factory in a private car 
accompanied by an engineer in order to get to know the products and manufacturing process. 
He described how the other temporary employees were all jealous of him, and how the engineer 
had told him that he was asking all the right questions, that he knew how to think. Mahmoud’s 
manager often praised him for being a ‘fast learner,’ for being creative, and for working well. 
Mahmoud often boasted about his success to his friends. During this period, the city was 
generating an atmosphere of positivity and hope.  
 
Two days after the factory tour, Mahmoud was called into the HR office when his manager 
was not around. He thought: this is finally it, all his efforts would be rewarded through a 
permanent position. But when he got there they told him he was being laid off. He thought they 
were joking at first, until they made him sign resignation papers. He asked them why, and they 
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simply said: “we don’t need you anymore.” On his way out, he spoke to a younger HR 
employee, to whom he had spoken before. He asked Mahmoud why he was being fired, “your 
file looks good,” he said. Mahmoud responded: “I really have no idea, I was working well.” 
The employee replied, if he had to guess, it was either so they can bring a relative in, or because 
Mahmoud was overqualified. They thought he would not stay long.  
 
When I met Mahmoud, his face was full of anguish, and his voice trembled as he spoke. As 
soon as we met, he asked: “why did they do it Harry?” Wasta, he said, was not a reason because 
“why would they do it for such a shitty job, they should do it for other better jobs.” He did not 
understand their perception that he was overqualified either: “if they thought that why didn’t 
they just tell me, I would have said to them they are not right, I will stay in the job.” As he said 
this, Mahmoud pointed to a car in the street and said: “look, I would have bought a small car 
like this if I had kept the job, I would have been able to in four months, but not anymore.” 
Mahmoud had decided he could not tell his Aunt (with whom he was living) about losing the 
job, so every day he left the house at 6.30am as he had done when he went to work. Instead, he 
went to a library to use a computer and pass the time.75 He could not tell her, he said, because 
she would be so disappointed, and would feel so sorry for him. He did not want to disappoint 
her.  
 
As we walked, Mahmoud began lamenting the plight of educated youth in Egypt. They have 
worse prospects than the uneducated, he said, before relaying a story of a young woman he had 
seen selling perfume on the streets the other day. He could tell by her clothes she was educated, 
maybe to university level. He felt sorry for her because he understood her difficulty, “you work 
                                                          
75 Berlant (2011) discusses how people feel compelled to sustain the pretense of a “normal” life after destructive 
events. 
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so hard to educate yourself here and you can’t get a job after.” He then said directly to me: “in 
Europe you get a chance to live, to build a decent life, but not here.” In the weeks after this 
event, every time I met Mahmoud he would spend considerable time expressing his deep 
frustration with Egypt’s labour market and rigged economy, the prevalence of wasta, the 
preference for those with private education, and the corruption of the rich. He would send to 
me pictures depicting this that he had found on social media (Figure 6.1) – a platform on which 
many youth, including Mahmoud, had previously shared hopeful quotes and pictures. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 - Image comparing "Egypt, Equality, and Equity" (Source: Sarcasm Station) 
 
This picture provides another example of how Egyptians, and these young men, used humour 
to criticise the inequality they now perceived as inhibiting (see Chapter 5). In response to this, 
Mahmoud said to me: “look, people know what is really happening in the country.” The picture 
was shared on a page called ‘sarcasm station,’ and widely shared by its ‘fans.’ The picture is 
adapted from an original image created in 2012 by a US ‘business professor’ (hence the 
 260 
 
baseball), who created it to illustrate the difference between ‘equality of opportunity’ and 
‘equality of outcome’ in an argument with a conservative activist.76 This picture compares that 
‘equity’ and ‘equality’ with an Egyptian reality in which the older man, who is depicted as a 
gleeful, paternalistic army officer, is stood rigidly looking over the two children who cannot 
see. The children have puffed up faces, which originate from a well-known GIF comic 
character named ‘Forever Alone.’ This character is often used to express ‘loneliness and 
disappointment with life.’77  
 
Having previously watched self-help videos as a way of giving himself motivation to keep 
trying, Mahmoud now endlessly criticised those same activities, along with placing one’s faith 
in God. When I asked him during one meeting about the practice of reading self-help, 
Mahmoud immediately shot back angrily, saying people engage in these activities “just so they 
can create hope in their lives, because they need it. But it is bullshit and fake, it only enslaves 
youth in fake positivity”: 
 
“Some people rely on believing God will make everything alright, other 
people find hope and inspiration in the stories of famous people like Steve Jobs. I’m 
the third kind, who has had enough of both.” 
 
When I asked Mahmoud why he had lost belief in these forms of hope, he responded 
dismissively: “after six years of unemployment I have seen the real world Harry.” 
 
                                                          
76 https://medium.com/@CRA1G/the-evolution-of-an-accidental-meme-ddc4e139e0e4 
77 http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/forever-alone 
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Mahmoud at this point was judged by others – and at times even by himself – for the negativity 
and pessimism he exuded in group outings. He was considered ‘weak,’ no longer a mukāfiḥ. 
Ibrahim was one of the people who judged him. In late 2015, even though he had also 
experienced many false starts in his pursuit of a good life, Ibrahim had a long-term plan. 
Remember how he had relocated to Cairo in early 2015 full of confidence that his 
entrepreneurial dream would be realised, only to leave again after two months because the job 
and living situation sapped his time, energy, and money. After that he also experienced 
numerous job rejections and failed attempts to find start-up funding. Every experience induced 
intense feelings of anger and sadness. Yet, each time he would overcome them by returning to 
the optimistic objects and discourses upon which he had relied. He reread about the success of 
his ‘idol’ Steve Jobs despite adversity (see Figure 6.2), immersed himself in English, asked 
either God, or successful entrepreneurs and career coaches, for guidance and help, who duly 
obliged, and even made a self-motivational PowerPoint outlining ways to maintain hope. 
Ibrahim returned to focusing on what he had done wrong in the past and what he could do 
better in the future. This enabled him to relocate a sense of hope, what he would describe as a 
sense of ‘power’ (qowa).78  
 
                                                          
78 For Ibrahim, Apple founder Steve Jobs represented someone who’s “eyes always tell me not to give up [his] 
dreams and there is always a way, and one day all dreams will come true” (adapted from one of Ibrahim’s 
Facebook posts). Jobs’ lack of education, “smartness,” “passion,” childhood adoption, and even his Syrian 
heritage provided inspiration to many Egyptians. He stood in moral contract to an Egyptian elite that made 
money through “stealing, giving bribes, utilising wasta, and trading drugs or weapons.”  
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Figure 6.2 - A picture Ibrahim kept on his laptop at home. This represents just one of the quotations he would use to 
maintain motivation (Source: author) 
Ibrahim judged people like Mahmoud for ‘surrendering’ to the tough conditions. He passed a 
similar judgement on a friend in his village: 
 
“Hossam has no job. He just sits in the shop all day. He sometimes skips it 
to smoke hashish. He is not happy at all. He wants to leave Egypt. He hates it. He 
didn’t try to apply for other jobs, because he knows he will be rejected. He thinks if 
he tries to develop himself someone who didn’t deserve the job will get it through 
wasta or bribes. I don’t agree with him though. He is very depressed. There is no 
benefit to being like that. I decided to take by reason, to earn it and not surrender. I 
have told him a lot not to surrender, but there is no hope. He could have tried to do 
something else but he took the easiest way, he has no fight, he doesn’t believe. He 
will probably stay in the shop his whole life.” 
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Thus, like Adel in the previous chapter, Ibrahim acquired moral value through his ability to be 
active and keep hope alive. He judged those who sat around, distracting themselves through 
smoking cigarettes and hashish, and complaining about Egypt.  
 
However, in early 2016, Ibrahim’s response was different. For almost a year, he thought he 
would travel to the UAE to work with his uncle who had promised him a job in the building 
firm in which he worked. Tellingly, familial wasta had come to his rescue after his many failed 
attempts within Egypt. Ibrahim spent that year, as well as thousands of pounds he took from 
his parents, taking two courses in order to acquire the necessary qualifications. Though Ibrahim 
was initially upset that he was leaving behind his entrepreneurial dream, he came to think that 
travelling to the Emirates would enable him to save money before returning to Egypt to open 
a start-up, as well as marry the girl he loved. However, at the last moment, the opportunity fell 
through. Though the details were hazy, his uncle had been unable to get him the position as he 
had promised.  
 
Ibrahim was devastated. I was not in the country at the time, but he would not talk to me for a 
week afterwards. Describing the experience, he later said: “I became so fed up. I became 
annoyed all the time and smoked cigarettes. I even tried hashish.” Ibrahim stopped reading, 
attending entrepreneurship events, and posting positive quotations on Facebook as he had been 
doing. Depression and apathy overwhelmed him. He would sit at home ‘overthinking’ about 
“how I can’t achieve anything, how I haven’t been able to achieve anything.” This event closed 
up the future before him. Without travel, he would have to take a basic accountancy or sales 
job in his area, a job he had long resisted (see Chapter 3). This would kill any possibility of 
developing a start-up, drastically reduce his lifestyle trajectory, and even throw marriage into 
doubt.  
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When I next saw Ibrahim at his home in September 2016, he was a completely different person 
to the one I had known previously. His face looked tired and angry. In previous visits we had 
spent time looking at pictures from his entrepreneurship activities (for example the AUC start-
up competition), and talking about Steve Jobs and his plans for a start-up. It thus constituted 
an atmosphere of positivity. But, on this occasion, we stood on his roof as he told me his friends 
had been right, there is no hope in Egypt. After previously rejecting them as excuses, he began 
railing against the wasta and corruption (fassad) in Egypt that turned powerful, creative youth 
like him into “slaves who mashyeen fe dowama (walk in whirlpool).” At one point he angrily 
told me a story he had heard from a friend:  
 
“It is about a boy who loved a girl. He is a graduate of commerce. He had 
very good grades. His friend got a pass. Both applied to Bank of Egypt. His friend 
had wasta and got accepted even though he was a lot worse. He then stole the girl he 
loved. The boy is now working as a garage keeper. There is no hope…” 
 
The only way to achieve a good life was to have wasta, or leave Egypt, he said. As he was 
telling me this story, my mind switched to the kinds of stories he used to tell me, about people 
who had ‘worked hard’ and found success.  
 
Later, Ibrahim began telling me how he had questioned the existence of God during this period: 
“I haven’t prayed much, I felt that God is not with me, I don’t know why I am being punished 
so much because I worked hard and tried a lot but still failed.” As we talked on his roof, Ibrahim 
lit up a cigarette (which he was hiding from his family). I was shocked as this was a habit for 
which he had previously chastised young men in his neighbourhood as a symbol of surrender 
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and terminal stagnation. Now however, he said with a palpable sense of despondency, smoking 
was helping him to forget his troubles. Ibrahim had now become one of the ‘depressed.’ 
 
Both of these young men were stripped of that vital component of a meaningful life, namely 
the sense that “there is more to life than what exists for us in the here and now” (Jackson, 2011: 
xii). It underpins one’s impetus to carry on acting in the world. But now the affective 
atmosphere of the city (and in Ibrahim’s case the village), in their homes and their workplaces, 
had been transformed. They were now places that induced feelings of anger and depression, 
rather than enthusiasm and hope. The objects and discourses – such as self-help books, films, 
study materials, even religion – that used to induce hope had lost their original affective power. 
They were both ignored, but they also induced frustration. Instead, these young men interacted 
with stories and images that materialised their anger.  
 
Late one evening, a couple of months into his unemployment, Mahmoud messaged me saying: 
“I’m so sad and angry, I’m reviewing my life from my shitty country to my shitty parents.” He 
then said: “to be honest I still doubt, maybe God is there, and it frightens me every time I think 
about killing myself. If I was sure that there is nothing on the other side, I would do it at once.” 
When I expressed worry and said “you can’t do that, you have a whole life ahead of you,” he 
responded saying: “I don’t give a shit about life, but the idea of hell frightens me, being mortal 
in hell.” Later in the mediated conversation, Mahmoud told me not to worry, because he was 
just “thinking aloud.” However, this signifies the emotional state he had reached by this stage 
of his life. A combination of his childhood abandonment, and his prolonged inability to secure 
a job brought forth moments of intense ‘depression’ (ikti’āb), most often expressed when he 
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was alone in his house.79 When I met him a few days later, I tried to make him feel better by 
telling him he could still find a job (in an attempt to affect his emotional state). But, 
immediately, he shot back: “I don’t live as a human Harry. When we let our dreams go, we 
never get something back, even our simple rights to live as a human. What kind of human can 
live with less than US$150 in a month (the salary he would get in a call centre), even your pets 
need more money. Harry, I’m 27 years old, I have nothing, I can’t afford myself, do you think 
I enjoy that, I cry every single day in my life, I am so sad, so upset, I can’t even do anything.” 
Mahmoud saw a future in which he would have to remain in his area surrounded by vulgar, 
ignorant sha’by people in a job he hated, and with a salary which would force him to send his 
children to the same public schooling he attended. This would only bring ‘darkness’, ‘nidāl’ 
(struggle), and depression. He knew this because that is what he had experienced.  
 
These intense feelings led to outbursts of anger against structural inequalities, and the 
meritocratic myths these young men had been sold. By this point, they were far from being 
dupes who were invested in meritocratic notions of mobility. Instead of blaming themselves, 
they were, like Paul Willis’ working class lads (1981), criticising the idea that hard work can 
secure success. They were latching on to discursive frames that have long been in existence in 
Egypt, particularly since the 2011 Uprising. These frames materialised their anger, which was 
directed towards the prevalence of wasta, a lack of government support, and the hoarding of 
military power. One can see here forms of collective social consciousness, and perhaps the 
conditions for collective action arising. In the previous chapter, I showed how the existence of 
a moral economy of hope closed down these moments, but this time Mahmoud and Ibrahim 
had lost belief in this moral economy. What then stifles the emergence of ‘resistance’ now?  
                                                          
79 “Ikti’ab” was a word used constantly to describe the emotional states following experiences which dashed their 
hopes. It is commonly used to describe intense sadness, thus differing from the more clinical definition one might 
find in a UK context.  
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It is eminently possible that Ibrahim and Mahmoud’s anger could have been channelled into 
forms of protest. But, in a dejected post-revolutionary moment inside Egypt that has seen the 
swift return of a repressive security apparatus, there is a certain level of fatigue and fear. 
Second, these lower-middle class young men were not exposed to activist groups and frames. 
Finally, their parents expected them to get on with their lives, finding a job and preparing for 
marriage, and not engaging in protest. But furthermore, protest or resistance was not a long-
term strategy for any young middle-class man. They would still be expected to engage in the 
pursuit of a respectable future.  
 
In the absence of alternative avenues, I will show in the remainder of this chapter how these 
young men continued to dispel their depression and anger through, cruelly, the same objects 
and discourses of atomised hope which had generated these emotions. They returned again and 
again to the same objects, discourses, and places in their everyday activities, not because they 
retained belief, but because it was the only means through which they could sustain ‘continuity’ 
and ‘keep on living’ (Berlant, 2011). It is in this way, through affect, I argue, that their 
continued compliance is secured.  
 
Without hope there is no life 
 
On November 4th 2015, three months in to his unemployment, I met Mahmoud at 9am to make 
the long journey to Nasr City, an upper-middle class neighbourhood in eastern Cairo, to meet 
his uncle’s friend who owned a publishing house. Mahmoud had heard he might have a job, 
but Mahmoud thought his uncle just wanted to get rid of him, so did not expect much. When 
we got in the microbus, I asked Mahmoud about a job (as a ‘box boy’ for a supermarket) for 
which he had applied a few days earlier: Mahmoud had arrived to find ‘uneducated’ people 
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applying for the job. He was quickly told by the manager that he was overqualified. Customers 
would treat him like he was uneducated, and he would have to work for tips, which Mahmoud 
would find embarrassing. I then pointed out a closed-off tunnel in the street, asking what it 
was. Mahmoud replied in a frustrated voice: “it is supposed to cross over to the other side of 
the road, but it’s closed. They want us all killed instead.” Mahmoud then suddenly said he 
hopes the job his uncle’s friend would offer is good, because the journey every day from his 
home would be long and expensive.  
 
Mahmoud then started telling the story of when he tried to find his father. He was 16, got his 
clothes together and travelled to Imbaba where he knew his father had a house. He knocked on 
the door but there was no response. A neighbour then told him they had moved. He gave his 
clothes to the neighbour to keep because he could not carry them all the way back to his house. 
He walked around for a while, thinking what to do. He then got a call from his father, who told 
him to never come looking for him again. Mahmoud had no money to get back to his home, so 
had to walk the five hour journey. With tears in his eyes, Mahmoud said: “I just wants to ask 
my father why?” We then talked more about his family, before arriving in Nasr City. Before 
meeting his uncle’s friend, Mahmoud wanted to visit a training centre at which he had done 
another soft skills course two years earlier. As we walked, he recollected how he had come 
here every day. He loved it. There was a teacher called Noura who was amazing. She was a 
graduate of AUC and refused to speak any Arabic. Mahmoud wanted to see her again. He told 
me not to tell her he was unemployed though, because she would be disappointed. He asked 
me to put the CV he was carrying inside my bag. When we arrived, Mahmoud asked the 
receptionist if Noura was there, but was quickly told she had long since left the organisation. 
Mahmoud then hesitantly asked how much a normal course costs, 800LE (US$100) per level 
was the reply. He could never afford that. 
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When we got outside Mahmoud got a call. His face suddenly went red with anger, but he kept 
calm and polite, saying: ‘no problem sir’ over and over. After he put the phone down, 
Mahmoud exclaimed “mother fucker!” His uncle’s friend had cancelled, 15 minutes before 
they were supposed to meet. He told Mahmoud to come on Sunday, and then said no, Monday, 
then again no, Tuesday. He finally told Mahmoud to call before to confirm. Mahmoud was 
angry and humiliated. He exclaimed: “I am cursed!” I said I was sorry, but he replied, “I am 
used to it now, this disappointment, it’s not new.” After a few moments of silence, Mahmoud 
suggested we go to the CityStars shopping mall close by.  
 
As we started walking, Mahmoud said: “I just want to do my own project, to break the barrier 
that tells us we can’t.” He then switched back to talking about the soft skills course. They had 
to do an entrepreneurship project at the end. His group took it very seriously, making GPS 
watches. He had travelled to Port Said to find out how much import taxes would cost, printed 
a 3d design, and even made a mock-up of the watch. His group were in the top three, and got 
to go on an entrepreneurship workshop, where they had to come up with a ‘serious’ business 
plan. Mahmoud then showed it to me. He still kept it on his phone and carried it with him. He 
had done the accounts perfectly, he said, no mistakes. He and another man had wanted to 
establish the company for real, but the others thought it was too big a risk, so nothing happened: 
“I wished they had taken the risk,” he nostalgically said “I think in life if you don’t take risks 
you never get anywhere, Bill Gates started from nothing and look where he is now.” Another 
problem, he went on to explain, is how hard it is to access money in Egypt. You have to be rich 
to get a loan. Mahmoud quickly switched to telling me about another project he had been 
working on recently. He had made a comprehensive business plan for a restaurant, which 
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incorporated an excel spread sheet working in detail through expected expenditure and 
revenue:  
 
“I have come up with a name called Big Ben Burger (see Figure 6.3). It would 
serve the same burgers I made you for 14.50LE, and then cheaper burgers for 4LE, 
the more expensive is handmade and also better quality meat. It will be cheap, so 
shaʿby people will come, but it will be different from what is there already. A mix 
of people will come. I will have hotdogs too. People now just think about making 
money quickly, but I won’t think about that for the first year, I will make 1LE, but I 
will build customer loyalty and after that I will start to make money. I have done 
very precise plans for it.” 
 
 
Figure 6.3 – Mahmoud’s British-inspired company logo (Source: Mahmoud) 
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As Mahmoud was talking, he saw a plane flying overhead, and shouted out: “can’t you take 
me with you!” 
 
We then arrived at the mall. Mahmoud knew the shop he wanted to find, Virgin Megastore. He 
had been here many times before to look at the products. On the way he excitedly commented 
on how fancy the mall was (see Figure 6.4). Walking past one shop he pointed out: “one day I 
hope I get money to buy clothes here” (coats were worth 15,000LE (US$1875)). We entered 
Virgin and headed straight for the high-definition flat screens. The average price was 20,000LE 
(US$2500) – Mahmoud’s highest salary to date had been 1,400LE (US$175) per month. As 
we stood there, Mahmoud began to smile and laugh to himself, before saying: “doesn’t this 
feel so good,” followed by a brief pause, “just the thought of one day having it, it makes me 
very happy.” I questioned whether this was really a satisfying or frustrating experience. He 
responded: “It depends if you are positive or negative. If you are negative you will find it 
frustrating that you will never have these things. But if you are positive it will give you hope 
that one day you will be able to afford it. That something will happen to help you do it. The 
key is thinking positive Harry.” 
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Figure 6.4 – City Star’s Shopping Mall (Source: author) 
 
We then decided to get some food. I wanted to treat Mahmoud to food inside the mall, but he 
refused. He could not afford it, so wanted to eat on the street outside. As we were leaving 
Mahmoud saw a gumball machine, and asked if I wanted one. It was the only thing he could 
afford, he remarked while laughing. Upon exiting, Mahmoud claimed he would come back one 
day and buy everything. On the microbus home, Mahmoud started talking about girls, which 
was another of his favourite topics: “I want to meet girls, but I don’t know how to go up to 
someone on the street. I saw a guy try in the street and he was rejected. I felt sorry for him.” 
We then joked about going up to girls feeling good in your head, but turning out badly. When 
we left the bus, Mahmoud began excitedly telling me, as he had told me many times, about the 
“amazing” sexual encounter he had had with a girl in university. He dearly loved this girl, and 
still kept a bank note on which she had written: “I will be yours forever.” She was now married 
and had a baby. 
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Three weeks later, on November 23rd, Mahmoud and I were in the microbus again travelling to 
the same neighbourhood. He wanted to apply for one of 200 government jobs released by the 
General Authority for Investment and Free Trade Zones. He would submit his CV for one of 
70 accountant positions. When we met, Mahmoud immediately said, while laughing, he has no 
chance of getting a job: “there will be an army of people there!” He told a story about the state 
water company, which had advertised two accountant positions a year before. Mahmoud said 
two million people applied for them. You had to pay 20LE to apply, so Mahmoud thought it 
was a scam to make money. When we got into the microbus I asked Mahmoud about call centre 
jobs. They are “crap,” he responded, explaining it was because of their non-fixed salaries and 
hours. He also stressed, again, that it is not his field. He studied business administration and 
accountancy. He needed a job he could find stability in, so would refuse to take another 
“temporary” job. Compared to this, the government provided fixed shifts and job security, 
although salaries were bad: “my uncle left for 10 years to travel to the Gulf, and still kept the 
job,” he explained. Mahmoud then mentioned an employment fair he had attended a few days 
earlier. He applied to all the non-customer service jobs: “I hope I get something,” he said 
without much confidence. In the microbus, we also talked about companies discriminating 
against where people went to university. Mahmoud said they have a right, because people from 
private universities are more qualified. If he owned a company he would do the same. 
Mahmoud used the example of his half-brother, who learns accountancy techniques of which 
Mahmoud has never heard, to justify this. Mahmoud then suddenly defiantly said: “I think I’ll 
do something illegal to get money, maybe smuggling, I won’t do anything that hurts anyone, 
but I want to do something illegal.” He then immediately switched: “I need to travel, at least 
I’ll be rich. I can’t feed myself here. I am 26 and take money from my aunt, it’s humiliating.” 
By this point we were walking up to the Authority building. Mahmoud looked up to the planes 
overhead and said, “I want to grab on to one, can’t they just take me away.”  
 274 
 
 
We switched our attention to the application process. Mahmoud was told to take a ticket and 
wait outside the gates, along with around 200 others (see Figure 6.5). He took ticket number 
850 for that day. The application process would be open for 10 days in total, suggesting many 
thousands would be applying overall. Other prospective applicants had travelled similarly long 
distances, both from inside and outside Cairo. Mahmoud helped one who could not read to 
work out what positions were available. However, he had not come with a CV or photos, so 
Mahmoud said he would have to get them and come back tomorrow. While we sat on the wall 
waiting for Mahmoud’s number to be called, we got talking to other applicants. Some were 
working as self-employed lawyers or in small shops, and all longed for the stability and prestige 
that would come with a government job. Everyone repeatedly expressed that they believed they 
had no chance of being accepted. Many made jokes that the jobs had already been decided 
through wasta. This application process, they stated, was administered only to project an image 
that the government was helping unemployed youth. One man asked if I worked. I said I am 
still a student. He asked if I get money from the government: “I get a scholarship to do 
research,” I responded. He then quipped: “in your country they give you money, in ours they 
slap us on the back of our necks!” 
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Figure 6.5 – Outside the General Authority for Investment and Free Trade Zones (Source: author) 
 
In response to the air of hopelessness that followed these conversations, each would shrug their 
shoulders and say: “lāzim na‘mil illy ‘aliyyna” (we have to do our duty). The second half of 
this phrase, left unspoken here, is “w’ rabina heya’mil al ba’y” (and God will do the rest). 
Mahmoud’s block was suddenly called in, after we had waited more than an hour. He came out 
five minutes later having submitted his CV. Immediately after we left, Mahmoud said he was 
proud he had come, and that he felt hopeful, before going on to note: “if I get this Harry I will 
convert to Christianity (he thought I was Christian), so pray to God to help me, it would be 
amazing if I got this.” Mahmoud expressed happiness that he had come and applied, as well as 
excitement at the prospect of acceptance, even though he had previously thought he had no 
chance. I asked him why people come despite thinking it was concluded by wasta, and that 
their chances were so remote. Mahmoud replied: “they come because they hope, they need to 
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hope. Egyptians are experts in hoping for unhopeful things, aspiring for things which can’t be 
aspired after. If we didn’t do that we would die.” He then repeated that he actually would kill 
himself, but he was scared of God’s punishment.  
 
Leaving the area we walked past the Pepsico factory nearby. It prompted Mahmoud to say: “I 
wonder if I can apply my CV here?” He asked security, but they told him to apply online. He 
quickly became annoyed: “why don’t they just let us apply here!?” We then walked through 
this upper-middle class area. Mahmoud said he wants to live here. He noted that they collect 
the rubbish unlike in his neighbourhood. He then pointed to a flat with a wide balcony: “I want 
to live there,” before seeing a very young man driving a car, “that’s crazy!” he exclaimed. We 
walked past an empty plot being used as a rubbish tip. Mahmoud bellowed: “why don’t they 
build a building on that and give me a small flat to live in!” We then went to get a microbus. 
Mahmoud wanted to go for a beer with me, but I had to meet someone else, so he went home. 
 
During the month in Cairo in November 2015, I would spend many days with Mahmoud like 
these. On six occasions we made the same journey to Nasr City, each time in search of future 
job or scholarship opportunities. We went twice to his uncle’s publishing house, to two 
employment fairs, the government recruitment day, and to an Aiesec (a global youth 
volunteering organisation) overseas volunteering event. These trips began to feel like outings. 
Simply moving around the city, away from his house and area, which were places that induced 
frustration, instead generated for Mahmoud a sense of ‘prospective momentum,’ both 
distracting him from his despair and reopening the future (Miyazaki, 2004). But during these 
days, Mahmoud’s emotional state would undulate between euphoric hope and frustrated 
despair. Thus, though we spent much time discussing his plight, depression, thoughts of 
suicide, and complaining about the injustice of Egypt’s labour market and society, we were 
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also moving around the city locating moments that opened up the future, looking for new jobs 
and opportunities, going to the mall to imagine what items Mahmoud would buy in the future, 
talking about the entrepreneurship project he was planning, and discussing girls and sex.  
 
Mahmoud was actively seeking out experiences and topics – through encounters with certain 
objects, discourses, and places – which extended affective intensities that might fill him with 
what Kathleen Stewart (2007) labelled a ‘surge of vitality.’ In particular, he would do this 
whenever he experienced or thought too much about the despair that his continued stagnation 
was generating. One of his favourite topics was sex. He would often want to talk about previous 
sexual encounters, porn he had watched, and encounters he was planning with women. This 
bred much excitement, and represented a realm in which, discursively at least, he could exert 
masculine power and feel a sense of intimacy. However, it was a topic that also introduced 
frustration, due to his inability to make much contact with women, and the love that he had lost 
in the past.  
 
Mahmoud would also switch to topics or practices that imaginatively opened up the future. 
After the humiliating experience of the cancellation of the appointment with his uncle, 
Mahmoud rapidly switched attention to the entrepreneurship project he had been planning. He 
was engaging in a temporal reorientation of knowledge, an effort to immediately foreclose his 
humiliation and shame. Every time he discussed this project with me, his face lit up and his 
voice filled with enthusiasm. On some days he would send me pictures of food he had cooked 
in preparation for the restaurant. He loved the project because “at least it is one thing I chose 
to do,” in contrast to the jobs he had been forced to take. But when I talked to him about the 
project on one occasion, he said he knew it was not realistic. Nevertheless: “it makes me feel 
good to plan it.” It was at this point that Mahmoud used the metaphor with which I opened this 
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chapter. He knew he would never reach a dignified life, but he kept engaging in this practice 
because it felt good. Imagining that it could happen one day was preferable to “waiting for 
death.” It repetitively enabled him to deflect attention away from his current stagnation and 
dispel the depression that built up as a result.  
 
Thinking of desirable items he wished to buy performed a similar role. Very often, when we 
were speaking about a frustrating experience in the labour market, Mahmoud would suddenly 
switch to discussing a product he had been looking at. On countless occasions we would go to 
either a mall or a shop to look at products. He described the mall as a place that “helps me 
release the frustration that builds up in my life outside.” When I asked why, he responded: 
“because I can distract myself from everything by looking at all the products I want to buy, like 
clothes, or a laptop.” In the mall, he would walk around the glitzy corridors, entering his 
favourite shops to get a closer look at the products. He would then either discuss them with me, 
or speak to the shop assistant about the item’s specifications. Through this activity, Mahmoud 
was adding items to his ‘wish-list’ for the future, which he also kept with him on his phone. 
Being in the mall made him feel hopeful that one day he would be able to afford these icons to 
success. Again, on one occasion, Mahmoud said he knows these items are not within reach: “I 
just like to pretend I’ll buy it, I’m a sick person, it’s like motivation…I only like to mess around, 
it’s about feelings mate.”  
 
Mahmoud’s trip to the General Authority for Investment and Free Trade suggested he was also 
using applying for jobs for the same purpose. Though he had no expectations of being accepted 
before travelling to Nasr City, he still enjoyed the act of applying. Calling on religious 
divination (although he was a self-described atheist), the moment of submission defied doubt 
and brought forth hopeful visions of acceptance. Mahmoud, again, right after this event 
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described how people who had applied were hoping for acceptance, because without hope they 
would ‘die.’  
 
Mahmoud’s definition of death was illustrated during another of our trips to Nasr City, to the 
Aiesec volunteering event. We met an old friend of his from university, who was working in 
two jobs as a cashier and microbus driver earning only 1700LE (US$210) per month, and 
slowly saving money towards marriage (although Mahmoud scornfully suggested he would 
never save enough). This friend told Mahmoud to give up his ‘crazy dreams,’ to settle in a job 
and start saving. His friend, now 33, described how he used to be like Mahmoud, but have 
given up his dreams. On the journey home, Mahmoud saw a billboard advertising an exclusive 
new compound, claiming: “I need that one day.” I attempted to say that he does not, but he 
quickly retorted:  
 
“yes I do Harry, if I bring up children they need to be surrounded by good 
people, and need to be sent to good schools. If I accepted what my friend accepted 
they would continue to exist in the same shitty situation as me, the same struggles 
and I would regret that I had them, and then their children would be the same, it is a 
cycle. I refuse to be part of that and give up like him. I would rather die trying than 
give up now and accept a shit future…I will never give up. He works two jobs and 
only gets 1700LE, he can’t afford anything with that life.” 
 
In this late stage of youth, Mahmoud is being judged for not settling. However, he could not 
emotionally give up and accept this ‘shitty life.’ At this point, he considered ‘death’ preferable. 
Mahmoud judged his friend for accepting such ‘death.’ 
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Mahmoud was also seeing a woman by this point, whom he had met at the GTO course.80 She 
was also putting pressure on him to accept a low-end job and stay in it, as she wanted him to 
save money so they could get married. She did not care about raising her standard of living. 
She stressed that many Egyptians tolerate tough conditions. But Mahmoud refused. He could 
not raise children in this environment, he would not be able to be a respectable father and 
husband. He might not even be able to save enough money for marriage. Mahmoud’s inability 
to accept his position was therefore highly gendered. He was unable to accept his inability, as 
a man, to provide what he considered a good life. Mahmoud retained higher aspirations, 
perhaps finding them more painful to let go. This woman was now focused on marriage. She 
did not have a mobile life, and was waiting on this man to enable her own prospective 
momentum. Mahmoud still had some licence to roam around the city, and like others, defy the 
will of parents (in his case his aunt) and frustrate his partner (Ghannam, 2013). His inability to 
“settle down” was creating a sense of frustration for this woman at her own stagnation.  
 
Hopeful city? 
 
In each of these examples, the city continued to create an affective atmosphere that repetitively 
produced hopeful openings for the future (see Chapter 4). Entrepreneurial discourses are 
eternally optimistic, and the continued presence of open recruitment processes by the 
government, and within employment fairs, offers up the meritocratic potential of future 
acceptance. The mall is a place I did not discuss in Chapter 4, but it is certainly designed to 
affect a feeling of hope within its clientele. In Cairo, it acts as a vivid signifier of upper-
middle/upper-class consumer lifestyles, and the city’s global ambitions.81 Aesthetically, its 
                                                          
80 The GTO course acted as a place for more than one couple to establish relations, however these couples have 
since separated due to rejections from the women’s families.  
81 Mona Abaza (2006) estimates that 20% of Egyptians can afford to shop in malls (still 3 million people in 
Cairo), however it might be far less, particularly in CityStars where products replicate European pricing. 
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cleanliness, cool temperature, and vacant walkways form a blunt juxtaposition to the dirty, 
stifling, overcrowded streets outside. It is also emblematic of an intensification of consumption 
as a class signifier (de Koning, 2009). The first mall was built in 1989, and there are now 
around 25 in Cairo, each with varying degrees of exclusivity. They arose out of a combination 
of land speculation from private investors – including wealthy Egyptian families – but also 
more and more from Gulf real estate companies wishing to reproduce the region’s extravagant 
malls, and as a result of a ‘global’ urban modernisation project headed by the state (Ghannam, 
2002). There are also rumours that the army is involved in construction, and even evidence of 
mall building being used as an avenue for money-laundering (Abaza, 2006). Furthermore, 
shopping malls map on to the consumption trends picked up by Egyptians living in the Gulf, 
suburbanisation processes in Cairo, and pre-existing class schemas. 
 
Malls are in many ways exclusive places, particularly in Cairo where security guards attempt 
to keep out young shaʿby men who are imagined as a threat, particularly to upper/middle-class 
women. However, they are also open to more than those who are able to afford the products. 
Malls are actively built to attract not only shoppers. According to the managing director of Al-
Futteim, the firm behind one of Cairo’s biggest malls, people come for “eating and drinking in 
giant food courts and using the facilities such as ski slopes, cinemas and entertainment centres 
for children” (Wall Street Journal, 2014).82 In the social sciences, malls have long been 
conceptualised as hyperreal, theatrical places which offer up “transitory participatory pleasure” 
to those who inhabit them (Harvey, 1989: 91).83 In different contexts, researchers have noted 
                                                          
82 https://www.wsj.com/articles/cairos-hottest-import-shopping-malls-1402430917 
83 Walter Benjamin, writing on the Paris arcades – which foregrounded the modern mall, posits that these 
consumer dream-houses placed people in a “dream-like state”. The utopian visions of material abundance therein 
– what Benjamin terms wish-images – veil the “material scarcity and exploitative labour that form the structural 
course of societies based on class domination” (Buck-Morss, 1991: 118). They provide a “momentary, fleeting 
experience of fulfilment dimly anticipatory of a reality that is not yet” (ibid. 111).  
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how poor people frequent malls in order to hang out in a modern, sanitised place (Abaza, 2006; 
Schindler, 2007). Geographers have conceptualised this activity as an act of transgression 
(Schindler, 2007; Mittleman, 2004). However, as I stood next to Mahmoud, this did not seem 
an appropriate reading. Mona Abaza (2006: 216), writing about the poor’s inhabitation of 
Cairo’s malls, states that these places “might encourage a feeling that one can participate in a 
better world, even if merely by window-shopping.” The mall generates an atmosphere of 
possibility, offering up aspirational objects for viewing and for play. Viewing desirable items 
induces an affect upon the body that is felt as anticipation and satisfaction.  
 
For Mahmoud, encountering the aesthetics of the mall, and the commodities therein, enabled 
him to imaginatively transfer himself into a future dream-world in which his consumption and 
lifestyle desires would be realised. It provided a feeling of intense satisfaction, reintroducing 
momentarily a feeling of hope for something to look forward to and desire, to a present and 
future in which – he was perpetually reminded – there was nothing to wait for. A similar sense 
was affected when he dreamed up an entrepreneurial project, and when he submitted his CV 
for a desirable job. However, in each of these cases, it is insufficient to look at these places of 
the hopeful city, in other words at the objects, discourses, and places and the affective 
intensities generated by them. This was not a linear process of object ‘affecting’ subject. 
Mahmoud expressed countless times open disbelief in his ability to establish a start-up, find a 
good job, and afford the products he desires. But he kept going back to these objects, 
discourses, and places, not out of belief, but because of the visceral bodily shifts they affected 
within him. They repetitively enabled him to feel better on a day-to-day basis. Vincent 
Crapanzano (2003) states that hope intrinsically defies doubt, particularly when we yearn for 
something. Thus, in the moments of applying, planning, and staring at products, Mahmoud was 
able to defy doubt and enjoy the feeling of renewed hope and excitement. His compulsion for 
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the feeling enabled him to disavow cynicism and keep coming back. These activities thus 
turned into a way of coping, of carrying on and staving off the feelings of depression he now 
felt in his home, or as he walked the streets. Mahmoud once even described hope as a drug, 
which allowed the ‘hopeless like me’ to carry on.  
 
The cruelty lies in Mahmoud’s attempts to escape his depression through the very forms of 
hope that had caused it when he realised they were false. The only solution to his depression 
was returning to these hopeful, yet harmful objects. Affecting himself with a feeling of hope 
through imagining the realisation of an entrepreneurial dream as he designed a logo, or 
consumption dream as he stood in front of his icons of success, sustained the feeling of 
depression that engulfed him as a result of their absence. In this sense, these objects enacted an 
affective atmosphere that induced hope when in their presence, and one that induced its 
opposite in their absence. Mahmoud, by retaining an attachment to these objects, was actively 
sustaining the conditions that enabled his depression to flourish. Echoing Berlant (2011), 
Mahmoud continues to hold on to this cruel form of hope because the alternative of letting go 
of these “scenes of his desire” is too much to bear. It would lead to a life not worth living. 
 
Mahmoud’s ability to describe the instrumental nature of these activities undermined the very 
act of hoping itself, as it brought forth his ultimate disbelief. When planning his project, he 
tried to ignore the problem of money, to imagine ways in which it might come. Without that 
ability to expel doubt he would find no pleasure. But, on occasions his body was not able to 
receive the hopeful affect. The act of planning made him feel worse, because it reminded him 
of his current stagnation. Thus, Mahmoud said to me he was not very good at being hopeful in 
general: he was too depressed and negative. He wishes he had more hope. He said others were 
able to do a better job of “lying to themselves.” It is certainly true that the others expressed far 
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less reflexivity regarding their attempts to hang on to hope. As was often the case for Mahmoud, 
this would have destroyed the pleasure of hoping itself. However, the same drive to perpetually 
recreate possibility acts upon many of these young men. I will now describe how this effected 
Ibrahim and Mostafa during their periods of stagnation. 
 
Everything is still possible 
 
During his months of apathy, and before I met him in September 2016, Ibrahim messaged me 
one day. After many weeks of negative discussions over WhatsApp, he now asked for help on 
an application for a scholarship to take a Master’s at Bradford University. The scholarship was 
designed to “aid students in financial hardship due to the fact that they are from a country that 
is in crisis as a result of the political situation, war, natural disaster etc.” He had come across it 
while looking on a Facebook page advertising opportunities for study abroad. In the following 
days, Ibrahim set his mind to filling out the application form and writing a cover letter. 
Following submission, he immediately said to me: “after applying I feel more motivated 
(mutahamis) again.” I asked him why: “because I now think there is a way again, there is an 
opportunity for me.” A feeling of excitement had briefly replaced his sense of apathy and 
depression, through his encounter with the application form. It became an object of hope, 
affecting in him a reconnection between the present and a desirable future.  
 
Ibrahim thought his chances were ‘70%,’ because he did not have an International English 
certificate. When I asked why he thought his chances were so good, he replied: “because I am 
a positive person, I like to think positively, and also I filled out the application well.” Ibrahim 
was practicing the positive thinking he had been taught by Steve Jobs: “the people who are 
crazy enough to think they can change the world are the ones who do.” He also knew two 
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people, both engineering graduates, who had obtained scholarships to study in Turkey, and 
took hope from them. Ibrahim’s family were also very encouraging. They made a du‘aa 
(request from God) for him to be accepted. Thus, nobody told Ibrahim he might be rejected. 
Hope was secured through calling on recognizable objects and discourses of hope. He did not 
hear negativity. Ibrahim would now focus on applying to multiple scholarships. If he applied 
for many, he said: “it makes sure of a high percentage of being accepted in one at least.” This 
practice temporarily reintroduced a sense of hope. Again, it is necessary to focus on the role of 
scholarships in that they hold affective qualities of hope. However, Ibrahim was desperate to 
escape his feeling of apathy and frustration. This had led him to seek out this “object,” which 
enabled him to live on by keeping alive the scene of his desire.  
 
Ibrahim was not alone in locating hope through scholarship applications. Mostafa, briefly 
introduced in the previous chapter as he entered the flat during my final days, has applied and 
been rejected from 18 foreign scholarships in the past few years. Mostafa considered that 
travelling abroad would “completely change [his] life.” In November 2015, he was working in 
a ‘temporary’ call centre job, and saw before him depression and struggle if he remained in 
Egypt. Obtaining a scholarship would enable him to either obtain a good job in Europe, or 
return to Egypt and obtain a high-status job or open a business. The last scholarship for which 
he applied was the Chevening Scholarship, a UK government diplomatic effort to help ‘young 
leaders and professionals’ across the world undertake a Master’s degree in the UK. I recently 
discovered another person had obtained this scholarship. She was part of the upper-middle class 
group interviewed in Chapter 3, having studied at the American University in Cairo, and before 
that at an expensive international private school. This gave her a very different profile from 
Mostafa’s free Arabic public education at one of the ‘kullyāt al shaʿb’ (faculties of the people). 
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Each new rejection instigated intense feelings of ‘depression’ for Mostafa. He would do 
nothing and not speak to anyone for a few days. However, despite his numerous rejections, 
Mostafa did not stop trying. He continued to search on his laptop through Facebook and Google 
every two weeks for scholarships to which he can apply, before focusing his mind on the 
application and fulfilling its requirements. Mostafa is now again in the process of applying for 
the Chevening. When I pressed Mostafa on why he continues to apply, he answered: 
 
“It’s like when someone falls into a deep hole and is trying to reach the top to 
get out. Every time you get near the edge you fall again, so I think what is better for 
me, to keep trying or to stay in the hole? I decided to not stop trying because one 
time I might succeed to get out. If I stay still I will kill myself…I don’t mean kill 
myself literally, but when you live without a goal or target, or hope, you will live 
like a dead person. I cannot imagine myself to live like an animal, to eat, drink, and 
sleep, or like most shaʿby people, that’s all they do. So I search for a source every 
time to find inspiration again. A source means hope, anything that can make me 
dream and therefore renews the hope inside me” 
 
Although Mostafa does not quite express the same reflexivity as Mahmoud, he makes clear 
that his decision to carry on is an attempt to sustain the bodily feeling of hope in itself. It is this 
feeling that allows him to continue ‘living.’ Social death would constitute living without a 
target, and without the feeling that comes with it. This reflects Michael Jackson’s (2012) notion 
that having something to look forward to, which is different to the here and now, is a vital 
component of life. It also reflects some of the notions of social death utilised before in the 
social sciences. Bourdieu (1990) describes social death as a life lived without being known and 
recognised, being insignificant. He focuses on those experiencing chronic underemployment, 
 287 
 
poverty, and neglect. For these young men, giving up on their dreams meant giving up on the 
pursuit of recognition. Another young man described his fear of ending up like a friend. This 
friend used to be motivated, but now stays at home all the time, and just goes out for cigarettes. 
He was described as “not really living.” This fear would also be discussed as a fear of becoming 
‘accustomed’ (muta’wid) or permanently distracted by daily needs. Egyptian youth, Mostafa 
said, start with high ambitions, “of working in a high position, travelling abroad, and over time 
their dreams get smaller and smaller. Eventually they start to focus on opening a house 
(marriage), and accept where they are.” Mostafa’s global disposition leads him to view shaʿby 
living as akin to animal living. 
 
Mostafa’s friends have expressed their doubt about his chances of success directly. One told 
him he was afraid Mostafa would become depressed again, and restated how difficult 
acceptance is. But Mostafa simply told his friend in response: “I will be depressed anyway if I 
don’t try, I have no other choice.” Mostafa has even developed doubts about the preference for 
private university graduates in the Chevening scholarship himself. However, after each 
rejection he would ritualistically refocus on what he had done wrong. When I asked him about 
this, he replied: “I have to blame myself, because if I just look at the hard circumstances, I 
would not be able to keep my goal alive.” 
 
Mostafa knew his activities, and these objects, are injurious, but he carried on anyway. He 
continued to put himself through periods of pain and depression, because the alternative of 
accepting his present social and spatial world would produce more pain. He retained an 
attachment to this cruel form of hope not out of belief, but because of affect. The affect upon 
his body produced by the scholarship enabled him to maintain continuity of his “sense of what 
it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the world” (Berlant, 2011: 24). 
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He even reengaged in a process of self-blame out of necessity. Mostafa has now resorted to not 
telling friends or family about his activities, in order to avoid “kalam mohbaT” (depressing 
words). He therefore created a privatised affective place of hope, dispelling objects and 
narratives which would introduce negativity. This also meant rebuking the moral pressure he 
was beginning to face to move on with marriage. Instead of marriage, Mostafa invested much 
of his modest work salary in two cheaper evening courses offered by the AUC (he has spent 
10,000LE (US$1250) to date). These courses were geared towards improving his chances of 
acceptance.84  
 
Ibrahim was swiftly rejected from the scholarships to which he had applied. He descended back 
into apathy and anger, which were on show in the September 2016 meeting described above. 
A week after our meeting, Ibrahim took an office assistant job in his industrial town, something 
he had sworn he would never do. He was under pressure from his family to start earning money 
and save for marriage. But after another two weeks, I saw a quotation on Ibrahim’s Facebook: 
“Life is a #DREAM, in a #Dream you can be whatever you want.” This reflected the 
inspirational quotations I had seen before. When I spoke to him he told me the post means 
“everything is still possible,” “but it will take time” he added: it was “50/50.” Ibrahim had 
made another plan to save money for a start-up, and had started studying English, and praying 
to God again. He was also going to do an advice session for university students in the town, 
about how to build a start-up and secure an HR job. He said giving this session may help renew 
                                                          
84 A common assertion in literature on Arab men is that difficulties in affording marriage are a source of intense 
frustration (Singerman, 2007). However, for these young men, at this stage “opening a house” was considered a 
symbol of stagnation and immobility rather than mobility and respectability. It would secure undesirable social 
positions (jobs and lifestyles), that would not fit a middle-class disposition, as they would have to redirect 
resources towards it. Again, this inability, either to afford marriage, or to accept preparations, is highly 
gendered. It forces women into extended periods of waithood to start a “home.” This inability to accept these 
standards of middle-class living might not last.  
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his own hope for the future, as it would remind him of the “good days when I was very active 
and enthusiastic about things.”  
 
Ibrahim was actively leaving his state of apathy and returning to the meritocratic promise he 
had come to know as false just a few weeks previously, forgetting narratives that told him his 
dream was impossible. These actions, again, demonstrate the attachment Ibrahim had forged 
to the discourses extended to him in the hopeful city. But it is not an attachment to the 
discourses themselves, rather to the intimate sense of hope they had brought forth. He wished 
to feel that feeling again, and foreclose his intense depression. This shows how it is the affective 
dimension that renders these discourses so powerful. Ibrahim was re-enlisting in these promises 
in order to keep alive a sense of hope that his dreams could be realised, without which he could 
not carry on. He had developed an attachment to promises that were hurting him, because the 
alternative of letting go was too much to bear. Most cruelly perhaps, in this pursuit of affective 
solace, Ibrahim turned into an active reproducer of these promises for others who would come 
after him, starting the cycle again.85 Becoming a ‘teacher’ fed his own sense of entrepreneurial 
selfhood relative to others.  
 
Conclusions 
 
To end, I would like to return to a discussion of compliance in the lives of these young men. I 
started the thesis by questioning Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic power, which rests on a 
congruence between one’s subjective expectations and objective chances (Burawoy, 2012). 
This is incidentally the kind of society Mostafa craved, where people are given the power to 
                                                          
85 Young & Jeffrey (2016) discuss how young educated unemployed Indian men make money through 
establishing private training centres, thus contributing to the problem.  
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do what they want. However, Bourdieu himself has argued, along with others, that 
contemporary capitalism is creating evermore situations of mismatch. This, as Chapter 3 
argued, has become the case for many in Egypt’s falling middle-class. For these young lower-
middle class men, living where they are breeds intense dissatisfaction.86 Recent urban 
transformations in Cairo, as around the world, have fermented aspirations for global urban 
living (Ghertner, 2015). These young Egyptian men were over a number of years exposed to 
what Appadurai (1996) terms other ‘possible lives’ in a city which offers up international 
private sector employment, exclusive gated community living, modern consumption styles, and 
international mobility to some. This exposure took place as they moved around the city 
(attending university activities, employment fairs, training courses, and prestigious events), 
communicated with those who live it (teachers, friends, family, or indeed foreign researchers), 
and as they engaged with mediated forms inside their homes. At the same time, the lives of 
many in Egypt’s middle-classes have been devalued symbolically, if not materially (see 
Chapter 3). Theirs is a life not considered fitting for those with middle-class status, it is rather 
a shaʿby life. They are pushed into insecure, low-paid, low-status jobs that render the possibility 
of ever affording the increasing costs of marriage, a good quality private education, and 
appropriate consumptive signifiers, extremely difficult. This set of historically-constituted 
conditions produces a particularly acute and painful disconnect between expectations and 
chances for these young men at this stage of early adulthood.87  
 
For Ghertner (2015), this democratisation of consumerist aspiration in the context of ‘world-
class’ city making in Delhi stimulates attempts by the urban poor to exercise claims on the city. 
They are claims that only become intelligible through the hegemonic discourses of the ‘world-
                                                          
86 Samuli Schielke (2015) points to a paradox of living in poverty in contemporary Egypt, that while materially 
people may be materially enjoying more, the experience is emotionally more defeating. 
87 I have described in previous chapters how this pain is specifically gendered, classed, and age-specific. 
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class’ city – thus they reproduce hierarchical class and caste schemes – yet they are still able 
to demand participation. Laurence Ralph (2015) notes a similar phenomenon of claims-making 
in the context of Chicago’s gang members who, despite injurious pasts, work to improve both 
their individual and collective lives through the act of dreaming. Both lay bare how 
individualised, often consumerist, aspiration can be formative of collective claims for 
improvement. However, as I have shown in previous chapters, these forms of collective claims-
making seen in Delhi and Chicago have been foreclosed in Cairo by an architecture of 
meritocratic hope which keeps people tied to the individualised possibility of future 
participation and social mobility.  
 
But by this stage in their lives, after repeated rounds of rejection and prolonged stagnation, the 
meritocratic illusion was shattered for these young men. Overwhelmingly, they no longer 
blamed themselves, rather the structural conditions. They became mired in the conscious 
foreclosure of possibility. This again opened up the possibility of collective claims-making, as 
shown by the language they used, of ‘youth’ being actively unsupported or treated unjustly. 
This space is kept open, particularly as they continue to refuse to adapt to the social position 
they have been able to reach – as many do, including Mahmoud’s friend – and give in to the 
pressure exerted by those around them to settle down and prepare for marriage.88 This in itself 
is an act of gendered defiance, against a system that is delivering so little to them, and against 
familial pressures. This refusal stems from emotional compulsion, an inability to live with 
current reality, to live in a state of social death. An important consequence of this is the 
emergence of frustration for women who face delayed marriage.  
 
                                                          
88 In the case of Willis’ working class lads (1981), their distrust of meritocracy contributes to their acceptance of 
low-level jobs. 
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This refusal led these men to recoil back into atomised discourses and practices of meritocracy. 
In the absence of a collective avenue, their anger and depression was dispelled by imaginatively 
returning again and again to the same forms of hope that produce their exclusion and feeling 
of pain. They were continuing to comply with this meritocratic system, not because they 
believed in it, but because they could not bear the loss of the feeling that the scene of their 
desires had affected within them (Berlant, 2011). It was an affective attachment that led to 
reinvestment. I therefore use the word compliance, because it is a term that does not necessarily 
require the belief of the participant (Scott, 1985). These young men develop an affective 
attachment to these forms, even though they induce so much pain, because the alternative of 
letting go is unliveable. In a dejected post-revolutionary moment, where prolonged complaint 
is disallowed, there is no alternative pathway for hope. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
Class, affect, and meritocracy in Egypt 
 
In May 2015, Egypt’s Justice Minister Mahfouz Saber was asked in a television interview 
whether the son of a garbage collector could be appointed to the judiciary. Here was his reply: 
 
“The son of a garbage collector will not become a judge, because he is not 
brought up in the right environment for this profession. Even if he becomes a judge, 
he will come across many problems and will [end up] quitting…The rubbish 
collector must have done a great job raising his son and helping him obtain a degree, 
but there are other jobs that would suit him better.”89 
 
Saber emphasised the need for judges to come from a ‘respectable environment’ (be’a 
muhtarama), both financially and morally. Saber’s comments caused public uproar, and led to 
his resignation. The event brought to mind other cases of discrimination in Egypt’s labour 
market. Abdul Hamid Sheta committed suicide in 2003, at the age of 25, after being rejected 
from a job as a commercial attaché in the diplomatic service. Having scored higher than many 
others on the entrance exam, he was rejected because he came from a poor peasant family. The 
Foreign Ministry explained that Sheta was ‘socially unsuitable’ (ghīr munassba igtima‘iyya). 
Sheta jumped off Cairo’s Qasr al-Nil bridge, an act interpreted by many journalists and 
commentators as a show of strength against discrimination of the poor. 
 
                                                          
89 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/05/egypt-jobs-meritocracy-favoritism-judiciary-
parliament.html 
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This is the same bridge on which I had been walking with Gamal in late 2015, in the vignette 
with which this thesis began. On that night, Gamal judged the man who had jumped. His act 
was not a show of strength, but rather a sign of weakness. Gamal considered him weak for not 
continuing to work hard to reach a good life, and not having faith that hard work would be 
rewarded. This judgement, as the thesis subsequently demonstrated, stemmed from Gamal’s 
investment in a discursive terrain of meritocracy that posits success comes with perseverance, 
no matter one’s social background. In response to Saber’s comments, former vice president 
Mohamed ElBaradei tweeted his disgust, stating that ‘international rights charters guarantee 
freedom of choice of employment.’ The British Ambassador also waded in, announcing that 
all are welcome to work at the British Embassy, including the garbage collector’s son. The 
National Council for Human Rights (NCHR) rapidly prepared a draft law forbidding all forms 
of discrimination in employment, in line with Article 53 of the 2014 Constitution, which reads: 
“Discrimination and incitement to hate are crimes punishable by law.”90  
 
The reaction to this event has been therefore to push further for the discursive implementation 
of equal opportunity and meritocracy in what remains a ‘backwards,’ classist society. 
Recruitment must be based on an individual’s talent and credentials, rather than their social 
background, thus ensuring all have an opportunity to be accepted. Judging someone based on 
individual merit seems to represent a noble pursuit, but in this thesis I have examined the 
harmful effects enacted by the hopeful extension of meritocracy and fairness in a hierarchical 
capitalist system that continues to reward inherited privilege, as Saber’s comments made clear. 
In this conclusion, I want to set out how the previous pages have answered the research 
questions articulated in the introduction. As I do this, I will discuss some of the contributions 
                                                          
90 Even though the constitution (redrafted in 2014) calls for the equal treatment of all citizens, no specific 
directive or regulation addressing discrimination in recruitment existed.  
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towards thinking through the formation and experience of class immobility, and the continued 
stability of capitalist regimes, in Egypt and beyond. I will then end by posing some questions 
which can provide a blueprint for further research.  
 
Mismatch in Egypt’s middle-class 
 
The first aim of the thesis was to analyse the historical emergence of an under-recognised 
‘falling’ middle-class in contemporary Egypt. Chapter 3, through a series of life histories, and 
a Bourdieu-inspired approach to class reproduction, told the story of two middle-classes in 
Egypt over the previous 80 years. Through following their historical trajectory, I contributed 
to understandings of the emergence of ‘new middle-class’ populations in the context of 
neoliberal change in the Global South (Liechty, 2003; Fernandes, 2006; Zhang, 2010). 
Specifically, I revealed the importance of historically-owned rural land, historical cultural 
privilege, the legal and political remnants of state socialism, and international migration in their 
socio-economic ‘rise.’ I also moved away from a predominant focus on consumption, and 
instead highlighted how educational markers, and ‘character’ differences enable the exercise 
of a new form of ‘open-minded’ middle-class distinction.  
 
However, the major contribution of this chapter was to highlight the historical emergence of 
an alternative middle-class population in Egypt, one which has experienced a socio-economic 
fall. I want to call for recognition and more exploration of alternative, less celebratory ‘middle-
classes’ in the late-20th and early-21st century across the Global South (Hage, 2003; Jeffrey, 
2010; Heiman, 2015; Hochschild, 2016). The chapter set out how a middle-class that was 
created out of a project of state-socialism in Egypt has faced increased precarity in the context 
of neoliberal transformations. The struggles of this group were in many ways a direct 
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consequence of the economic mobility of the ‘upper-middle classes,’ as capital-intensive 
growth, high-inflation caused by a trade deficit, and declining public spending left many 
struggling to hang on to the cultural markers of respectable middle-class living, a stable white-
collar job, a good education, and a comfortable financial, and even moral, life. 
 
Having established the historical emergence of this falling middle-class, the rest of the thesis 
delved into the lives of a group of young men attempting to make the transition from education 
to employment, with the aim of understanding lower-middle class life in contemporary Egypt. 
In Chapter 3, I demonstrated how this group has developed a mismatch between their 
aspirations for a middle-class life, and their ability to reach them. This arose in part as a 
consequence of the recent fall in the socio-economic position of this middle-class population, 
whereby the jobs, wages, education, and housing they experienced and foresaw as accessible 
to them did not match their aspirations for middle-class ‘respectability’ and ‘comfort.’ But, 
crucially, I showed how this mismatch developed out of a simultaneous increase in aspirations 
among young lower-middle class men. They grew up with greater access to education and 
exposure to the globalised knowledge and employment, international mobility, and lavish 
consumption lifestyles of Egypt’s upper-middle classes, both those residing in Cairo’s ‘global 
city,’ and abroad in Europe and the Gulf. They therefore developed an aspiration, or dream, 
distinct from their parents, to ‘make a difference to the world,’ to be part of an imagined global 
circulation of knowledge, goods, and people (Ferguson, 2006).  
 
I also described how the formation of these aspirations was gendered, as men faced increased 
pressure, and are given enhanced mobility, to chase their employment dreams, for example by 
moving to Cairo, or moving alone around the city. This is indeed exemplified in the focus in 
Saber’s interview on the son, rather than the daughter, of a garbage collector. It is the son who 
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is expected to secure the lifestyle of the family. Yet it is not only Egyptian men who develop 
‘mismatches’ between their high aspirations and ability to reach them. I highlighted at different 
points how women are also developing aspirations for high-status jobs, and also develop a 
mismatch in relation to their marital or lifestyle dreams. 
 
This mismatch represents a departure from the theory of class reproduction of Pierre Bourdieu, 
which rests on a correspondence between one’s ‘subjective expectations’ and their ‘objective 
probabilities.’ In contemporary lower-middle class Egypt, and perhaps far beyond this context, 
this correspondence is coming under threat. The fact that Saber was asked whether the son of 
a garbage collector could become a judge symbolises the contemporary breakdown of an 
Egyptian system of structured dispositions, for men at least. In the example discussed during 
the television interview, the son’s aspirations to become a judge developed out of increased 
access to university education. The aspirations of many ordinary Egyptians have been raised 
in recent years, at the very same time as corruption, structural unemployment, and political 
instability is rendering those aspirations harder to reach (Ghannam, 2002; Peterson, 2011). This 
mismatch is being replicated among diverse groups across the world, as a result of 
contemporary capitalist regimes not producing stable well-paid jobs, homes, and services, 
while at the same time increasing ordinary aspirations for a ‘good life’.  
 
The remainder of the thesis, and the three main empirical chapters, were concerned with the 
consequences of this situation of mismatch among young middle-class men in contemporary 
Egypt. In the Introduction, I set out three research questions: what happens when a mismatch 
between classed aspirations and chances develops within young lower-middle class men in 
Egypt? What constitutes their lived experience of middle-class immobility? And, how is the 
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stability of Egypt’s political-economic system maintained even when young middle-class 
Egyptian men are denied movement towards their classed, gendered, and aged dreams?  
 
In chapters 4, 5, and 6, by applying affect to the study of class immobility among young men, 
and utilising eleven months of ethnographic fieldwork, I demonstrated how the lives of young 
lower-middle class Egyptian men can be understood through their everyday attempts to hang 
on to a feeling of hope for future mobility. I argued that they survived their classed and aged 
immobility through repetitively interacting, even when they did not believe in it, with a 
discursive and material terrain of Egyptianised meritocracy that filled them with hope. This 
terrain was continuously extended by certain labour market industries and institutions that 
constituted part of Cairo’s ‘global city.’ I therefore demonstrated how Egypt’s capitalist-
authoritarian regime also survived in relation to these immobile young men, despite denying 
them access to respectable middle-class living, by continually providing them with a form of 
meritocratic hope. In the next section, I will work through the key contributions this argument 
makes to literatures theorising class, affect, and meritocracy in Egypt and beyond.  
 
Meritocracy and hope among Egypt’s ‘elusive middle-class’ 
 
By exploring the difficult emotional journeys of young men in Egypt attempting to reach their 
middle-class aspirations, I call on conventional sociological approaches to class, and class 
immobility specifically, to recognise its emotional dimensions. The empirical chapters showed 
how a sense of mobility among these young men towards their aspirations for independent 
adulthood, globalised middle class-ness, and respectable masculinity was experienced through 
the presence of a feeling of hope: hope being defined as the feeling that arises out of the sense 
that one is headed towards the “scene of desire” (Berlant, 2011: 24). Returning to the language 
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of Bourdieu, when a seeming congruence between classed desires, and chances of reaching 
them existed, this was felt as hope. Conversely, in situations of mismatch between aspirations 
and chances which produce class, aged, and gendered immobility, hope might be lost. 
Throughout the empirical chapters I demonstrated how experiences which reminded these 
young men of their immobility, such as a job rejection, or a prolonged period spent in an 
undesirable, or undignified job, were felt through the emergence of frustration, anger, fear, and 
confusion in place of hope.  
 
However, describing that young men who materially stand still in relation to their aspirations 
experience frustration, boredom, or fear, is not enough. By following my participants, I wanted 
to reveal how waithood as a prolonged condition is experienced as an oscillating emotional 
journey between hope and frustration. In Chapter 4, I showed how the dominant economic 
system that produces ‘waithood’ also peddles hope. Certain labour market industries and 
institutions, that in Cairo form part of a ‘global city’ – such as recruitment companies, training 
organisations, and entrepreneurship organisations – generate and extend a material and 
discursive terrain of ‘meritocracy.’ These industries and institutions incorporated international 
development organisations, the Egyptian government, and the internationalised private sector, 
and they were staffed overwhelmingly by members of Egypt’s upper-middle classes, as well 
as foreigners. I argued that this generation represented a new ‘rule of experts’ in contemporary 
Egypt (Mitchell, 2002), namely an advertised attempt to construct a ‘modern,’ transparent 
labour market that rewards individual merit – hard work, acquiring skills, and building a 
network – and destroy ‘backwards’ recruitment practices that reward family connections, and 
discriminate against people based on where they are from.  
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This shift reflects similar shifts in other contexts towards ensuring that employment outcomes 
are ‘meritocratic,’ and therefore ‘fair’ (Littler, 2013; Khan, 2012). As others have previously 
shown, I demonstrated how, rather than producing a level playing field, meritocracy provides 
a language that legitimises the privileged positions of Egypt’s upper-middle classes, by 
converting their inherited cultural, social, and economic capital – which were highlighted in 
Chapter 3 – into acquirable, individual character traits, qualifications, skills, and networks 
(Khan, 2012). Even though class prejudice continued beneath the surface, and in some places 
in public as Saber’s comments show, it is becoming less admissible openly in upper-middle 
class Egypt in place of an emphasis on deserved success. It renders privilege illegitimate, and 
shameful. But current literature on meritocracy concentrates on how it legitimises privilege, 
and also legitimises blame on an ‘undeserving poor’ (Wacquant, 2009). I wanted to move 
beyond this, to show how it has important ‘affects’ on those pursuing social mobility.91 
Meritocracy possesses a hopeful quality. It affects people who are chasing social mobility with 
hope, as they encounter employment fairs, training centres, and entrepreneurship events that 
generate hopeful ‘atmospheres’ (Anderson, 2009).  
 
In making this argument, the research moves beyond much current literature on class 
immobility. It is seen by many as a condition which holds within it revolutionary possibilities 
(Bourdieu, 2000; Harvey, 2002; Hochschild, 2016; Hage, 2003). Indeed, my interlocutors – 
immobile young middle-class men – were seen as some of the main protagonists of Egypt’s 
2011 Uprising (Bayat, 2011). But, in following them around the city of Cairo, I uncovered an 
alternative cartography of hope, in shopping malls, employment fairs, and entrepreneurship 
events, far removed from the revolutionary places of squares and streets. I thus revealed how 
                                                          
91 By revealing this process as it is exercised within certain labour market places of Cairo’s ‘global city,’ I also 
criticised existing literature on ‘global’ or ‘world-class’ cities, which overwhelmingly views them as material 
and discursive places that exclude (and displace) wider urban populations. I showed that they also extend 
discourses and produce material landscapes of hope and inclusion (Ghertner, 2015). 
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capitalist regimes that deny people prospective mobility can maintain a precarious form of 
stability, through providing the experience of the possibility of mobility. 
 
I made this argument by utilising the theorisations of affect, which reintroduces a transpersonal 
focus to the study of emotion. I want to posit therefore that affect can add much to our 
understandings of the way power is exercised. Previous ethnographic literature on populations 
experiencing waithood has uncovered how people maintain hope through mundane practices 
(Mains, 2012; Pedersen, 2012; Elliot, 2015; Jansen, 2015). But, this literature can possess a 
celebratory tone. By switching focus to the objects, places, and discourses which affect people 
with hope, I was able to examine how people are made to hope. I posited this as a form of 
power, exercised by labour market institutions, on groups experiencing prolonged waithood. It 
is distinct from Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic power that rests on securing a congruence 
between people’s classed aspirations, and their classed positions. Securing this congruence 
does not work in socio-economic systems which produce mismatches between where people 
are situated, and where they want to be. In this case, an alternative form of power is 
operationalised through attaching people to the meritocratic idea that future social mobility is 
possible through hard work. In other words, people are encouraged to be eternally future-
orientated, hopeful subjects.  
 
But in Chapters 5 and 6 I showed how this ‘affective’ form of power develops over time. This 
represents an important development to existing affect theory, which often remains temporally 
static. It does not examine enough the oscillating ‘affect’ of certain objects, places, and 
discourses, namely how their affect changes over time. Thus, these young men were not 
incessantly hopeful. They became angry, fearful, and confused when they experienced an 
encounter which reminded them of their continued stagnation. By following these young men 
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over many months, I revealed the diverse practices through which people who live prolonged 
‘waithood’ and precarious situations cope. But this research is distinct from previous literature, 
because my interlocutors were more ‘ordinary.’ They were extremely active, constantly 
searching for jobs, trying to develop themselves, and plan their entrepreneurial projects. They 
were not ‘inactive.’ They also engaged in practices which distracted their minds, and practices 
which reintroduced a sense of forward momentum towards a better future. Yet, this relied on 
an injurious meritocratic moral economy that rested on continual self-blame. Chapter 5 
therefore revealed something about how workers in various contexts who dream of better jobs 
cope with their prolonged immobility. They cope by making and remaking plans for the future, 
plans which rest on a sanctified notion of individual power. They cope through sustaining a 
discursive terrain that legitimises their failure.  
 
Chapter 6 revealed how this is continues, even when belief in the possibility wains. It revealed 
the subject’s need for hope, which in the lives of these young Egyptian men, could only be 
sustained through returning to meritocratic narratives. This account also made an important 
contribution to affect theory, which emphasises the linear ‘affect’ of objects on subjects. 
Subjects though can play a vital role in this process, because of an intrinsic need for ‘hope’. In 
Chapter 6 I also complicated the affective form of power introduced in Chapter 4. In Chapter 
4, young men were being affected with a hope that rested on conviction. But as they became 
more disillusioned through continued stagnation, they kept returning not because of active 
belief in the narratives of meritocratic progress, but through continued attachment to the feeling 
of hope they had previously induced. This reveals something important about the workings of 
power. I argued that this was compliance at work, rather than consent, due to a lack of belief. 
But it worked through emotion. Meritocracy, I argue, sustains its power and allure through its 
eternally hopeful quality.  
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Overall in this thesis, by examining the contemporary experience of class immobility through 
the lens of affect I have shown how waithood is survived through perpetually re-encountering 
a hopeful discursive and material terrain of meritocracy. My interlocutors constituted members 
of an elusive Egyptian middle-class. For this population, the country is producing a 
simultaneous expansion of possibilities, alongside the destruction of the foundations that 
enable them to be reached. This is a situation which is being replicated in other contexts around 
the world, and it is producing much anger. Yet a notion of meritocracy, which has also 
proliferated in Egypt in recent years, alongside the constant threat of state-violence, is enabling 
the maintenance of a precarious form of stability for the current capitalist-authoritarian regime. 
This is because meritocracy possesses a hopeful quality, it offers up the elusive good life to all 
those who work hard for it, no matter where they come from. Meritocracy keeps people 
attached, emotionally, to the possibility of future mobility and success, and removes the anger 
that emerges from present hardship. It is paramount to locate and render visible the places, 
discourses, and objects which are affecting people with, and selling, a false sense of hope for 
the future in different contexts. However, in this task, one must recognise that people who are 
being denied access to a dignified life for real, like these young Egyptian men, rely on this hope 
in their daily lives. As much as Egypt’s regime might be surviving on hope, ordinary people 
are also surviving on the meritocratic hope that their lives will get better. Cruelly, this is the 
same atomised hope that sustains the regime which produces their difficult lives.  
 
Looking to the future 
 
I want to finish by posing some questions which have emerged out of this thesis for future 
research. First, the thesis examined a very particular life stage of these young men, in which 
they were afforded the possibility of hanging on to original hopes. It will be important to 
understand what happens as they transition to their late-20s and early-30s, and face mounting 
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pressure to marry. Will they adapt their expectations? Will they continue to find ways to 
reproduce hope? Will they become permanently ‘depressed’? Will they find some sense of 
mobility? Lauren Berlant (2016), in an attempt to describe an affective state beyond her notion 
of cruel optimism, recently introduced a notion of dissociation, that defines a state of “being in 
life without wanting the world.” This is a state – materially signified by the bodily “shrug” – 
in which people let go of the normative aspirational markers of the future they have been 
chasing, in favour of life in the durative present. It is a subjectivity shaped on one side by 
“suicide,” and on the other by a “life drive that is also, paradoxically, negative, in that it turns 
toward life by turning away from the world of injury, negation, and contingency that endure as 
a defining presence for biopolitical subjects.”  Though I witnessed periods of disengagement 
like this, most notably in the case of Mahmoud, they were interrupted by the necessary 
reengagement in normative pursuits. For most of these young men, the transformation will not 
be so stark. They will marry, and therefore will be able to construct some semblance of a 
respectable life expected from them as men. Indeed many are already shifting their attention, 
after parental pressure, towards marriage. Yet, many will carry with them the injuries sustained 
in their stunted pursuit. 
 
As I finish this thesis at the beginning of 2018, Mahmoud is in Dubai. Over the last year he 
held a job in a Lebanese import company, achieving an ‘amazing’ promotion, before being told 
two weeks later the company would be forced to close due to Egypt’s foreign currency 
shortages. This latest shock instigated a risky decision to travel to Dubai without a job offer in 
the hope he might secure better employment. He did this in part to speed up his marriage 
preparations with the woman he was seeing (Chapter 6). He is now working in a call centre 
handling taxi requests, and living in a dorm with seven other young Egyptians. Mahmoud tells 
me how he regrets his decision to travel. In October, his fiancé-to-be decided she could not 
 305 
 
wait any longer for marriage, and left him. Mahmoud is 29 now, and, even though he has 
migrated, feels no closer to marriage or respectability. He still feels trapped.  
 
Ibrahim was working in his job in a local company near his village when he got accepted to a 
job in Saudi Arabia. After preparing to travel, and leaving his job, the salary offered to him 
was suddenly decreased dramatically. He decided not to accept, and is therefore unemployed 
again. Gamal obtained a junior job in a law firm in Saudi Arabia, which was not the place to 
which he had originally wanted to travel. Like Mahmoud, he is extremely lonely, and is worried 
about becoming stuck – he still dreams of coming to London. However, having recently 
returned to Egypt for a family visit, he realises the financial and social mobility he has 
experienced. After talking for so long about finding a European wife, he is about to get engaged 
to a cousin in Cairo. Eslam is now working in a mobile phone shop in Cairo, living in a similar 
flat to the one described in Chapter 5. He still hopes to obtain a better job, but is now also 
engaged. Adel returned to Zagazig with his family and worked in a local accountancy office, 
not unlike the one he had originally left in order to come to Cairo. When I spoke to him a few 
months ago he was less hopeful of finding better because the economy is becoming worse. 
However, in the last few days I have found out he has returned to Cairo again to rejoin the call 
centre. Finally, Mohammed also got an opportunity to move to Saudi Arabia. Having discussed 
with me the pros and cons of moving (he was scared about being lonely, and having to remain 
there for the rest of his life), he is now working there and making preparations for marriage.  
 
For many of these young men, after years of hard work, they remain trapped in a state of 
incompleteness and ‘stuckedness.’ However, others have found a semblance of mobility, 
though their lives remain scattered by blockages. For one man the story is notably different. 
Mostafa continued working for a while in his “temporary” job in Cairo, while applying to the 
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Chevening scholarship. During this time, he began doing a language exchange with a Dutch 
friend of mine. Through a series of referrals, this brought him into contact with a Dutch woman. 
They conducted an intensive language exchange over a period of several months, and fell in 
love. In July 2017 Mostafa proposed, and was duly accepted. At the same time, Mostafa began 
taking on private clients from his work in advising Saudi investors. When the company found 
out, he was fired, only to be rehired because of his success rate in the job. He negotiated 
continued access to private clients. Mostafa has therefore enjoyed a drastic change to his life 
trajectory. This was in large part enabled through my research activities. He now plans to move 
to the Netherlands after marriage, though he wants to do it alone rather than with his wife to-
be’s help out of pride. Although it seems like he is enjoying material class mobility, many 
obstacles remain for Mostafa owing to his precarious socio-economic position. Life in Europe 
may prove to bring a series of difficulties. He was recently denied a tourist visa to visit because 
there was insufficient proof that he would return. If he reaches a semblance of a ‘good life,’ 
what does this mean for this research? Is he an exception? Will Mostafa then perhaps be used 
as an example to prove that success is possible? 
 
These stories provide a blueprint for further research. It will be important to examine the 
continued efforts of these young men to sustain mobility in a world which continues to present 
encounters with immobilities. Specifically, I would want examine how the experience of 
migration – particularly to the Gulf, which is an ambivalent place in the minds of young 
Egyptians, impacts upon the pursuit of existential mobility. Furthermore, though I have 
attempted discuss the gendered aspects of the pursuits of these young men, research must 
examine how young women experience this ‘tormented pursuit’ of a good life. What forms of 
hope do they rely on, and how do they navigate hopes deferred?  
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The thesis has examined how young men navigate precarious labour markets which induce 
prolonged waithood. The focus on their everyday practice throws up some important questions 
that could be explored further. First, the research highlighted the role of continually making 
and remaking plans as a way of surviving a precarious present. Plan-making provides a way of 
connecting the present and future, and managing the future’s inherent uncertainty. Yet, plans 
often fail, and must be restarted. How does this process unfold over time? It involves taking 
hold of certain objects, a laptop, a business card, a marketing textbook in a practice of curation. 
Adopting the approaches of new materialism, it would be interesting to examine how these 
objects come to embody certain agencies. The thesis also threw up important questions about 
how the body is used to perform an aspirational identity. Performances such as wearing trendy 
clothing, perfecting one’s English accent, or conducting oneself in a ‘classy’ way provide the 
sense that one is moving towards mobility. Yet, as Chapter 3 demonstrated, this can cause a 
split between body and mind which can be rendered visible by those who patrol access to 
desirable employment. Finally, the thesis has opened up important conceptual questions 
regarding affect, and hegemony and power. I have begun to examine the relations which 
determine the changing ‘affect’ of particular objects, highlighting the role of time and 
subjective need in this process. But affect theory needs to do much more to determine the 
ambivalence and oscillation that encompasses the relation between subject and object. Building 
on this, the thesis also examined one situation in which the exercise of power works through 
affect. I argued that this is not hegemonic, due to the presence of critique, but these young men 
were complying with a meritocratic system that harms them because of an affective attachment. 
I hope this provides a blueprint for further exploration of how power is exercised affectively.  
 
To end, I want to briefly discuss the potential for radical change arising out of the condition of 
hopeful survival I have described. Contemporay capitalist regimes encourage the aspiration of 
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all, while not allowing more and more to fulfil those aspirations – both because capitalism 
relies on perpetual movement and growth, but also because of the widespread denial of access 
to movement towards a dignified life. This continues to ensure the production of anger, as 
people momentarily realise that their expectations are impossible to reach. It is this anger than 
can imminently by channelled towards creating something different.92  
 
However, what that something different can and will be remains an open question. The 
direction that this anger takes is a highly contested, contingent process. As Talal Asad (2015) 
states, this subjectivisation of morality makes it very difficult to develop a moral language to 
collectively criticise structural problems. However, there are countless occasions when this 
meritocratic myth is penetrated, and when anger is instead directed outwards. Yet, we have 
seen in recent years how this anger can head towards dangerous ends (Hochschild, 2016; Hage, 
2003). In the West there is a general trend of anger being directed in racialized, classed, and 
gendered ways towards outsiders, “scroungers,” and even the “liberal elites” who call for more 
openness, and who succeed within the system. The discursive terrain of meritocracy plays an 
important, yet unrecognised role in this phenomenon, creating the language which allows it to 
thrive. Because people are invested in the belief that hard work secures success – and they 
perceive they are doing that – they become angry at people who appear to circumvent that 
through government help. All the while, the rich are able to sustain their privilege quietly, under 
the radar, through the veil that they have earned it without the need for help. Indeed, this 
deflection is orchestrated and exploited by those who benefit. The task therefore is to redirect 
people’s anger towards the systems which keep wealth and power in the hands of a few, and 
away from other “victims” of these systems.  
                                                          
92 Bourdieu stated that the “falling out of line” of aspirations and chances can “leave a margin of freedom for 
political action aimed at reopening the space of possibles” (2000; 234). 
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Amongst my interlocutors, I heard outbursts of anger against the continued prevalence of wasta 
or class prejudice in recruitment, against the terrible state of the economy, the corruption of 
elites who become rich through selling illegal products or stealing land, poor industrial 
planning, the dilapidated state of public education, and even in more racialized ways against 
Israeli collusion in Egypt’s economy. There is though potential in these narratives for change. 
However, there are many dangers as well. Thus, these complaints, as I heard many times, might 
not be listened to by elites who are invested in discourses of meritocracy, and thus perceive 
them as excuses for personal failures. Complaints about public education are used to justify 
further privatisation – I even heard from some young men that those who could were justified 
in sending their children to private schools to avoid state education, which does not recognise 
that a hierarchical education system is part of the problem. Finally, complaints about wasta or 
prejudice can be utilised to in fact further entrench meritocratic discourses, through making 
recruitment fairer and more open.  
 
Much deeper questions need to be asked in Egypt, and beyond, about who is able to secure 
success, to acquire the right skills, talents, qualifications, and connections, to find funding for 
entrepreneurship projects, or to obtain prestigious scholarships. Actions need to be taken to 
close the gap between what people aspire after, and what they are able to get. There are two 
ways of doing this, to promise less, or deliver more. For young men like Adel, or Mahmoud, 
the inequalities in access to education in a system that is becoming ever more stratified need to 
be addressed, and the number of dignified white-collar jobs needs to be raised. Yet, in general 
terms, this is a difficult debate in a labour market which is hierarchical. Thus, it is a noble (but 
impossible) goal to ensure that labour market success does not go to those with the most money 
in a social structure that is so unequal. However, there are more fundamental questions to 
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address. If everyone aspires to be a lawyer, many will be disappointed, even if there is a level 
playing field. Does that mean aspirations need to be limited? Should the goal be to realise a 
society where everyone is able to lead a dignified life, and to create the “objective chances” 
through which people can move towards self-realisation? It would be a good start to ensure all 
have access to a secure life, a job, an income, and a home. Yet so many crave more than that. 
Where then is the space to problematize the capitalised, classed, gendered, aged, racialized, 
heteronormative nature of individual dreams? Is it progressive to then redefine how success is 
measured? Would it be progressive for young men like Mahmoud or Ibrahim to redefine what 
it means to be successful adults, men, and members of the middle-class? These questions 
require much further discussion, but out of this research it is clear that a society in which so 
few make money off the back of the unfulfilled hopes of so many is unsustainable.  
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Appendix 
 
Table of key research participants 
 
Name Age (Jan 2018) Education Occupation(s)  Residence 
Mahmoud 29 Faculty of 
Commerce 
(Arabic), Helwan 
University (2009) 
-Accountant 
(student dorm) 
-Bank Teller 
-Call centre agent 
(mobile phones) 
-Kebab salesperson 
-Taxi customer 
service rep (Abu 
Dhabi) 
-Sales rep (mobile 
phones) 
-Data entry 
(electrical 
appliances) 
-Secretary 
(imports) 
-Taxi customer 
service rep (Dubai) 
Faysal, Cairo 
Ibrahim 28 Faculty of 
Commerce 
(Arabic), Zagazig 
University (2012) 
-Call centre agent 
(mobile phones) 
(Cairo) 
-Customer Service 
rep (mobile 
phones) (Cairo) 
-Office assistant, 
10th of Ramadan 
Kafr al-
Ghunaymi, 
Sharqia 
governorate 
Adel 26 Faculty of 
Commerce 
(Arabic), Zagazig 
University (2014) 
-Accountant (local 
tax office) 
(Zagazig) 
-Call centre agent 
(mobile phones) 
(Cairo) 
-Accountant (local 
tax office) 
(Zagazig) 
-Call centre agent 
(mobile phones) 
(Cairo) 
Zagazig, 
Sharqia 
governorate 
Eslam  26 Faculty of 
Humanities 
(Arabic), Sohag 
University (2014) 
-Football player 
(Sohag) 
-Call centre agent 
(mobile phones) 
(Cairo) 
-Customer service 
rep (mobile 
phones) (Cairo) 
Sohag, Sohag 
governorate 
Gamal 28 Faculty of Law 
(Arabic), Cairo 
University (2012) 
-Clothing salesman 
-Legal assistant 
(unpaid) 
Ezbet el-Nakhl, 
Greater Cairo 
 343 
 
-Master’s in 
International 
Business Law, 
Cairo University 
(2015) 
-Legal assistant 
(unpaid) 
-Legal advisor 
(unpaid) 
-Self-employed 
family lawyer 
-Legal councillor 
abroad (Saudi 
Arabia) 
Mostafa 26 Faculty of 
Commerce 
(Arabic), 
Mansoura 
University (2013) 
-Call centre agent 
(mobile phones) 
(Cairo) 
-Call centre agent – 
investments (Cairo) 
Mahalla, 
Gharbia 
governorate 
Mohammed 26 Faculty of 
Commerce 
(Arabic), Tanta 
University (2014) 
-Tyre salesman 
(Zefta) 
-Call centre agent 
(mobile phones) 
(Cairo) 
-Sales (Saudi 
Arabia) 
Zefta, Gharbia 
governorate  
Saami 30 Faculty of 
Translation, Al 
Azhar University 
(2009) 
Master’s in 
Applied 
Linguistics 
International 
Islamic University 
Malaysia (2018)  
-Call centre agent 
(mobile phones) 
(Cairo) 
-English-Arabic 
translation (Cairo) 
Abu Numrus, 
Greater Cairo 
Mohamed 30 Faculty of 
Engineering, 
Mansoura 
University (2010) 
-Computer sales 
start-up (Cairo) 
-Call centre agent 
(mobile phones) 
(Cairo) 
Shubra el-
Kheima, 
Greater Cairo 
Hisham 28 Faculty of 
Humanities 
(Arabic), Helwan 
University (2012) 
-Tour guide (Cairo) Helwan, 
Greater Cairo 
Abanoub 28 Faculty of 
Humanities 
(Arabic), Helwan 
University (2012) 
-Call centre agent 
(internet) (Cairo) 
-Call centre agent 
(internet) (Dubai) 
Maasara, Cairo 
Hani 27 Faculty of 
Commerce 
(Arabic), Cairo 
University (2016) 
-Call centre agent 
(mobile phones) 
(Cairo) 
-Outdoor sales 
(Cairo) 
Haram, Cairo 
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Hashem 26 Faculty of 
Commerce 
(Arabic), Cairo 
University (2014) 
-Call centre agent 
(mobile phones) 
(Cairo) 
-Customer service 
rep (mobile 
phones) (Cairo 
-Customer service 
rep – outsourced 
banking (Cairo) 
Downtown, 
Cairo 
 
